Case Studies of Multi-Sectoral Resilience to Natural Disasters

August 2022

Case Studies of Multi-Sectoral Resilience to Natural Disasters TABLE OF CONTENTS | i

Table of Contents

Executive Summary ... 1

Key Lessons Learned ... 1 Insights and Recommendations ... 4

CHAPTER 1: Introduction ... 8

Background and Goal of Conducting Case Studies ... 8 Intended Audience ... 8 Overview of Sources Consulted ... 9 How the Report is Organized ... 9

CHAPTER 2: Overview of Events ... 11

February 2021 Winter Storm Uri in Texas ... 12 November 2018 Wildfires in Southern California ... 32 October 2018 Hurricane Michael in Florida ... 38 December 2017 Wildfires and Mudslides in Southern California ... 41 October 2017 Wildfires in Northern California ... 46 September 2017 Hurricane Irma in Florida ... 48 August 2017 Hurricane Harvey in Texas ... 53

CHAPTER 3: Original 2019 Report: Summary of Impacts and Resilience ... 58

Energy Supply ... 58 Backup Generation ... 72 Mobility and Transportation ... 76 Water and Wastewater Services ... 78 Telecommunications ... 82

CHAPTER 4: Post-Event Resilience—2022 Update ... 86

End User Resilience ... 86 Legislative and Utility Responses ... 95 Resilience Measures in Subsequent Events ... 100 Federal Support after Hurricanes Michael, Irma, and Harvey ... 104 Conclusions ... 105

CHAPTER 5: Lessons Learned ... 107

Additional Research Needs to Better Understand and Improve Natural Gas Resilience ... 112

References ... 115

Case Studies of Multi-Sectoral Resilience to Natural Disasters TABLE OF CONTENTS | ii

APPENDIX A: Research Methods and Sources Consulted in Developing

Case Studies ... 129

Desk Review ... 129 CPUC En Banc ... 130 One-on-One Interviews ... 130 Social Listening ... 132

APPENDIX B: GHG Impacts from Forest Fires in 2017 and 2018 in California ... 137

APPENDIX C: Criteria Air Pollutant Emissions from Forest Fires in 2017

and 2018 in California ... 140

APPENDIX D: Best Practices in Wildfire Risk Reduction ... 143

APPENDIX E: Renewable Natural Gas Potential from Gasifying Deceased

Trees in California Forests ... 146

Executive Summary

The Southern California Gas Company (SoCalGas) developed this study to better understand how recent natural disasters have impacted natural gas and other key sectors, how these sectors remained resilient in the face of such disasters, and how natural gas utilities can better prepare for future events. The study team developed case studies for the following natural disasters: Hurricane Harvey in Texas, Hurricanes Irma and Michael in Florida, the October 2017 wildfires in northern California, the December 2017 wildfires and subsequent mudslides in southern California, the November 2018 wildfires in southern California, and the February 2021 Winter Storm Uri in Texas. These case studies are meant to help inform planning efforts at SoCalGas for increasing resilience to climate stressors. The case studies are also designed to be of value to other utilities, municipalities, and communities that are undertaking similar resilience and hazard mitigation planning efforts. The Key Lessons Learned presented below highlight the findings of these case studies, focusing on the impacts to natural gas infrastructure and the role of natural gas in supporting resilience.

In the following summary table and narrative of key lessons learned, we use icons to note to which hazard(s) and sector(s) the lesson is relevant.

Hazards:

Sectors:

Wildfires

Clear communication and coordination between utilities across sectors and with emergency personnel is critical to a successful disaster response

Natural Gas

Hurricanes

People

Multiple

Hazard(s)

Case Studies of Multi-Sectoral Resilience to Natural Disasters EXECUTIVE SUMMARY |

Key Lesson Hazard(s) Sector(s)

Natural gas contributed to resilience during emergencies

Natural gas supply is significantly more reliable than electricity

Technology supported the resilience of natural gas

Safety investments in gas infrastructure are also providing resilience benefits

Diversity in fuel supplies improve resilience

The increasing focus on resilience and availability of backup generation may worsen air quality

Inadequate consumer knowledge can affect safety and limit the ability to reap the benefits of the resilience of natural gas

Marginalized communities suffered disproportionately

Natural gas infrastructure and services were relatively resilient to hurricanes,

wildfires, mudslides, and the winter storm. Most natural gas infrastructure is

belowground, which is inherently less vulnerable to natural disasters than aboveground infrastructure. The greatest observed impact to natural gas infrastructure was due to intensive scouring of creeks during flood events, uprooted trees during hurricanes, and large boulders carried by mudslides.

Natural gas’ interdependence on other sectors is a greater point of weakness than the natural gas infrastructure itself. This is illustrated by the inability to export gas supply when ports are closed in a hurricane or when downed electric infrastructure reduces the demand for natural gas used in electricity generation.

Clear communication and coordination between utilities across sectors and with emergency personnel is critical to a successful disaster response. Utilities cannot operate in siloes and they must recognize their interdependencies—particularly to address any weak points as mentioned above. Access to infrastructure must be carefully coordinated when conditions are unsafe, and natural gas, electric and telecommunication utilities must communicate the locations of their assets and potential risks to avoid further damage during response activities. Organizations such as the California Utilities Emergency Association (CUEA), in which points of contact for all utilities are brought together and facilitated by expert responders, are an excellent example of how organized, institutionalized coordination can streamline responses and minimize damage while maximizing efficiency.

The greatest impact to natural gas provision during the wildfires came from the utilities’ need to selectively isolate service by turning off the supply to targeted areas affected by fire. Reductions in natural gas supply during the wildfires were primarily caused by the utilities’ efforts to selectively isolate service (turn off the supply

Case Studies of Multi-Sectoral Resilience to Natural Disasters EXECUTIVE SUMMARY |

to targeted areas affected by fire). Selective isolation, a protective measure that can be put in place quickly to avoid damages during wildfires, can also be time-consuming and expensive to reverse while impacting customers without service in the interim. Increasing the number of valves to further enhance isolation can create more potential leak points on the system, so tradeoffs must be evaluated.

Natural gas contributed to resilience during emergencies. Backup generation for electricity service disruptions is an important component of overall resilience from climate hazards. In most examples of backup generation explored in these case studies, facilities successfully maintained power because of such investments. In particular, natural gas provides a cleaner source of fuel for backup generators than diesel and can be more reliable than diesel in certain circumstances. Natural gas can be a reliable source of energy over long-term disruptions of electricity service (i.e., multiple days) where current battery capacity for renewable systems may not be adequate. Diesel fuel supply can be interrupted by the very climate disasters that created the need for the use of generators. 1 Compressed natural gas (CNG) and liquefied natural gas (LNG)-fueled vehicles can help to maintain functionality, especially when access to other fuel sources is disrupted by climate hazards.

Natural gas supply is significantly more reliable than electricity. Two recent reports from the Natural Gas Council and Gas Technology Institute (GTI) found that characteristics of natural gas’s transmission and distribution infrastructure, such as greater storage capacity and underground assets, make natural gas a more reliable energy source than electricity. Only one in almost 800 gas customers experience service disruptions annually, whereas every electric customer will experience an outage annually. The economic impacts of disruptions to gas customers are insignificant when compared to those of electricity customers.

Technology supported the resilience of natural gas. SoCalGas improved resilience through technologies such as pressure sensors, which detect dramatic pressure drops and send signals to valves that immediately shut off flows for specific lines. SoCalGas’ use of drones and satellite imagery was also useful, providing visibility into areas inaccessible by personnel to closely assess damage. Satellite imagery was particularly helpful immediately following the event, when (FAA) restrictions prohibited flights from third parties to avoid conflict with first responders’ rescue efforts.

Safety investments in gas infrastructure are also providing resilience benefits. As utilities replace bare steel and cast-iron gas pipe to address infrastructure aging and safety issues, they also reduce the potential for water entry and disruption of gas service, making the systems more resilient. Also, the plastic pipe used for many of these replacements is more flexible and less likely to break when there is ground shifting due to water flow from hurricanes or seismic activity.

Diversity in fuel supplies improve resilience. Energy backup systems with diverse fuel supplies such as onsite diesel storage with bi-fuel connections that allow a switch to natural gas will provide greater flexibility and higher levels of resilience. Recovery after an event can also be better supported with more diverse vehicle fleets that include compress natural gas fueled vehicles in addition to petroleum fueled vehicles since

Ericson, S., and Olis, D. “A Comparison of Fuel Choice for Backup Generators.” National Renewable Energy Laboratory,

2019. https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy19osti/72509.pdf

|||Case Studies of Multi-Sectoral Resilience to Natural Disasters|||EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | 4| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |||storage and propane generation for backup supply. of nitrous oxides (NOx) to the environment.|using petroleum fuels, it is likely that this increasing adoption will have an adverse utmost importance that residents understand what power source are and are not available during power outages—and how to use them safely. Marginalized communities suffered disproportionately. The most marginalized|petroleum fuel supplies may be limited after an event. The PG&E remote microgrid program which improves reliability and significantly reduces wildfire risk by replacing the overhead distribution powerlines serving small groups of customers in High Fire-Threat Districts with microgrids, uses several resources including photovoltaic panels, battery The increasing focus on resilience and availability of backup generation may worsen air quality. As the number of extreme events continues to increase, more residents are installing backup generation in their homes. Since the majority of these generators still impact on air quality. During the October 2019 PSPS events, a CARB report identified that an estimated 1,800 stationary diesel generators contributed an additional 125 tons 2 backup generators used during the October 2019 PG&E PSPS event from diesel to natural gas would have reduced emissions by 70%, avoiding 88 tons of NOx pollution. Inadequate consumer knowledge can affect safety and limit the ability to reap the benefits of the resilience of natural gas. During Winter Storm Uri, many consumers were unaware that many gas stoves and fireplaces are capable of operating during a power outage, either by being lit with a match or by using a small 9-volt battery to power the electronics. Without such knowledge, some residents unnecessarily went without heat, hot water, or the ability to cook. On the flip side, some Texans suffered carbon monoxide poisoning when they ran outdoor generators indoors. Thus, it is of the communities with the poorest ability to withstand and recover from events (e.g., live in|Converting the estimated 1,800 stationary 3| |2 3 4 5|increasing resilience to climate events. System Modifications affect smaller populations. https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2020- ICF analysis of CARB data.|Insights and Recommendations 4 especially in geohazard areas such as fault lines. high cost and time intensity of restoring service post-isolation. 01/Emissions_Inventory_Generator_Demand%20Usage_During_Power_Outage_01_30_20.pdf Personal communication with PG&E. January 15-16, 2018. Personal communication with SoCalGas. January 22, 2018.|affected by proactive load shedding and delayed restoration, longer outages. Based on the above findings, the study team provided the following recommendations for Further sub-divide the system to minimize the extent of service isolation. PG&E is working to sub-divide their system so that when service isolation is necessary, it can be more targeted and 5 California Air Resources Board. (2020). “Emission Impact: Additional Generator Usage Associated with Power Outage.”|older homes with outdated infrastructure, have fewer financial resources, not have fluency in English, and/or depend on public transportation) are also often the communities most Similarly, SoCalGas is considering increasing the frequency of valves, This is a particularly useful strategy in light of the||

Case Studies of Multi-Sectoral Resilience to Natural Disasters EXECUTIVE SUMMARY |

Increase use of technology and smart grids. Modernizing systems will require more communication and data. It is useful for cities to monitor gas consumption in order to know where disruptions occur. 6 SoCalGas is deploying fiber optics sensing technologies through debris flow areas above its pipelines. This technology will enable monitoring of outside force threats and identify any leaks in these vulnerable areas to facilitate swift and targeted responses.

Make weatherization a requirement for power plants and critical natural gas facilities. FERC recommendations on weatherization for power plants in Texas were advisory. Texas implemented these recommendations with Senate Bill 3 and as of 2022, 98% of power plants were properly winterized. Only natural gas facilities deemed “critical” are required to winterize equipment. To ensure adequate supply of natural gas, winterize wellheads, install backup power at compressor stations, and ensure that underground storage facilities maintain a minimum supply (e.g., based on withdrawal during Winter Storm Uri).

Examine adding more regional interconnections to the Texas grid to compensate for future power production shortfalls. Cities in Texas outside of ERCOT’s jurisdiction suffered few power outages during Winter Storm Uri because they were connected to other grids.

Backup generation mandates should allow for natural gas as a fuel source. Mandates for backup generation for critical facilities such as nursing homes have sought to ensure the continuity of electric supply after an extreme event as well as the duration of that supply, often by mandating minimum onsite fuel storage. Given the proven resilience of natural gas to extreme events, including gas as fuel supply option can help build the resilience of a greater number of critical facilities by addressing such issues as available space for fuel tanks and the uncertainty of obtaining fuel after an event.

Coordination and Communication

Expand services and outreach to first responders. Interviewees expressed a desire to increase use of natural gas during emergency operations based on reliability of supply, air quality benefits, and the potential for utilizing low-carbon fuels through renewable natural gas (RNG). Some specific ideas include:

Ÿ SoCalGas could enhance efforts to coordinate and supply emergency responders through investments in mobile supply infrastructure and outreach with emergency responders. Mobile infrastructure could include mobile gas compressors or fuel storage tanks, tube trailers, and other technologies to support emergency vehicles and generators during events. Ÿ Utilities could center outreach efforts on educating emergency responders about best practices for using natural gas supply lines in the field. Additionally, natural gas utilities must communicate to other utilities and response organizations where their infrastructure is located and what sort of risk it faces, all of which is key information for responses such as digging in the aftermath of mudslides or for assessing damage to infrastructure. For example, during the California wildfires, gas utilities were able to work with emergency managers to proactively isolate at-risk areas, therefore preventing damage both to and from natural gas infrastructure. After events, restoring services requires close coordination with emergency responders regulating access.

Enhance cross-training exercises with emergency response personnel. The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) and the California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (CalOES) have a

Ibid.

memorandum of understanding (MOU) to facilitate gas utility and fire service emergency response collaborations in which the two groups of organizations undergo cross-training on how to address, secure, and suppress gas fires at both residential and commercial locations. California Utilities Emergency Association (CUEA) asserts that this is the most aggressive preparation program of this 7 type in any state and provides a model for other states as a result. However, there should also be more cross-training beyond the fire service: utilities must work with public service agencies to preplan, and to involve law enforcement officials and state DOTs to know how their requirements and procedures will play into utility emergency response protocols. Such interdisciplinary collaboration 8 and preparation will allow for a more coordinated and informed response.

Mutual assistance agreements between utilities are critical to disaster response but can be strengthened further. In times of emergency, mutual assistance agreements were effective complements to the limited standby utility resources (e.g., backup generators) and staff (e.g., qualified technicians) utilities can maintain. There are only so many units, such as backup generators, that utilities can maintain in their inventory on standby. The same goes for qualified technicians; there are limitations to the size of utilities’ labor forces. Mutual assistance agreements and coordination through bodies such as the CUEA allow for the pooling of resources when necessary and for the swelling of the labor force in specific areas in need; for example, the CUEA 9 was able to send extra technicians to PG&E from unaffected utilities during the October wildfires. However, these mutual assistance agreements could be further strengthened to increase responsiveness, proactively address challenges (e.g., transportation and telecommunication service disruptions), and provide a larger array of assets during emergency events.

Plan for potential scenarios that could impact natural gas pipelines. The case studies show that natural disasters have the potential to impact natural gas pipelines. Other studies investigating additional hazards, such as a 2013 Sandia National Laboratories study on a major earthquake scenario in southern California, have drawn similar conclusions. In order to build resilience to these events, utilities can develop plans centered around potential impacts, possibly using models to estimate such impacts.

Educate consumers to better understand the capabilities of their appliances. In Winter Storm Uri, many consumers were unaware that their gas ranges and fireplaces may have been operable during power outages by using manual ignition with a match. Also, some units require that small backup batteries be maintained and changed periodically to provide functionality during power outages, but many consumers did not know this.

Planning and Operations

Develop longer-term plans to build resilience. Cities and counties across Texas are working towards establishing goals and strategies to increase their resilience to extreme weather and storms. For example, the City of Austin Strategic Direction 2023 and Travis County Vision, Mission, and Goals establish pathways to address inequities, foster community engagement, expand 10 preparedness programs, and increase staffing to handle emergency operations.

7 Personal communication with SoCalGas. January 22, 2018. 8 Ibid.

Personal communication with SoCalGas. January 22, 2018. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid.

Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 City of Austin and Travis County. “2021 Winter Storm Uri After-Action Review Findings Report.” 2021.

Ibid. 10 City of Austin and Travis County. “2021 Winter Storm Uri After-Action Review Findings Report.” 2021. https://www.austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/HSEM/2021-Winter-Storm-Uri-AAR-Findings-Report.pdf

Revise risk assessments to account for future climate change, including increasing frequency of 11 winter storms and heat waves.

Improve customer communication and warning systems, especially for non-English speaking households. In Winter Storm Uri, if warnings had been issued earlier, residents would have had 12 more time to prepare and what to expect.

Require carbon monoxide alarms in all homes. During Winter Storm Uri, more than 1,400 people went to emergency rooms or urgent care clinics for carbon monoxide poisoning due to the use of outdoor equipment (grills, smokers, propane heaters, generators) indoors for heating and electricity. Local governments in Texas have discretion to establish carbon monoxide rules. As a 13 result, many older or single-family homes do not have carbon monoxide alarms.

Improve equity in rolling blackouts and service restoration so that historically disadvantaged communities do not suffer longer losses of service. During Winter Storm Uri, 76% of African 14 Americans lost power compared to 66% of Anglos.

Supplemental Research: Natural Gas Resilience and Wildfires

The report appendices provide a deeper look at decreasing the vulnerability of landscapes to wildfire and of strengthening the system’s ability to withstand or recover from wildfire. This research provides a high-level estimate of impacts from greenhouse gas (GHG) and criteria air pollution emissions from the 2017-18 California wildfires (Appendices B and C). GHG emissions ranged from 250 to 700 MMTCO2e; a similar amount to California’s total non-wildfire GHG emissions in 2016 (430 MMTCO2e). Air quality impacts from particulate matter (PM) were roughly seven to ten times the total PM from all on-road mobile sources in the state in 2017-18. To mitigate these impacts, we examined best practices in forest management for wildfire prevention in Appendix D, and fuel reduction was found to be an effective management practice. In Appendix E, we examined the potential of using dead trees as feedstock for renewable gas production, which could utilize a latent resource created during fuel reduction if barriers to implementation are addressed.

Our supplemental research found that dead-tree removal for renewable gas generation offered significant benefits in wildfire resilience, and GHG emission and air pollution reduction. However, thermal gasification and dead-tree removal are currently lacking in investment and should be considered state-wide to realize these benefits.

11 Smith, Robert. “A Climate Black Swan: The Lessons Learned from Uri.” VettaFi, March 11, 2021. https://etfdb.com/esgchannel/climate-black-swan-lessons-learned-from-uri/ 12 Busby, Joshua W., Kyri Baker, Morgan D. Bazilian, Alex Q. Gilbert, Emily Grubert, Varun Rai, Joshua D. Rhodes, Sarang

12 Busby, Joshua W., Kyri Baker, Morgan D. Bazilian, Alex Q. Gilbert, Emily Grubert, Varun Rai, Joshua D. Rhodes, Sarang Shidore, Caitlin A. Smith, and Michael E. Webber. 2021. “Cascading Risks: Understanding the 2021 Winter Blackout in Texas.” Energy Research & Social Science, 77:102106. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2021.102106. 13 Trevizo, Peter, Ren Larson, Lexi Churchill, Mike Hixenbaugh, and Suzy Khimm. “Texas Winter Storm: Worst Carbon

Texas.” Energy Research & Social Science, 77:102106. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2021.102106. 13 Trevizo, Peter, Ren Larson, Lexi Churchill, Mike Hixenbaugh, and Suzy Khimm. “Texas Winter Storm: Worst Carbon Monoxide Poisoning Catastrophe in Recent U.S. History.” Deceleration News, April 29, 2021. https://deceleration.news/2021/04/29/texas-winter-storm-carbon-monoxide-poisoning/ 14 University of Houston. “Reliability and the Texas Power Grid in the Aftermath of Winter Storm Uri.” Houston: Hobby

https://deceleration.news/2021/04/29/texas-winter-storm-carbon-monoxide-poisoning/ 14 University of Houston. “Reliability and the Texas Power Grid in the Aftermath of Winter Storm Uri.” Houston: Hobby School of Public Affairs. 2021. https://uh.edu/uh-energy/research/forbes-blog/failure-of-texas-power-grid/content/tegsreport-6-24-2021.pdf

Case Studies of Multi-Sectoral Resilience to Natural Disasters CHAPTER 2 |

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Background and Goal of Conducting Case Studies

To inform SoCalGas’ planning for resilience to climate-related stressors, ICF developed case studies in 2019 to assess the lessons learned from natural disasters, starting with Hurricane Harvey in Texas; Hurricane Irma in Florida; the October 2017 wildfires in northern California; and the December 2017 wildfires and subsequent mudslides in southern California. This 2022 update to the report provides any new information from resilience lessons learned after the previous case studies and provides an analysis of Winter Storm Uri, which hit Texas in 2021.

For the 2022 update on resilience measures, the study team was particularly interested in discovering the actions taken to improve end-user resilience and examples of legislation proposed after the events. The research also focused on how resilience measures implemented in response to these disasters fared during subsequent events. While some measures were taken as a direct result of a specific natural disaster, others were the result of the compounded effect of seeing similar disasters in close succession.

Several resilience measures and community actions emerged as common themes among all case studies, often despite geographic differences. Thus, this report is meant to illustrate the breadth of possible resilience measures taken in the wake of disasters. Overall, findings indicate that installed microgrids, upgrades to electric grid infrastructure, alternative fuel vehicles, and dispatched generators were the most common successful resilience measures observed across all events. These measures allowed energy customers to gain access to power during power outages caused by the events, which helped residents maintain health and well-being and fueled response and recovery activities or safeguarded against further damage during the disaster.

These case studies do not offer a comprehensive post-disaster incident or damage report, nor do they prescribe actions that should have been taken. Instead, they illustrate observed vulnerabilities and resilience based on information available shortly after the disasters struck and distill from those observations key lessons learned and recommendations to inform future research and planning.

Intended Audience

These case studies are meant to help inform planning efforts at SoCalGas for increasing resilience to climate stressors. The case studies are also designed to be of value to other utilities, municipalities, and communities that are undertaking similar resilience and hazard mitigation planning efforts.

Case Studies of Multi-Sectoral Resilience to Natural Disasters CHAPTER 1 |

Overview of Sources Consulted

The document draws upon a diversity of sources to create a picture of the events and what can be learned from them, including: utility and Department of Energy (DOE) reports, news articles, social media postings, first-hand observations (obtained through interviews); and studies that examined similar events elsewhere. A fuller description of the sources consulted is provided in Appendix A.

How the Report is Organized

This report provides several case studies on impacts from and examples of resilience during natural disasters, as well as findings on resilience measures taken after these events.

Chapter 2 presents an overview of each of the events that are covered within this document, providing summary information about the date, location, and nature of the event as well as the utilities that service the affected area. This chapter also provides the full additional case study on Winter Storm Uri.

Chapter 3 provides research findings on impacts and resilience. These findings are divided by sector to provide insight into the ways that the natural disasters have impacted critical infrastructure sectors. In addition, there is also discussion of the compounding consequences, in which impacts to one sector cascade into impacting related, interdependent sectors. The sectors include:

Ÿ Energy Supply, focusing on transmission and distribution of electricity and natural gas; Ÿ Backup Generation, including its role in maintaining critical community infrastructure and responding to natural disasters; Ÿ Mobility and Transportation, which highlights the role of CNG and LNG; Ÿ Water and Wastewater Services; and Ÿ Telecommunications.

Note that while the research findings were grouped into these sectors, the previously mentioned interdependencies create continual overlaps between the sectors throughout the report. For example, the Backup Generation and Mobility and Transportation sections highlight impacts to energy supply during emergency operations.

Chapter 4 presents the 2022 findings on post-event resilience, including the success of existing resilience measures, measures implemented as a result of the events described in the case studies, and how such measures fared in later events.

Chapter 5 presents key takeaways from this research on impacts and resilience, including lessons learned and a list of additional research needs.

Appendix A contains details on the research methodology and sources used.

Appendices B-E include supporting research on related impacts and best management practices related to the climate induced extreme events discussed in this report, namely the 2017-18 California wildfires. These supplemental assessments identify opportunities, namely through dead tree removal and gasification, for natural gas utilities to contribute to wildfire management and impact mitigation.

Ÿ Appendix B: GHG Impacts from Forest Fires in 2017 and 2018 in California estimates the GHG emissions from combustion, or burning of forest biomass, and carbon sequestration losses to create a total estimate for GHG emissions from California’s 2017-18 wildfires.

– Key point: Net GHG emissions from California forest fires in 2017 and 2018 are estimated at a range of 250 to 700 MMTCO2e, comparable to California’s entire non-wildfire GHG 15 emissions in 2016 (430 MMTCO2e).

Ÿ Appendix C: Criteria Air Pollutant Emissions from Forest Fires in 2017 and 2018 in California estimates the total emissions of particulate matter (PM), carbon monoxide (CO), volatile organic 16 compounds (VOC), and nitrogen oxides (NOx) from the 2107 and 2018 California wildfires.

– Key point: Particulate matter emissions from 2017 and 2018 were roughly seven to ten times the total emissions of PM from all on-road mobile sources in the state in those same two years. Based on these estimates, wildfires should be considered amongst the greatest threats to air pollution in California.

Ÿ Appendix D: Best Practices in Wildfire Risk Reduction provides a brief overview of current state of knowledge and best practices in fuel treatment for wildfire risk mitigation, both in living forests and in areas of high tree mortality. – Key point: The science research of wildfire management indicates that fuel reduction is

– Key point: The science research of wildfire management indicates that fuel reduction is 17, 18 effective and can be used strategically to reduce risk in key areas, especially in 19 combination with management efforts for healthier forest structure.

Ÿ Appendix E: Renewable Natural Gas Potential from Gasifying Deceased Trees in California Forests provides a quantitative estimation of RNG production from gasification of deceased trees.

– Key point: California’s dead trees have the potential to produce 1.7 trillion cubic feet of Renewable Natural Gas through gasification, nearly double SoCalGas’ total gas demand in 20 21 2018 and 80% of California’s total natural gas consumption in 2017. While there is currently little infrastructure to support dead tree gasification, dead-tree gasification offers considerable benefits in wildfire resilience, renewable energy generation, and GHG emission and air pollution reduction.

19 Stephens, Scott L., et al. “Drought, tree mortality, and wildfire in forests adapted to frequent fire.” Bioscience 68.2 (2018): 77-88. https://www.fs.fed.us/psw/publications/fettig/psw_2018_fettig002_stephens.pdf. 20 California Gas and Electric Utilities. 2018. 2018 California Gas Report. Available at:

16 VOC reported as methane. 17 Stephens, Scott L., et al. “Drought, tree mortality, and wildfire in forests adapted to frequent fire.” Bioscience 68.2

(2018): 77-88. https://www.fs.fed.us/psw/publications/fettig/psw_2018_fettig002_stephens.pdf. 18 Martinson, Erik J., and Philip N. Omi. “Fuel treatments and fire severity: a meta-analysis.” Res. Pap. RMRS-RP-103WWW. Fort Collins, CO: US Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station. 38 p. 103 (2013), https://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs/rmrs_rp103.pdf. 19 Stephens, Scott L., et al. “Drought, tree mortality, and wildfire in forests adapted to frequent fire.” Bioscience 68.2

20 California Gas and Electric Utilities. 2018. 2018 California Gas Report. Available at: https://www.socalgas.com/regulatory/documents/cgr/2018_California_Gas_Report.pdf. 21 U.S. Energy Information Administration. 2019. Natural Gas Consumption by End Use. Available at:

https://www.socalgas.com/regulatory/documents/cgr/2018_California_Gas_Report.pdf. 21 U.S. Energy Information Administration. 2019. Natural Gas Consumption by End Use. Available at: https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/NG_CONS_SUM_A_EPG0_VC0_MMCF_A.htm.

CHAPTER 2

Overview of Events

This chapter provides a brief summary of each of the natural disasters covered in this report, organized by chronological order (Figure 1). Key information includes when the event occurred, standout features of the event, which areas were affected—including the coverage of FEMA disaster declarations—and power utilities serving the affected area. Chapter 3 provides a deeper discussion on how each event impacted key sectors and examples of resilience.

Figure 1. The seven events covered in this report include California wildfires and associated mudslides, Winter Storm Uri, Hurricane Harvey, Hurricane Michael, and Hurricane Irma.

February 2021 Winter Storm Uri in Texas

Dates: Winter Storm Uri was a major ice storm that affected parts of the southwest United States from February 13-17, 2021.

Standout features: Texas’ energy infrastructure was not prepared to withstand sustained freezing temperatures. During the storm, an estimated 246 people lost their lives, at least 4.5 million electricity customers in Texas lost power, and about 12 million people received “boil notices” because of poor water quality that could impact 24, 25 health.

As a result of the high demand on the power grid, many Texans went without heat and electricity for days during the storm and were hit with exorbitant power bills in the months following the storm. In the end, Winter Storm Uri caused an estimated $295 billion in 26 economic damages.

Area affected: All 254 counties in Texas and parts of Louisiana were affected. A disaster declaration was issued for the entirety of 27 the state.

A snow-covered street in Austin, Texas on February 15, 2021. Source: Montinique 22 Monroe/Getty Images.

Grocery shoppers in a Houston supermarket on February 21, 2021. Source: Francois Picard/ 23 Getty Images.

22 Monroe, Montinique. Getty Images. https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-carry-groceries-from-alocal-gas-station 23 Picard, Francois. “US-WEATHER-TEXAS.” AFP via Getty Images. https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-

local-gas-station 23 Picard, Francois. “US-WEATHER-TEXAS.” AFP via Getty Images. https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/newsphoto/shoppers-are-seen-wandering-next-to-near-empty-shelves 24 Norton, Kara. 2021. “Why Texas was not prepared for winter storm Uri.” PBS, March 25, 2021.

photo/shoppers-are-seen-wandering-next-to-near-empty-shelves 24 Norton, Kara. 2021. “Why Texas was not prepared for winter storm Uri.” PBS, March 25, 2021. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/texas-winter-storm-uri/ 25 University of Houston. Reliability and the Texas Power Grid in the Aftermath of Winter Storm Uri. (Houston: Hobby School

https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/texas-winter-storm-uri/ 25 University of Houston. Reliability and the Texas Power Grid in the Aftermath of Winter Storm Uri. (Houston: Hobby School of Public Affairs, 2021), https://uh.edu/uh-energy/research/forbes-blog/failure-of-texas-power-grid/content/tegs-report-6- 24-2021.pdf 26 Ibid.

24-2021.pdf 26 Ibid. 27 Texas Department of Emergency Management. n.d. “Texas Severe Winter Storm DR-4586.” Accessed on July 14, 2022.

Ibid. 27 Texas Department of Emergency Management. n.d. “Texas Severe Winter Storm DR-4586.” Accessed on July 14, 2022. https://www.tdem.texas.gov/disasters/winter-storm-uri

Utilities: Nearly all elements of the electric energy system were impacted by the freezing temperatures, including energy extraction, storage, delivery, and power generation. Wind turbines iced over, piles of coal froze, and cold temperatures impacted natural gas 29 pipelines and electric generation facilities. A multitude of factors contributed to the failure of the power grid and cascading impacts on transportation, emergency response, and water supply.

Houston residents wait in line to refill propane tanks on February 17, 2021. Source: David J. 28 Phillip/ AP and Shutterstock.

Figure 2. All 254 counties in Texas were included in FEMA’s Major Disaster Declaration for Winter Storm Uri.

FEMA-4586-DR, Texas Disaster Declaration as of 11/12/2021

30 Source: FEMA.

Individual Assistance and Public Assistance (Category B)

Individual Assistance and Public Assistance (Categories A - G)

Public Assistance (Categories A-G)

Brazos, Irion, Jones, and Taylor Counties for snow assistance under the Public Assistance program.

28 Wurzburger, Andrea. “See Photos from the Record-Setting Winter Storm Uri: Its Impact on Texas and Beyond.” People, February 21, 2021. https://people.com/human-interest/winter-storm-texas-snow-photos/?amp=true 29 De Lune, Marcy and Amanda Drane. 2021.” Bitter cold deepens state's power crisis”, Houston Chronicle, February 16,

29 De Lune, Marcy and Amanda Drane. 2021.” Bitter cold deepens state's power crisis”, Houston Chronicle, February 16, 2021. https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/Power-tight-across-Texas-winter-storm-blackouts- 15953686.php 30 FEMA. 2021. “Winter Storm Uri (DR-4586).” February 19, 2021. https://www.fema.gov/disaster/4586.

15953686.php 30 FEMA. 2021. “Winter Storm Uri (DR-4586).” February 19, 2021. https://www.fema.gov/disaster/4586.

Summary of Impacts and Resilience

The following sections detail the events of Winter Storm Uri and compounding impacts on energy systems, water services, transportation, and communities. Each section provides examples of resilience and highlights gaps for future improvements. Note that this narrative is provided here for Winter Storm Uri as part of the 2022 updates to this report; narratives on impacts and resilience for the other events are provided in Chapter 3 below.

Overview of Texas’s Energy System

Several factors contributed to the power crisis that occurred during Winter Storm Uri. Chief among these were a lack of winterization for most Texas energy infrastructure and Texas’s independent power grid, which made it difficult to import power from other states. The following sections describe the causes of the power crisis and the impact of the storm on electricity and natural gas.

Texas is the only state in the U.S. with a power grid that is largely isolated from the rest of the U.S. The grid is managed by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) and supplies electricity to 25 million customers, or 90% of all residential homes and businesses within the state (Figure 3). Texans outside of ERCOT are served by the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) and the Southeast Power Pool (SPP). As a state grid, ERCOT is not subject to requirements set by the Federal Energy Regulation Commission (FERC), including regulations to winterize equipment 31 and maintain a minimum reserve capacity.

32 Figure 3. ERCOT grid coverage by county (left) and transmission and distribution 33 company service areas (right).

Source: ERCOT

ERCOT does not have its own grid infrastructure, relying instead on power generation companies, electric utilities, and transmission and distribution utility (TDU) companies that participate in the 34 deregulated market. Customers purchase power from retail electricity providers (REPs), who

31 University of Houston. Reliability and the Texas Power Grid in the Aftermath of Winter Storm Uri. (Houston: Hobby School of Public Affairs, 2021), https://uh.edu/uh-energy/research/forbes-blog/failure-of-texas-power-grid/content/tegs-report-6- 24-2021.pdf 32 ERCOT. “Maps.” n.d. Accessed on April 20, 2022 from https://www.ercot.com/news/mediakit/maps/.

24-2021.pdf 32 ERCOT. “Maps.” n.d. Accessed on April 20, 2022 from https://www.ercot.com/news/mediakit/maps/. 33 Direct Energy. n.d. “Who is My Texas Electric Utility Company?” Accessed on May 2, 2022 from https://www.directenergy.com/learning-center/who-is-my-texas-electric-utility.

34 Hegar, Glenn. 2021. “Winter Strom Uri 2021.” Fiscal Notes, October 2021.

https://www.directenergy.com/learning-center/who-is-my-texas-electric-utility.

34 Hegar, Glenn. 2021. “Winter Strom Uri 2021.” Fiscal Notes, October 2021.

35 compete to buy power from the grid. ERCOT manages over 1,800 active market participants that generate, distribute, and sell electricity. Though highly interdependent, natural gas and electricity are regulated by different agencies: the Texas Railroad Commission (RRC) oversees natural gas and the Public Utilities Commission of Texas (PUCT) oversees the electricity industry, including TDUs 36 and ERCOT.

Texas is the largest producer and consumer of natural gas in the U.S. In 2020, the state produced a 37 quarter of the nation’s natural gas and accounted for 15% of the natural gas consumed in the U.S. Texas is also the largest producer of electricity in the U.S. In Texas, electricity is largely produced by 38 natural gas (approximately 50%), wind (20%), and coal (20%). Nuclear energy and biogas provide the rest.

Winter Storm Impacts on Texas Energy Supply

Winter Storm Uri was one of the most severe winter storms on record in Texas and caused the 39 greatest loss of power crisis and loss of electricity the state had ever seen. In the days preceding the storm, a major storm developed over North and Central Texas, bringing freezing rain and snow. 40 Temperatures in Texas reached record lows of 6°F in Austin, 8°F in Dallas, and 10°F in Houston. On February 10 and 11, 2021, ERCOT issued an extreme cold weather event advisory and watch, directing generators to review fuel supplies, prepare to preserve fuel, and issue notices in advance 41 of any expected fuel restrictions. Governor Greg Abbott issued a disaster declaration for all 254 42 counties in Texas on February 12. Between February 10 and 14, freezing infrastructure forced 43 power plants offline, including nuclear reactors, coal and gas generators, and wind farms.

Freezing of generator components was the primary cause of generating unit unavailability during 44 the storm. Over the course of the storm, 1,045 individual generating units (58% natural gas-fired, 27% wind, 6% coal, and 2% solar) collectively experienced 4,124 outages or failures. Of these 45 issues, 75% were caused from complications related to freezing (44.2%) or fuel (31.4%). Extreme winter weather led to freezing of power generation infrastructure, frozen line intakes, and icing on

35 Houston Advanced Research Center (HARC). 2021.Winter Storm Uri’s Impacts & Pathways to Resilience in Texas. https://experience.arcgis.com/experience/cc48fcfebfae414b99b3d18f86c72c27 36 Energy Institute at the University of Texas at Austin. 2021. “The Timeline and Events of the February 2021 Texas Electric

Report.pdf 43 Sullivan, Brain K. and Naureen S. Malik. 2021. “5 Million Americans Have Lost Power From Texas to North Dakota After Devastating Winter Storm”, Time, February 15, 2021. https://time.com/5939633/texas-power-outageblackouts/#:~:text=5%20Million%20Americans%20Have%20Lost,on%20Feb.%2015%2C%202021. 44 FERC, NERC, and Regional Entities. 2021.The February 2021 Cold Weather Outages in Texas and the South Central

Corporation, SERC Corporation, Texas Reliability Entity and Western Electricity Coordinating Council. 41 Energy Institute at the University of Texas at Austin. 2021. “The Timeline and Events of the February 2021 Texas Electric Grid Blackouts.” https://www.puc.texas.gov/agency/resources/reports/UTAustinEventsFebruary2021TexasBlackout.pdf. 42 City of Austin and Travis County. 2021 Winter Storm Uri After-Action Review Findings Report. (Austin: City of Austin and Travis County, 2021). https://www.austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/HSEM/2021-Winter-Storm-Uri-AAR-Findings- Report.pdf 43 Sullivan, Brain K. and Naureen S. Malik. 2021. “5 Million Americans Have Lost Power From Texas to North Dakota After

https://www.eia.gov/state/analysis.php?sid=TX 38 Busby, Joshua W., Kyri Baker, Morgan D. Bazilian, Alex Q. Gilbert, Emily Grubert, Varun Rai, Joshua D. Rhodes, Sarang Shidore, Caitlin A. Smith, and Michael E. Webber. “Cascading Risks: Understanding the 2021 Winter Blackout in Texas.” Energy Research & Social Science 77 (2021): 102106. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2021.102106. 39 Energy Institute at the University of Texas at Austin. 2021. “The Timeline and Events of the February 2021 Texas Electric

blackouts/#:~:text=5%20Million%20Americans%20Have%20Lost,on%20Feb.%2015%2C%202021. 44 FERC, NERC, and Regional Entities. 2021.The February 2021 Cold Weather Outages in Texas and the South Central United States. November 16, 2021. https://www.ferc.gov/media/february-2021-cold-weather-outages-texas-and-southcentral-united-states-ferc-nerc-and 45 Ibid.

central-united-states-ferc-nerc-and 45 Ibid.

Case Studies of Multi-Sectoral Resilience to Natural Disasters CHAPTER 2 |

wind turbines. Of the freeze-related generating unit outages, 81% occurred at temperatures above the units’ stated ambient design temperature. 46 In many cases, failures could have been avoided if infrastructure and assets had been winterized for cold weather, but in Texas, infrastructure is typically designed to handle extreme heat rather than extreme cold. 47

Approximately 87% of utility-scale generator outages caused by fuel issues were related to production and processing of natural gas, while 13% were related to issues with coal and oil. Figure 4 shows the net generator outages by fuel type. The power outages fed into a closed loop cycle that further limited power generation, as facilities that relied on power to operate were forced offline or to reduce load. 48

Figure 4. Net capacity outages by fuel type from February 14-19, 2021.

49

ERCOT plans for extreme events in its seasonal winter resource adequacy assessment. Table 1 compares the actual generation during the event with the expected capacity, both for normal planning and during extreme events. Relative to the planned output for an extreme scenario, gas and coal underperformed, nuclear performed as expected, and wind and solar performed above expectations. 50

46 FERC. 2021. Final Report on February 2021 Freeze Underscores Winterization Recommendations. November 2016, 2021 https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/news/final-report-february-2021-freeze-underscores-winterization-recommendations. 47 Norton, Kara. 2021. “Why Texas was not prepared for winter storm Uri.” PBS, March 25, 2021. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/texas-winter-storm-uri/ 48 Enervus. “Winter Storm Uri – Natural Gas Analysis.” April 2022. Prepared for the Texas Gas and Oil Association. Energy Institute at the University of Texas at Austin. 2021. “The Timeline and Events of the February 2021 Texas Electric Grid Blackouts.” https://www.puc.texas.gov/agency/resources/reports/UTAustinEventsFebruary2021TexasBlackout.pdf. Busby, Joshua W., Kyri Baker, Morgan D. Bazilian, Alex Q. Gilbert, Emily Grubert, Varun Rai, Joshua D. Rhodes, Sarang Shidore, Caitlin A. Smith, and Michael E. Webber. “Cascading Risks: Understanding the 2021 Winter Blackout in Texas.” Energy Research & Social Science 77 (2021): 102106. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2021.102106.

Table 1. Comparison of Fuels Sources: Expected Capacity and Actual Generation, 51 Feb. 15 - 19th. Source: ERCOT data compiled by Blake Shaffer.

52 Figure 5. Power outages on February 16, 2021.

To ration the energy supply, ERCOT began ordering rotating outages of electricity for consumers, a practice called “load shedding.”

During the period of load shedding, the grid’s frequency declined significantly, reaching a low of 59.4 hertz, a frequency low enough that there was a significant risk of grid collapse if operators

51 Ibid. 52 Busby, Joshua W., Kyri Baker, Morgan D. Bazilian, Alex Q. Gilbert, Emily Grubert, Varun Rai, Joshua D. Rhodes, Sarang

Ibid. 52 Busby, Joshua W., Kyri Baker, Morgan D. Bazilian, Alex Q. Gilbert, Emily Grubert, Varun Rai, Joshua D. Rhodes, Sarang Shidore, Caitlin A. Smith, and Michael E. Webber. “Cascading Risks: Understanding the 2021 Winter Blackout in Texas.” Energy Research & Social Science 77 (2021): 102106. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2021.102106.

53 were not able to reverse the decline. ERCOT averted the collapse by ordering more load to be shed, helping the frequency to recover. The load shedding caused power outages throughout ERCOT’s service area. Usually, these outages are rotated on a frequent basis, so no customer is without power for more than an hour, but generation shortfalls were so large that, in many cases, available power was reserved for critical infrastructure, 54 such as hospitals and fire stations.

Over the course of the storm, more than 9.9 million people in the United States and Mexico lost power, including 4.5 million homes and businesses in Texas 55 (Figure 5). At first the rotating blackouts lasted 10 to 40 minutes, but some lasted 48 hours or more, leaving households without heat and electricity during

G rid Close to Collapse During the period of load shedding, the grid’s frequency declined to 59.4 hertz, a frequency low enough that there was a significant risk of grid collapse if operators were not able to reverse the decline.

minutes, but some lasted 48 hours or more, leaving households without heat and electricity during 56 record cold temperatures.

The storm resulted in increased demand at the same time power supply was becoming increasingly restricted. As temperatures dropped, the cold resulted in historically high customer demand. Before the storm, ERCOT’s worst case scenario for power demand was approximately 67,200 megawatts. However, due to the cold temperatures, demand reached 69,150 megawatts on 57 February 14.

ERCOT and the PUC drastically raised electricity prices to $9,000 per megawatt hour, leading to rapid inflation of the electricity market. In 2020, Texans spent $9.8 billion total on electricity. On February 16, 2021 alone, they spent approximately $10.3 billion, and electricity costs for all of 58 February reached more than $50 billion. The Texas legislature issued bonds to pay back some of 59 these costs that result in the equivalent of $200 for every Texas resident. Natural Gas

As of 2020, natural gas accounted for half of Texas’ power and supplied 46% of the energy Texans 60 use to heat their homes. In Texas, about 40% of homes are heated with natural gas and the 61 remaining 60% with electricity. During the summer, natural gas is used by power plants to generate electricity to power air conditioning and stoves for cooking. In the winter, natural gas is also used for cooking as well as for heating homes and buildings and providing fuel for electricity. Usually, the

53 Gold, Russell. “The Texas Electric Grid Failure Was a Warm-Up.” Texas Monthly, January 18, 2022. https://www.texasmonthly.com/news-politics/texas-electric-grid-failure-warm-up/

https://www.texasmonthly.com/news-politics/texas-electric-grid-failure-warm-up/ 54 Joshua W. Busby, Kyri Baker, Morgan D. Bazilian, Alex Q. Gilbert, Emily Grubert, Varun Rai, Joshua D. Rhodes, Sarang Shidore, Caitlin A. Smith, Michael E. Webber (2021), Cascading risks: Understanding the 2021 winter blackout in Texas, Energy Research & Social Science, Volume 77, 2021,102106, ISSN 2214-6296, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2021.102106. 55 Sullivan, Brain K. and Naureen S. Malik. 2021. “5 Million Americans Have Lost Power From Texas to North Dakota After

Ibid. 60 Busby, Joshua W., Kyri Baker, Morgan D. Bazilian, Alex Q. Gilbert, Emily Grubert, Varun Rai, Joshua D. Rhodes, Sarang Shidore, Caitlin A. Smith, and Michael E. Webber. 2021. “Cascading Risks: Understanding the 2021 Winter Blackout in Texas.” Energy Research & Social Science 77: 102106. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2021.102106. 61 Zelinksi, Andrea. 2021. “What Went Wrong With Texas’s Main Electric Grid and Could It Have Been Prevented?” Texas

Texas.” Energy Research & Social Science 77: 102106. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2021.102106. 57 Gold, Russell. “The Texas Electric Grid Failure Was a Warm-Up.” Texas Monthly, January 18, 2022. https://www.texasmonthly.com/news-politics/texas-electric-grid-failure-warm-up/ 58 Ibid.

Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Busby, Joshua W., Kyri Baker, Morgan D. Bazilian, Alex Q. Gilbert, Emily Grubert, Varun Rai, Joshua D. Rhodes, Sarang

58 Ibid. 59 Ibid.

Case Studies of Multi-Sectoral Resilience to Natural Disasters CHAPTER 2 |

demand for air conditioning in the summer is greater than the demand for heat in the winter, but 62 during the storm demand for natural gas to both heat homes and generate electricity skyrocketed.

Natural gas was available throughout the storm, but infrastructure damage and electric power interruptions impacted the ability of natural gas infrastructure to deliver gas to generation facilities. Freezing temperatures during Winter Storm Uri led to natural gas infrastructure damage 63 and shut down 38 of Texas’s 176 gas processing plants. Ice prevented flow to wellheads via 65 plugging64 starting as early as the week before the storm. However, residential customers still had access to their gas service.

By February 16, natural gas production in Texas and the south-central U.S. had declined 30% from 66 average due to wellhead freezes and processing plant shutoffs. The Energy Information Administration reported that Texas natural gas production fell almost by half during the storm, from

21.3 billion cubic feet per day (Bcfd) during the week ending February 13, to about 11.8 Bcfd at its 67 lowest point on February 17. Natural gas fuel supply issues represented 27% of all generating unit 68 outages during the event. Despite these shutoffs, natural gas still supplied most of Texas’ power during the storm.

Power outages also created issues in getting the gas to the generation facilities. Most of the natural gas in “Associated Gas” More Texas is sourced from the Permian Basin, which Vulnerable to Disruption produces a type of gas known as “associated gas,” a 69 Most of the natural gas in Texas is by-product of shale oil. The production process for associated natural gas is different than for sourced from the Permian Basin, deliverable natural gas, which comes from a which produces “associated gas,” pressurized gas reservoir and can flow on its own. a by-product of shale oil that Associated gas comes to the surface at low pressure requires pressurization via pumps and relies on electricity to compress it to be that use electricity and is transported to gas plants. During the storm, power therefore more vulnerable to outages meant there was no electricity to compress disruption than deliverable natural gas into usable products. Reduced natural gas production lowered pressure in pipelines, making it gas which comes from pressurized harder for power plants fueled by natural gas to reservoirs and can flow on its own. 70 operate. Luckily Texas had a hearty reserve of natural gas in storage facilities: at least 300 billion

62 Ibid. 63 Golding, Garrett, Anil Kumar and Karel Mertens. “Cost of Texas’ 2021 Deep Freeze Justifies Weatherization”, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, April 15, 2021. https://www.dallasfed.org/research/economics/2021/0415 64 A wellhead is a system of spools, valves, and adapters that provide pressure control at an oil or gas well. Source: Schlumberger Oilfield Glossary. Accessed April 15, 2022 from https://glossary.oilfield.slb.com/Terms/w/wellhead.aspx 65 Wellhead plugging occurs during cold spells when the water produced with natural gas crystallizes inside the pipeline. 66 Department of Energy. 2021.” Extreme Cold & Winter Weather Update #6.” February 21, 2021. https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2021/02/f83/TLP-WHITE_DOE.pdf 67 Energy Institute at the University of Texas at Austin. 2021. “The Timeline and Events of the February 2021 Texas Electric Grid Blackouts.” https://www.puc.texas.gov/agency/resources/reports/UTAustinEventsFebruary2021TexasBlackout.pdf. 68 FERC, NERC, and Regional Entities. 2021. The February 2021 Cold Weather Outages in Texas and the South Central United States. November 16, 2021. https://www.ferc.gov/media/february-2021-cold-weather-outages-texas-and-south- central-united-states-ferc-nerc-and 69 Pickrell, Emily. “Getting The Gas You Need Was A Key Problem For Texas In Storm.” Forbes, March 5, 2021. https://www.forbes.com/sites/uhenergy/2021/03/05/getting-the-gas-you-need-was-a-key-problem-for-texas-in- storm/?sh=5fdefd081e47 Busby, Joshua W., Kyri Baker, Morgan D. Bazilian, Alex Q. Gilbert, Emily Grubert, Varun Rai, Joshua D. Rhodes, Sarang Shidore, Caitlin A. Smith, and Michael E. Webber. 2021. “Cascading Risks: Understanding the 2021 Winter Blackout in Texas.” Energy Research & Social Science, 77:102106. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2021.102106.

71 cubic feet, more than enough to meet energy demand across the state. During the storm, 72 underground natural gas storage facilities were operating at maximum withdrawal rates.

Figure 6. Texas consumption of stored natural gas by sector during Winter Storm Uri.

Power plants and residential, commercial, and small business customers increased their consumption during the storm as industrial users decreased consumption (Figure 6). This corresponds with the Texas Railroad Commission’s Emergency Order issued on February 12 to 74 prioritize natural gas for power generation and residential homes.

71 Pickrell, Emily. “Getting The Gas You Need Was A Key Problem For Texas In Storm.” Forbes, March 5, 2021. https://www.forbes.com/sites/uhenergy/2021/03/05/getting-the-gas-you-need-was-a-key-problem-for-texas-instorm/?sh=5fdefd081e47 72 Energy Institute at the University of Texas at Austin. 2021. “The Timeline and Events of the February 2021 Texas Electric

storm/?sh=5fdefd081e47 72 Energy Institute at the University of Texas at Austin. 2021. “The Timeline and Events of the February 2021 Texas Electric Grid Blackouts.” https://www.puc.texas.gov/agency/resources/reports/UTAustinEventsFebruary2021TexasBlackout.pdf. 73 Ibid. 74 Texas Railroad Commission. “Emergency Order.” February 12, 2021. https://rrc.texas.gov/media/cw3ewubr/emergency-

Ibid. 74 Texas Railroad Commission. “Emergency Order.” February 12, 2021. https://rrc.texas.gov/media/cw3ewubr/emergencyorder-021221-final-signed.pdf 75 American Gas Association 2014. 76 Good, Allison. 2021. “$2.4B winter storm windfall drove Energy Transfer's earnings bonanza.” S&P Global Market

American Gas Association 2014. 76 Good, Allison. 2021. “$2.4B winter storm windfall drove Energy Transfer's earnings bonanza.” S&P Global Market Intelligence, May 6, 2021. https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/2-4bwinter-storm-windfall-drove-energy-transfer-s-earnings-bonanza-64143456

Petroleum and Petrochemicals

Cold temperatures caused by Winter Storm Uri forced oil refinery shutdowns, rate reductions, and 77 process unit outages. Refinery shutdowns accounted for 20% of all U.S. refinery capacity. U.S. oil 78 production dropped by more than four million barrels per day. Petrochemical plants shut down as 79 they lost power, triggering a global plastics shortage and disruptions in the supply chain. Prices for polyethylene, polypropylene, and other chemicals used to make auto parts, computers, and other plastic products grew higher than they had in years.

Water and Wastewater Services

During the storm, water services were affected due to power outages and extreme cold, compromising water quantity, quality, and availability.

Energy and water are highly interdependent. Water is needed in the production and cooling phases for most energy sources, while water services rely on energy during extraction, treatment, 80 transportation, distribution, and wastewater management and treatment. Power outages at many water treatment plants during the storm meant they were unable to treat and distribute water. This was largely the case for smaller water agencies without backup generation systems, some which 81 took over a week to regain full control of operations after the storm.

Texas residents received mixed messaging about what to do with their water during the storm. Many Texas homes have water pipes in uninsulated areas, such as exterior walls or attics, which makes them more likely to freeze. To prevent freezing, many residents were advised to slowly drip hot water through their pipes. However, the over-dripping of pipes combined with treatment plant failures caused low pressure in the water system and led to low water levels. To conserve water, residents were urged to turn off their taps to conserve water for hospitals and fire departments. Hospitals still lost access to water to supply boilers, leaving the most vulnerable members of the population without heat. At least one hospital transferred high risk patients to other facilities after 82 the water supply was shut off. Low pressure in the water system increases the risk of bacterial contamination since ground water

Low pressure in the water system increases the risk of bacterial contamination since ground water can seep into cracks in old pipes. Over the course of the storm, more than 2,300 Boil Water Notices were issued affecting 14 million people and the Emergency Operations Center ordered a million 83 gallons of water to be distributed to residents. The notices were lifted on February 22.

Water freezing in pipes causes pipes to swell, crack, or burst. When the water came back on, burst pipes began to leak. Over 31% of Texas homes and businesses suffered water damage. Demand

77 Department of Energy. 2021.” Extreme Cold & Winter Weather Update #6.” February 21, 2021. https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2021/02/f83/TLP-WHITE_DOE.pdf

https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2021/02/f83/TLP-WHITE_DOE.pdf 78 Presley, Jennifer Lynn. 2021. “Opinion: Texas freeze exposes flaws in energy system.” Upstream, February 23, 2021. . https://www.upstreamonline.com/opinion/opinion-texas-freeze-exposes-flaws-in-energy-system/2-1-967019 79 Matthews, Christopher, Austen Hufford and Collin Eaton. 2021 “Texas Freeze Triggers Global Plastics Shortage.” Wall

https://experience.arcgis.com/experience/cc48fcfebfae414b99b3d18f86c72c27 81 Glazer, Yael R., Darrel M. Tremaine, Jay L. Banner, Margaret Cook, Robert E. Mace, John Nielsen-Gammon, Emily Grubert, Ken Kramerjj, Anne M. K. Stoner, Briana M. Wyatt, et al. 2021. “Winter Storm Uri: A Test of Texas’ Water Infrastructure and Water Resource Resilience to Extreme Winter Weather Events.” World Scientific, December 31, 2021. https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/epdf/10.1142/S2345737621500226 82 Helsel, Phil and Yuliya Talmazan. “Texas water shortage adds to power crisis as new winter storm moves in.” U.S. News,

shortage-11615973401 80 Houston Advanced Research Center (HARC). Winter Storm Uri’s Impacts & Pathways to Resilience in Texas. 2021. https://experience.arcgis.com/experience/cc48fcfebfae414b99b3d18f86c72c27 81 Glazer, Yael R., Darrel M. Tremaine, Jay L. Banner, Margaret Cook, Robert E. Mace, John Nielsen-Gammon, Emily

. https://www.upstreamonline.com/opinion/opinion-texas-freeze-exposes-flaws-in-energy-system/2-1-967019 79 Matthews, Christopher, Austen Hufford and Collin Eaton. 2021 “Texas Freeze Triggers Global Plastics Shortage.” Wall Street Journal, March 17, 2021. https://www.wsj.com/articles/one-week-texas-freeze-seen-triggering-monthslong-plasticsshortage-11615973401 80 Houston Advanced Research Center (HARC). Winter Storm Uri’s Impacts & Pathways to Resilience in Texas. 2021.

for plumbers far outpaced the number available, and supply chain delays meant a shortage of the 84 parts and materials necessary to fix plumbing.

Mobility and Transportation

Extreme winter conditions led to road closures, car accidents, and flight cancellations. Emergency responders lacked the equipment and training necessary to travel in snow and ice. Lack of capacity for emergency vehicles to traverse highways and roads led to delayed emergency response during the storm, an increase in injuries and fatalities, and difficulty in transporting patients to hospitals.

There were numerous accidents reported on interstate highways. The Austin Fire Department 86 responded to 739 traffic incidents, and a 130- vehicle pileup on I-35 in Fort Worth led to six 87 fatalities.

An empty interstate on February 15th in Fort Worth. 85 Credit: Ron Jenkins/Getty.

Roadway closures and a shortage of all-wheel drive vehicles caused disruptions in the supply chain 88 and limited access to transport residents to shelters.

Those who took to the roads had to plan their routes with care, as gasoline was limited due to 89 frozen lines.

Texas Department of Transportation employees worked 12-hour shifts the two weeks of the storm to clear roads, bring medical staff to work, help people reach warming shelters, and respond to 91 requests for aid from Emergency Management departments.

84 Agnew, Duncan. “Plumber shortage and supply chain issues are delaying storm recovery efforts in Texas.” Texas Tribune, February 26, 2021. https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/26/texas-plumber-shortage-winter-storm/ 85 Wurzburger, Andrea. “See Photos from the Record-Setting Winter Storm Uri: Its Impact on Texas and Beyond.” People,

Report.pdf 87 Traffix. “Winter Storms in Texas Disrupt Supply Chains.” March 18, 2021. https://traffix.com/blog/winter-storms-in-texasdisrupt-supply-chains.

88 City of Austin and Travis County. 2021 Winter Storm Uri After-Action Review Findings Report. (Austin: City of Austin and

photos/?slide=eb22eef3-eddb-4aa7-9fbf-059dfec995f5 86 City of Austin and Travis County. 2021 Winter Storm Uri After-Action Review Findings Report. (Austin: City of Austin and Travis County, 2021). https://www.austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/HSEM/2021-Winter-Storm-Uri-AAR-Findings- Report.pdf 87 Traffix. “Winter Storms in Texas Disrupt Supply Chains.” March 18, 2021. https://traffix.com/blog/winter-storms-in-texas-

89 Traffix. “Winter Storms in Texas Disrupt Supply Chains.” March 18, 2021. https://traffix.com/blog/winter-storms-in-texasdisrupt-supply-chains.

90 Travel off the Path. “Winter Storm Uri Causes Mass Disruptions – What Travelers Need To Know.” February 15, 2021.

90 Travel off the Path. “Winter Storm Uri Causes Mass Disruptions – What Travelers Need To Know.” February 15, 2021. https://www.traveloffpath.com/winter-storm-uri-causes-mass-disruptions-what-travelers-need-to-know 91 Texas Department of Transportation. 2021. “TxDOT Responds to the 2021 Winter Storm. Accessed April 19, 2022.

91 Texas Department of Transportation. 2021. “TxDOT Responds to the 2021 Winter Storm. Accessed April 19, 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CLPnWEq3-Zw

Community Impacts and Support

Millions of Texans suffered from loss of electricity to heat their homes, a lack of clean drinking water, and gasoline limitations. Low-income communities were hit particularly hard since they had fewer resources for relocating, replacing damaged food and property, and paying exorbitant power bills.

Among those Texans who remained in their homes without power, more than one in four (26%) used their gas oven or cooktop as a source of heat, and desperate to avoid hypothermia, 8% used 92 a grill or smoker indoors and 5% used an outdoor propane heater indoors. Using outdoor equipment indoors increased the risk of carbon monoxide poisoning. The Texas Department of State Health reported 450 calls related to carbon monoxide poisoning by February 15 and more than 1,400 people went to emergency rooms or urgent care clinics for carbon monoxide poisoning 93 during the storm. One family lost five members after running a generator in the garage to 94 produce electricity.

The Texas Energy Poverty Research Institute (TERPI) surveyed 953 Texans about their experiences during the storm. Almost 75% lost electricity at some point during the storm, with 33% of respondents indicating losing 95 electricity for more than two days. Residential natural gas service was more reliable, with only 25% of respondents surveyed reported losing gas. However, since many gas furnaces need electricity to operate, many families who had gas service but who had lost power were 96 unable to stay warm.

As described earlier, in addition to losing power, a majority of Texans faced water restrictions. Nearly 65% of respondents from the TERPI survey said they had to boil water at some point, and over 40% went more than two days without clean water. Over 30% of

Reliability of Residential G as Supply

While approximately threefourths of customers surveyed lost electric service at some point during the storm, only about onefourth of customers reported losing gas service.

water at some point, and over 40% went more than two days without clean water. Over 30% of 97 respondents said they did not have running water for two days or longer. A different survey suggested that half of all Texans lost access to running water for an average of 52 hours during the 98 storm. While electricity was restored within days, it took weeks for potable water to be restored in 99 communities served by small water systems. One resident in Pflugerville boiled snow to flush the 100 toilet and to use as reserve drinking water.

92 University of Houston. Reliability and the Texas Power Grid in the Aftermath of Winter Storm Uri. (Houston: Hobby School of Public Affairs, 2021), https://uh.edu/uh-energy/research/forbes-blog/failure-of-texas-power-grid/content/tegs-report-6- 24-2021.pdf 93 Trevizo, Peter, Ren Larson, Lexi Churchill, Mike Hixenbaugh, and Suzy Khimm. “Texas Winter Storm: Worst Carbon Monoxide Poisoning Catastrophe in Recent U.S. History.” Deceleration News, April 29, 2021.

Ibid. 98 University of Houston. “Reliability and the Texas Power Grid in the Aftermath of Winter Storm Uri.” Hobby School of Public Affairs, https://uh.edu/uh-energy/research/forbes-blog/failure-of-texas-power-grid/content/tegs-report-6-24-2021.pdf 99 Glazer, Yael R., Darrel M. Tremaine, Jay L. Banner, Margaret Cook, Robert E. Mace, John Nielsen-Gammon, Emily Grubert, Ken Kramerjj, Anne M. K. Stoner, Briana M. Wyatt, et al. 2021. “Winter Storm Uri: A Test of Texas’ Water Infrastructure and Water Resource Resilience to Extreme Winter Weather Events.” World Scientific, December 31, 2021. https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/epdf/10.1142/S2345737621500226 100 Samuels, Alex. “Nearly 12 million Texans now face water disruptions. The state needs residents to stop dripping taps.”

24-2021.pdf 93 Trevizo, Peter, Ren Larson, Lexi Churchill, Mike Hixenbaugh, and Suzy Khimm. “Texas Winter Storm: Worst Carbon Monoxide Poisoning Catastrophe in Recent U.S. History.” Deceleration News, April 29, 2021. https://deceleration.news/2021/04/29/texas-winter-storm-carbon-monoxide-poisoning/ 94 Berlin, Carly and Amal Ahmed. “Nobody warned Texans about the public health risks of the winter storm.” Southerly, March

https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/epdf/10.1142/S2345737621500226 100 Samuels, Alex. “Nearly 12 million Texans now face water disruptions. The state needs residents to stop dripping taps.” The Texas Tribune, February 17, 2021. https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/17/texas-water-boil-notices/

Utility prices rose rapidly in response to fuel shortages and power plant shutoffs. The price of electricity peaked at $9,000 per megawatt-hour, where the week before the storm it had been $30 101 per megawatt-hour. The price affected Retail Energy Providers, who passed the expenses on to customers who were able to use electricity. One family in Fort Worth was left with less than $100 102 after a $6,000 energy bill drained their bank accounts. Households without financial safety nets were unable to repair damaged property, relocate when their homes lost heat or pipes burst, and replenish food that spoiled.

Disproportionate Impacts

The impacts from Winter Storm Uri were not distributed evenly throughout Texas. Households least prepared for extreme winter weather, such as those without backup generators or those who live in older poorly insulated homes, were heavily impacted by power outages and water shortages. In cities such as Austin and Houston, electricity was kept on in neighborhoods that share circuits with critical facilities such as hospitals. The areas where power was kept on rarely overlapped with poor communities or 103 predominantly Black or Hispanic communities. Hispanic, Black, and Asian Texans representing 57% of the state’s total population suffered 75% of 104 reported carbon monoxide poisonings. During the storm, 76% of African Americans lost power 105 compared to 66% of Anglos. In Houston, there was a strong correlation between the number of building code violations in a neighborhood and the share of Black residents or residents in poverty before the

Disproportionate Impacts to Communities

Communities of color and lowincome communities were less equipped to deal with extreme cold. They disproportionately dealt with freezing indoor temperatures, burst pipes, power outages, and unsafe drinking water. Some households could not afford to replace rotten food or the high price of heat, even if power was available.

code violations in a neighborhood and the share of Black residents or residents in poverty before the 106 storm, leaving communities of color vulnerable to impacts from extreme cold. Over 200 people died from impacts during the storm, including an 11-year-old boy from Honduras who froze to death 107 after his house lost power. Following Hurricane Harvey in 2017, Black and Latinx residents experienced difficulties accessing city services, making it difficult for them to recover. Houston

https://deceleration.news/2021/04/29/texas-winter-storm-carbon-monoxide-poisoning/ 105 University of Houston. Reliability and the Texas Power Grid in the Aftermath of Winter Storm Uri. (Houston: Hobby School of Public Affairs, 2021), https://uh.edu/uh-energy/research/forbes-blog/failure-of-texas-power-grid/content/tegsreport-6-24-2021.pdf 106 Rodriguez, Sonia Torres, Fay Walker, and Carlos Martin. “Winter Storm Uri’s Impacts on Houston Neighborhoods Show

report-6-24-2021.pdf 106 Rodriguez, Sonia Torres, Fay Walker, and Carlos Martin. “Winter Storm Uri’s Impacts on Houston Neighborhoods Show Why It’s Urgent to Build Equity into Climate Resilience.” Urban Institute, March 10, 2021. https://www.urban.org/urbanwire/winter-storm-uris-impacts-houston-neighborhoods-show-why-its-urgent-build-equity-climate-resilience 107 Valentine, Brittany. 2021. “Cristian Pineda’s death amid Texas’ winter storm crisis didn’t have to happen.” Aldia News,

107 Valentine, Brittany. 2021. “Cristian Pineda’s death amid Texas’ winter storm crisis didn’t have to happen.” Aldia News, February 23, 2021. https://aldianews.com/politics/policy/preventable-death neighborhoods with high populations of color were found to also have high rates of building code 108 violations and longer power outages during Winter Storm Uri (Figure 7).

Figure 7. Outage rates on February 17 and neighborhoods affected by Hurricane Harvey in Harris County.

Harris County Neighborhoods Affected by Hurricane Harvey Were More Likely to Experience Power Outages from Winter Storm Uri

Sources: Kinder Institute for Urban Research, City of Houston Hurricane Harvey damage assessment, and CenterPoint Energy.

When the extent and frequency of power outages was overlaid with census tracts, researchers found that neighborhoods with long outages were more likely to have multifamily housing, more residents who did not speak English, and more people who rely on public transportation for 110 commuting. Neighborhoods with more renters in Harris County, which encompasses Houston, th 111 had long outages lasting until February 19, when 99% of the county had power restored. Areas with a higher proportion of single-family homes had lower outage rates during the recovery phase. Disadvantaged populations were more likely to live in older homes with outdated plumbing and pipes. A survey found that 38% of low-income respondents experienced burst water pipes, compared to 25% of high-income respondents. Low-income respondents were also more likely to 112 have fallen trees, roof or structural damage, and damaged appliances.

108 Rodriguez, Sonia Torres, Fay Walker, and Carlos Martin. “Winter Storm Uri’s Impacts on Houston Neighborhoods Show Why It’s Urgent to Build Equity into Climate Resilience.” Urban Institute, March 10, 2021. https://www.urban.org/urbanwire/winter-storm-uris-impacts-houston-neighborhoods-show-why-its-urgent-build-equity-climate-resilience 109 Ibid. 110 rd Nejat, Ali, Laura Solitare, Edward Pettitt. “Equitable Community Resilience: The Case of Winter Storm Uri in Texas.” 3

Ibid. 110 rd Nejat, Ali, Laura Solitare, Edward Pettitt. “Equitable Community Resilience: The Case of Winter Storm Uri in Texas.” 3 International Conference on Natural Hazards and Infrastructure, July 2022. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/357925305_Equitable_Community_Resilience_The_Case_of_Winter_Storm_Uri_i n_Texas 111 Rodriguez, Sonia Torres, Fay Walker, and Carlos Martin. “Winter Storm Uri’s Impacts on Houston Neighborhoods Show

n_Texas 111 Rodriguez, Sonia Torres, Fay Walker, and Carlos Martin. “Winter Storm Uri’s Impacts on Houston Neighborhoods Show Why It’s Urgent to Build Equity into Climate Resilience.” Urban Institute, March 10, 2021. https://www.urban.org/urbanwire/winter-storm-uris-impacts-houston-neighborhoods-show-why-its-urgent-build-equity-climate-resilience 112 Texas Poverty Research Institute. “When the Lone Star Froze Over: Winter Storm Uri and the lived experiences of Texas

112 Texas Poverty Research Institute. “When the Lone Star Froze Over: Winter Storm Uri and the lived experiences of Texas low-income communities.”, July 2021. https://www.txenergypoverty.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/When-the-Lone- Star-Froze-Over.pdf

“I have had power off and on, mostly off, for 3 days now in 30-degree weather because TX officials were completely unprepared for a winter storm. I have been lucky enough to have running water and a gas stove, but many are in a far worse position.” — Colin Lowry

— Colin Lowry

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the impacts of the storm, as low-income communities and communities of color had already been disproportionately affected by the virus 113 and unemployment. Older homes with poor insulation experienced higher electric bills, as they use more energy trying to stay warm. One mother in a majority Hispanic and Black neighborhood of Dallas recounted not having the funds to spend the night in a hotel after sleeping the night before in near-freezing temperatures. Several members of her family had lost their jobs during the 114 pandemic, and over the summer they had gone into debt to cover utilities.

Power outages and water shortages affected the health of vulnerable populations, compounded by the ongoing pandemic. As hospitals lost power, medical centers rushed to administer covid 115 vaccines before they expired. In Houston and Austin, backup generators allowed hospitals to keep running but issues with water pressure and burst pipes prevented some facilities from 116 117 operating. Nurses were seen gathering rainwater and snow to flush toilets.

Disability Rights Texas, an advocacy group, conducted a survey to understand the impact of Winter Storm Uri on those with disabilities. More than 75% of respondents lost power, which can be devastating for those who rely on battery-powered medical devices such as ventilators and nutrition delivery systems. One mother reported being stranded in her home with three autistic children without power or water, while another was forced to choose which critical life support machines to 118 continue running for her son. Nearly 60% of those surveyed lost access to water, with 80% of the affirmative respondents losing access for more than 24 hours. Water is especially important for those who are immunocompromised as it helps flush toxins and waste to fight disease, and some 119 medications must be taken with water.

113 Busby, Joshua W., Kyri Baker, Morgan D. Bazilian, Alex Q. Gilbert, Emily Grubert, Varun Rai, Joshua D. Rhodes, Sarang Shidore, Caitlin A. Smith, and Michael E. Webber. 2021. “Cascading Risks: Understanding the 2021 Winter Blackout in Texas.” Energy Research & Social Science, 77:102106. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2021.102106. 114 Ura, Alexa and Juan Pablo Garnhma. “Already hit hard by pandemic, Black and Hispanic communities suffer the blows

storm-suffering-inequities/ 115 Sullivan, Brain K. and Naureen S. Malik. 2021. “5 Million Americans Have Lost Power From Texas to North Dakota After Devastating Winter Storm.” Time, February 15, 2021. https://time.com/5939633/texas-power-outage-blackouts/. 116 Srikanth, Anagha. “Emergency evacuations now taking place in Texas hospitals because of freezing temperatures.” The Hill, February 18, 2021. https://thehill.com/changing-america/resilience/natural-disasters/539387-emergency-evacuationsnow-taking-place-in-texas/. 117 Associated Press. “In anti-government Texas, catastrophic storms prompt calls for regulation.” The Guardian, February

117 Associated Press. “In anti-government Texas, catastrophic storms prompt calls for regulation.” The Guardian, February 21, 2021. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/feb/25/texas-regulation-power-grid-winter-storm-blackouts 118 Disability Rights Texas. n.d. “The Forgotten Faces of Winter Storm Uri: The Impact on Texans with Disabilities When We

Examples of Resilience

Infrastructure failures during the storm revealed several areas for energy resilience improvements. FERC recommended that regulatory agencies require natural gas facilities to maintain and implement cold weather preparedness plans and weatherize infrastructure. Additional recommendations included increasing the flexibility of manual load shedding, real-time monitoring of gas wellheads, increasing the number of emergency response centers, improving near-term load forecasts, analyzing intermittent generation effects to improve load forecasts and improving load shed 120 training for system operators. Two bills approved by the Texas state Senate require all power generators to weatherize, the ERCOT to revise its reliability standards to require generator owners to identify and protect cold weather components, build new generating units and retrofit existing units to withstand specific extreme temperatures, and provide annual training on winterization plans.

Building Resilience to Future W inter Storms

W inter Storms Among the actions to build resilience to future winter storms are requirements that all power generators weatherize and install retrofits to withstand extreme cold temperatures, the building of new generating units and the revision of ERCOT reliability standards to require generator owners to identify and protect cold weather components.

121 withstand specific extreme temperatures, and provide annual training on winterization plans. In January 2022, ERCOT announced that 321 out of 324 electric generation and transmission facilities 122 passed inspection for new winterization requirements. One of the bills, SB3, requires the Texas Department of Public Safety to develop and implement a statewide alert system that ERCOT or the PUC can activate when the power supply is endangered.

The requirement for natural gas facilities is limited to those facilities deemed “critical.” Critical facilities include gas wells producing more than 15 Mcf/day, oil leases producing casinghead gas in excess of 50 Mcf/day, gas processing plants, natural gas storage facilities, local distribution pipelines and pipeline facilities, and natural gas pipelines and pipeline facilities including associated 123 compressor stations and control centers. Some research concludes that the gas industry has not escalated efforts to weatherize infrastructure, and little has been done to improve the resiliency of 124 the power grid since the storm, though winter blackouts are expected to happen again. Winterizing equipment costs $20,000 to $50,000 per well, so annual winterizing of Texas’s natural gas plants is estimated to cost $85 to $200 million, the equivalent of one or two days of revenue 125 from the gas industry in Texas and 50 times less than the gas industry’s profits during the storm.

Efforts to winterize solar panels and wind turbines are ongoing. Winterizing wind turbines includes outfitting blades with internal warming equipment at the factory, which costs $400,000 per unit.

121 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). 2021. “February 2021 Cold Weather Grid Operations: Preliminary Findings and Recommendations - Full Presentation.” FERC, September 23, 2021. https://www.ferc.gov/media/february- 2021-cold-weather-grid-operations-preliminary-findings-and-recommendations-full 122 ERCOT. 2022. “Final Winterization Report: Texas Grid Ready for Winter Weather Operations.” January 18, 2022.

122 ERCOT. 2022. “Final Winterization Report: Texas Grid Ready for Winter Weather Operations.” January 18, 2022. https://www.ercot.com/news/release?id=50d48648-2119-1c22-e9e9-a32f57650203 123 McGinnis, David, Cathy Webking, and Eleanor D’Ambrosio. 2022. “RRC’s New Rule Designates “Critical Gas Suppliers.”

123 McGinnis, David, Cathy Webking, and Eleanor D’Ambrosio. 2022. “RRC’s New Rule Designates “Critical Gas Suppliers.” Scott Douglass McConnico, January 3, 2022. https://www.scottdoug.com/rrcs-new-rule-designates-critical-gas-suppliers/ 124 Gold, Russell. “The Texas Electric Grid Failure Was a Warm-Up.” Texas Monthly, January 18, 2022. https://www.texasmonthly.com/news-politics/texas-electric-grid-failure-warm-up/ 125 Golding, Garrett, Anil Kumar and Karel Mertens. “Cost of Texas’ 2021 Deep Freeze Justifies Weatherization”, Federal

https://www.texasmonthly.com/news-politics/texas-electric-grid-failure-warm-up/ 125 Golding, Garrett, Anil Kumar and Karel Mertens. “Cost of Texas’ 2021 Deep Freeze Justifies Weatherization”, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, April 15, 2021. https://www.dallasfed.org/research/economics/2021/0415

Retrofits to Texas’ 13,000 existing wind turbines is not feasible since it would require deconstructing each wind turbine, but blade coatings, cold weather lubricants, and de-icing drones can mitigate 126 ice formation for future installations.

Across the state, families found creative ways to stay warm. Those with certain types of gas- 127 powered stoves or fireplaces were able to stay warm even if the power went out. For those without power, community-based organizations rallied to fulfill unmet needs during the storm. The disruption in food supply chains and grocery store closures limited access to food, disproportionately affecting individuals without the resources to travel long distances or who 128 already faced food insecurity. Community-based organizations gave families money for gas, transported families without cars to warming centers, and delivered food. The Catholic Charities Foundation of Forth Worth helped 83 families across North Texas apply for disaster assistance 129 through FEMA and provided over $75,000 to cover hotels, rent, car repairs, and furniture. Other groups identified alternative housing and assisted vulnerable individuals in finding warm shelters.

The American Red Cross of North Texas provided warming stations, information, food, water, and mental health support throughout the storm. More than 300 trained staff worked with community 130 and government partners to provide and distribute meals, blankets, and shelter. Before and during the storm, volunteers distributed 500 cots, 1,000 blankets, 140,000 meals, and 12,000 131 comfort supplies (e.g., hygiene kits) to those in need. Home and apartment fires increased as people invented ways to stay warm. By the end of February, the Red Cross had responded to 285 132 fires and helped over 1,400 people, more than double the previous year.

Winter Storm Uri - Technology Solutions for Building Resilience

Residents that had gas service were more likely to be able to keep warm, continue to cook and boil water to make it potable. The following section discusses the resilience characteristics of selected technologies that supply essential functions. Gas Ranges

About 12 million people received “boil notices” because of poor water quality. ICF conducted a social media listening study and identified residents that had gas stoves and ranges that were able to boil water and cook food during the event.

Older gas ranges with pilot lights continued to function as usual without any specific customer intervention. Although ranges with pilot lights are still available for purchase, many newer gas ranges have electronic igniters which use electricity to ignite the burners. However, these ranges can typically function without electricity. For example, although the oven cannot be used, the stovetop burners of the GE Hotpoint RGBS200DMWW can be used during a power failure as the burners can be lit with a match by following the manufacturer’s instructions.

Older gas ranges with pilot lights continued to function as usual without any specific customer intervention. Although ranges with pilot lights are still available for purchase, many newer gas ranges have electronic igniters which use electricity to ignite the burners. However, these ranges can typically function without electricity. For example, although the oven cannot be used, the stovetop burners of the GE Hotpoint RGBS200DMWW can be used during a power failure as the 133 burners can be lit with a match by following the manufacturer’s instructions. It is unclear to what

126 Ibid. 127 Halsey, Anne. Twitter Post. February 16, 2021, 3:03 PM. https://twitter.com/anne_halsey/status/1361768250762088449

Report.pdf 129 Catholic Charities of Fort Worth. “Disaster Response: Reflecting on Winter Storm Uri.” Catholic Charities of Fort Worth, July 22, 2021. https://catholiccharitiesfortworth.org/disaster-response-reflecting-on-winter-storm-uri/ 130 Hegar, Glenn. 2021.”Winter Strom Uri 2021.” Fiscal Notes, October 2021.

131 Torres, Leticia. (2021, October). Texans Respond During and After the Storm. Fiscal Notes. Retrieved from

Hegar, Glenn. 2021.”Winter Strom Uri 2021.” Fiscal Notes, October 2021.

131 Torres, Leticia. (2021, October). Texans Respond During and After the Storm. Fiscal Notes. Retrieved from https://comptroller.texas.gov/economy/fiscal-notes/2021/oct/winter-storm-response.php 132 Hegar, Glenn. 2021.”Winter Strom Uri 2021.” Fiscal Notes, October 2021.

133 General Electric. Thermostat Gas Ranges. Accessed June 3, 2022.

132 Hegar, Glenn. 2021.”Winter Strom Uri 2021.” Fiscal Notes, October 2021.

133 General Electric. Thermostat Gas Ranges. Accessed June 3, 2022.

132 Hegar, Glenn. 2021.”Winter Strom Uri 2021.” Fiscal Notes, October 2021.

133 General Electric. Thermostat Gas Ranges. Accessed June 3, 2022. https://products.geappliances.com/MarketingObjectRetrieval/Dispatcher?RequestType=PDF&Name=49-2000315-4.pdf extent homeowners with electronic gas ranges are aware that the stovetop burners can be used even if there is no electricity.

Several manufacturers offer what are called battery ignition, battery operated or cordless natural gas and propane ranges that do not require AC power and in which the standing pilot light is replaced by an electronic spark igniter. General Electric offers a version of the GE Hotpoint RGBS200DMWW that operates via a 9-volt battery that lasts 3 years. The range can also be lit manually, with a match, if the 134 battery goes out.

E lectronic Gas Ranges Resilient to E lectric O utages

It is possible that some residents with electronic gas ranges may not have been aware that even their ranges could be lit manually and thus were not able to benefit from the resilience of natural gas.

Even though electronic ranges use electricity for igniting gas, they can function without electricity. Although the oven typically won’t work without electricity, the stovetops can be lit with a match if the user follows the manufacturer’s instructions. Other ranges use backup batteries to allow them to operate during a power failure.

Heating Systems

Most home heating systems became unavailable due to loss of electrical power either because the system relied on electricity as the primary energy source or because key components of the system required electricity to function. Electric resistance heating and forced air electric furnaces are examples of systems that use electricity as the direct source of energy and thus are unavailable during power outages. Electric heat pumps, gas powered heat pumps, gas furnaces that use blowers to circulate hot air and oil furnaces that use electricity to run a pump are examples of systems that don’t use electricity as the primary energy source but require electricity for key components to function and so won’t function during power outages.

The social media listening study found posts from several residents that were able to stay warm with gas fireplaces. Although many gas fireplaces use electricity to power functions such as air blowers and remote controls, most manufacturers of gas fireplaces offer battery backup accessories to allow the units to work without electrical power. On battery backup, although functions such as air blowers and remote controls will not be available, the fireplaces can still provide heat via convection. Some manufacturers offer specific units with integrated battery backup such as the “Heatilator” models that have the “IntelliFire” Intermittent Pilot Light system that includes a battery backup to allow the fireplace to run during a power outage.

135 that includes a battery backup to allow the fireplace to run during a power outage.

With regard to building resilience against future events, electrical resistance heating and electric furnaces would require higher capacity and more expensive backup generation systems than gas

During Winter Storm Uri, some residents were able to stay warm by using their gas fireplaces. Many gas fireplaces offer battery backup features that allow the fireplace to continue to operate without electricity, although at slightly reduced functionality.

134 Ibid. 135 “Heatilator.” Accessed on June 3, 2022. https://www.heatilator.com/ or oil furnaces or a natural gas heat pumps that require electricity mainly to run a fan, a pump or a compressor.

Hot Water Heaters

Hot water heating systems can be powered by electricity or gas. Gas powered systems include tank type and tankless heaters. Tank type heaters have a reservoir of hot water and are available with continuous pilot lights or electronic ignition. Heaters with continuous pilot lights do not require

continuous pilot lights or electronic ignition. Heaters with continuous pilot lights do not require electricity to function and will continue to supply hot water during a power outage. Some heaters with electronic ignition require an external electric supply and will not function during a power outage. For either type of tank type heater, the reservoir can supply hot water for many hours after electric supply is lost. Tankless water heaters supply water on demand and typically have controls that are powered by electricity and consequently will not work during a power outage.

Conclusions – Winter Storm Uri

Cities and counties across Texas are working towards establishing goals and strategies to increase their resilience to extreme weather and storms. For example, the City of Austin Strategic Direction 2023 and Travis County Vision, Mission, and Goals establish pathways to address inequities, foster community engagement, expand preparedness programs, and increase staffing to handle 136 emergency operations. Based on ICF’s review of Winter Storm Uri and its impacts, we offer the following recommendations for building resilience to future events:

Ÿ Make weatherization a requirement for power plants and critical natural gas facilities. FERC recommendations on weatherization for power plants were advisory. Texas implemented these recommendations with Senate Bill 3 and as of 2022, 98% of power plants were properly winterized. Only natural gas facilities deemed “critical” are required to winterize equipment.

Ÿ To ensure adequate supply of natural gas, winterize wellheads, install backup power at compressor stations, and ensure that underground storage facilities maintain a minimum supply (e.g., based on withdrawal during Winter Storm Uri). Ÿ Revise risk assessments to account for future climate change, including increasing frequency of

Ÿ Revise risk assessments to account for future climate change, including increasing frequency of 137 winter storms and heat waves. Include vulnerable populations as a component of this risk assessment to help target subsequent resilience measures to such communities.

Ÿ Improve emergency communication and warning systems, especially for non-English speaking households. If warnings had been issued earlier, residents would have had more time to prepare 138 and what to expect.

136 City of Austin and Travis County. 2021 Winter Storm Uri After-Action Review Findings Report. (Austin: City of Austin and Travis County, 2021). https://www.austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/HSEM/2021-Winter-Storm-Uri-AAR-Findings- Report.pdf 137 Smith, Robert. “A Climate Black Swan: The Lessons Learned from Uri.” VettaFi, March 11, 2021. https://etfdb.com/esg-

Report.pdf 137 Smith, Robert. “A Climate Black Swan: The Lessons Learned from Uri.” VettaFi, March 11, 2021. https://etfdb.com/esgchannel/climate-black-swan-lessons-learned-from-uri/ 138 Busby, Joshua W., Kyri Baker, Morgan D. Bazilian, Alex Q. Gilbert, Emily Grubert, Varun Rai, Joshua D. Rhodes, Sarang

138 Busby, Joshua W., Kyri Baker, Morgan D. Bazilian, Alex Q. Gilbert, Emily Grubert, Varun Rai, Joshua D. Rhodes, Sarang Shidore, Caitlin A. Smith, and Michael E. Webber. 2021. “Cascading Risks: Understanding the 2021 Winter Blackout in Texas.” Energy Research & Social Science, 77:102106. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2021.102106.

Case Studies of Multi-Sectoral Resilience to Natural Disasters CHAPTER 2 |

Ÿ Require carbon monoxide alarms in all homes. Local governments in Texas have discretion to establish carbon monoxide rules. As a result, many older or single-family homes do not have carbon monoxide alarms. 139

Ÿ Examine ways to make rolling blackouts and power, gas, and water restoration efforts more equitable so that historically disadvantaged communities do not suffer longer losses of service. This may involve mapping population demographics and using these data to help inform blackout and restoration plans and prioritizing backup power or resilience hubs in historically disadvantaged communities.

Trevizo, Peter, Ren Larson, Lexi Churchill, Mike Hixenbaugh, and Suzy Khimm. “Texas Winter Storm: Worst Carbon Monoxide Poisoning Catastrophe in Recent U.S. History.” Deceleration News, April 29, 2021. https://deceleration.news/2021/04/29/texas-winter-storm-carbon-monoxide-poisoning/

Case Studies of Multi-Sectoral Resilience to Natural Disasters CHAPTER 2 |

November 2018 Wildfires in Southern California

Dates: On November 9, 2018, Acting Governor Newsom declared a State of Emergency for Los Angeles and Ventura counties, and the federal Emergency th Declaration was also issued on November 9.

Standout features: The Woolsey Fire destroyed more than 1,500 structures, damaged 341 structures, resulted in three civilian fatalities, and forced close to a quarter 142, 143, 144 million people to evacuate. Given the Damages to electric lines along the highway. high population density and high value Image Source: Alejandra Reyes-Velarde | Los 140 properties, the impact of this fire was Angeles Times. 145 especially severe.

Firefighting crews struggled to reach and protect people and properties due to the steep terrain and narrow roads limited access to the affected areas.

Area affected: The Hill Fire started in Camarillo and spread north, burning approximately 4,500 acres and four structures 146, 147 over eight days. The Woolsey Fire began south of Simi Valley and burned over Remains of homes and vehicles in Malibu, CA. 141

Image Source: Frederic Brown | Getty Images.

97,000 acres in Ventura and Los Angeles Counties. The Woolsey Fire affected Thousand Oaks, Oak Park, Westlake Village, Agoura Hills, West Hills, Simi Valley, 148 Chatsworth, Bell Canyon, Hidden Hills, Malibu, and Calabasas.

140 Reyes-Velarde, Alejandra, November 20, 2018. “Woolsey fire victims file lawsuit against Southern California Edison.” Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from https://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-california-fires-woolsey-hill-camp-victims-of- the-woolsey-fire-file-lawsuit-1542736465-htmlstory.html 141 Brown, Frederic J./AFP/Getty Images. LAist, November 14, 2018. https://laist.com/2018/11/14/this_map_shows_where_homes_have_been_destroyed_and_damaged_by_the_woolsey_and_ hill_fires.php 142 Goodyear, Dana. “Building for Resilience in California's Fire-prone Future.” The New Yorker, Februrary 19, 2019. https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/building-for-resilience-in-californias-fire-prone-future 143 County of Los Angeles Fire Department, Los Angeles County Sheriff, and Ventura County Fire Department. “Woolsey Fire Incident Update.” November 19, 2018. http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/pub/cdf/images/incidentfile2282_4307.pdf 144 Southern California Edison. “Implementation of Emergency Disaster Relief Program for Hill and Woolsey Wildfire Victims Pursuant to Decision 18-08-004.” Advice Letter 3902-E, November 26, 2018. https://www1.sce.com/NR/sc3/tm2/pdf/3902-E.pdf 145 Folkman, Chris . “Camp and Woolsey Fires: A Historical and Numerical Perspective. RMS, November 19, 2018. https://www.rms.com/blog/2018/11/19/camp-and-woolsey-fires-a-historical-and-numerical-perspective. 146 CalFire. “Incident Information: Hill Fire.” January 4, 2019. http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/incidents/incidents_details_info?incident_id=2281 Southern California Edison. “Implementation of Emergency Disaster Relief Program for Hill and Woolsey Wildfire Victims Pursuant to Decision 18-08-004.” Advice Letter 3902-E, November 26, 2018. https://www1.sce.com/NR/sc3/tm2/pdf/3902-E.pdf County of Los Angeles Fire Department, Los Angeles County Sheriff, and Ventura County Fire Department. “Woolsey Fire Incident Update.” November 19, 2018. http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/pub/cdf/images/incidentfile2282_4307.pdf

Utilities: Southern California Edison (SCE) is the major electric utility and Southern California Gas (SoCalGas) provides natural gas in the counties affected by the Woolsey and Hill fires. Table 2 provides additional information about key utilities in Los Angeles and Ventura counties, including water and wastewater utilities, although this list is not comprehensive. LADWP provided water to fight the fire from its reservoirs, but its facilities 150 were not affected directly by the fire.

The fire moving in on homes in Malibu, CA. 149 Image Source: David McNew | Getty Images.

Figure 8. The extent of the Hill and Woolsey Fires.

Source: NOAA

149 McNew, David/Getty Images. Business Insider, November 14, 2018. 150 LA Department of Water and Power. “LADWP's Kittridge Water Tanks & Chatsworth Reservoir Provided Support to

McNew, David/Getty Images. Business Insider, November 14, 2018. 150 LA Department of Water and Power. “LADWP's Kittridge Water Tanks & Chatsworth Reservoir Provided Support to Woolsey Fire Response.” LADWP News, n.d. Accessed June 2019. https://www.ladwpnews.com/ladwps-kittridge-watertanks-chatsworth-reservoir-provided-support-to-woolsey-fire-response/

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While the Woolsey and Hill Fires burned in the south, the Camp Fire broke out in Butte County in Northern California. The Camp Fire became the deadliest and most destructive wildfire in California. 151 This fire was in the PG&E service territory, driven by strong, hot winds, extremely dry conditions, and downed power transmission lines. The fire destroyed the community of Concow and town of Paradise, CA, and residents were evacuated. However, the fire caused at least 85 casualties, making it the deadliest fire in California history. 152

Figure 9. Counties included in FEMA’s Major Disaster Declaration for the November

2018 California wildfires (Woolsey and Hill Fires in Southern California).

153

Eavis, P. A. “California Says PG&E Power Lines Caused Camp Fire That Killed 85.” The New York Times, May 15, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/business/pge-fire.html Cal Fire. “Camp Fire Incident Information.” November 8, 2018. http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/incidents/incidents_details_info?incident_id=2277 FEMA. “California Wildfires (DR-4407).” November 30, 2018. https://www.fema.gov/disaster/4407

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Table 2. Relevant California utilities whose service territories overlap with the

counties included in FEMA’s disaster declaration for the November 2018 wildfires.

Utility

Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (electric)

Southern California Edison (SCE) (electric)

Southern California Gas (SoCalGas) (natural gas)

Wate r Service

Wastewater Service

Examples of Resilience

Natural Gas ● emergency events ● Electricity ● Water/Wastewater ● ● ●

Overview

• Covers 465 mi2
• Serves over 4 million residents, with 1.5 million power customers in Los Angeles and 5,000 in the Owens Valley
• Serves 180 cities and 15 counties (50,000 mi2)
• Serves Los Angeles and Ventura counties
• Provides electricity to 15 million people and 285,000 businesses
• Serves 21.6 million customers in over 500 communities in central and southern California (20,000 mi2)
• Serves Los Angeles and Ventura counties Ventura County
• Metropolitan Water District delivers water to 14 cities, 11 municipal water districts, and one county
• Calleguas Municipal Water District
• Calleguas Municipal Water District serves roughly three quarters of Ventura County residents, primarily in the southern part of the county.
• City of Thousand Oaks
• California – American Water Company
• California Water Service Los Angeles
• Los Angeles Department of Water & Power
• Las Virgenes Municipal Water District
• LADWP serves over 4 million residents with 681,000 active service connections154
• Las Virgenes provides potable water, wastewater treatment, recycled water, and composting for more than 75,000 residents of the cities of Agoura Hills, Calabasas, Hidden Hills, Westlake Village, and unincorporated areas of western Los Angeles County
• City of Thousand Oaks
• Triunfo Sanitation District (serves Westlake, Lake Sherwood, and part of North Ranch)
• Ventura Regional Sanitation District
• Triunfo serves approximately 33,000 residents of east Ventura County, including wastewater collection and treatment
• Provides sanitation services to more than 600,000 residents of Ventura County SoCalGas initiated Emergency Response Operations Protocol for proactive pressure adjustments ahead of

Satellite and drone imagery were used to pinpoint impacted pipeline areas

Mutual assistance programs supported utilities in need of emergency personnel

System redundancies allowed for continued water delivery despite damage to assets Mutual assistance programs supported utilities in need of emergency personnel Support from state agencies in coordinating response efforts

LA Department of Water and Power. 2013. “Water: Facts and Figures.” https://www.ladwp.com/ladwp/faces/ladwp/aboutus/a-water/a-w-factandfigures

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Figure 10. Service territories for California IOUs.

Source: California Energy Commission.

California Energy Commission. 2016. “California's Electric Investor-Owned Utilities (IOUs).” October 24, 2016. https://www.energy.ca.gov/maps/serviceareas/CA_Electric_Investor_Owned_Utilities_IOUs.html

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Figure 11. Natural gas utility service areas in California.

Source: California Energy Commission.156

California Energy Commission. “California Natural Gas Utility Service Areas Map.” June 28, 2018. https://www.energy.ca.gov/maps/serviceareas/naturalgas_service_areas.html

October 2018 Hurricane Michael in Florida

Dates: October 10, 2018 Hurricane Michael made landfall along the Florida panhandle on October 10, 2018 as a Category 5 160 hurricane.

Standout features: The 160 mph winds ripped through vegetation and infrastructure, leading to at least 45 fatalities and $25 billion in 161 damages. Michael is only the fourth hurricane on record to make landfall in the United States as a Category 5 storm, and the first to do so since Hurricane Andrew in 162 1992.

Hurricane Michael was one of the costliest weather and climate disasters of 2018 – a year that saw 14 weather and climate disasters with losses each exceeding $1 billion in the United 163 States. Estimated insured losses from 164 Hurricane Michael exceeded $5.5 billion, and FEMA approved over 31,000 individual 165 assistance applications.

Area affected: A stretch of land in the North and Northwestern portion of Florida were hit. FEMA designed 12 counties for individual assistance and 18 counties total in its disaster declaration (Figure 12).

Flooding and destruction in Panama City, Florida. 157 Image source: AP.

Utilities: Major utilities impacted by Hurricane Michael in Florida include Duke Energy, Emera, Florida Public Utilities, and Southern Co. (Table 3).

Homes destroyed by Hurricane Michael in 158 Panama City, FL. Image source: P.

Flooding and destruction in St. Marks, Florida. 159 Image source: AP.

Ibid.

160 NOAA. “Hurricane Michael upgraded to a Category 5 at time of U.S. landfall.” NOAA, April 19, 2019. https://www.noaa.gov/media-release/hurricane-michael-upgraded-to-category-5-at-time-of-us-landfall 161 NOAA. “Assessing the U.S. Climate in 2018.” NOAA National Center for Environmental Information, February 6, 2019.

https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/news/national-climate-201812 162 NOAA. “Hurricane Michael upgraded to a Category 5 at time of U.S. landfall.” NOAA, April 19, 2019. https://www.noaa.gov/media-release/hurricane-michael-upgraded-to-category-5-at-time-of-us-landfall

603416678 158 Ibid.

159 Ibid.

https://www.noaa.gov/media-release/hurricane-michael-upgraded-to-category-5-at-time-of-us-landfall 163 NOAA. “Assessing the U.S. Climate in 2018.” NOAA National Center for Environmental Information, February 6, 2019. https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/news/national-climate-201812. 164 The News Service of Florida. “Hurricane Michael insured losses near $5.53 billion.” News Herald, February 7, 2019.

https://www.newsherald.com/news/20190207/hurricane-michael-insured-losses-near-553-billion 165 FEMA. “Florida Hurricane Michael (DR-4399).” October 23, 2018. https://www.fema.gov/disaster/4399

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Figure 12. Counties included in FEMA’s disaster declaration for Hurricane Michael.

Source: FEMA.

FEMA. “Florida Hurricane Michael (DR-4399).” October 23, 2018. https://www.fema.gov/disaster/4399

Table 3. Relevant Florida natural gas and electric utilities whose service territories overlap with the counties included in FEMA’s disaster declaration.

Examples of Resilience

Natural Gas Prompt restoration of service to critical customers

● Prompt restoration of service to critical customers Electricity

Electricity Mutual assistance programs supported utilities in need of emergency personnel

168 TECO Peoples Gas. “Our Natural Gas System.” Accessed May 31, 2019. https://www.peoplesgas.com/company/ournaturalgassystem/

https://www.peoplesgas.com/company/ournaturalgassystem/ 169 Florida Public Utilities. “Florida Public Utilities Service Area.” Accessed May 31, 2019. https://fpuc.com/customer-

● Mutual assistance programs supported utilities in need of emergency personnel

167 Duke Energy. “About Us.” Accessed July 19, 2022. https://www.duke-energy.com/our-company/about-us 168 TECO Peoples Gas. “Our Natural Gas System.” Accessed May 31, 2019.

https://www.peoplesgas.com/company/ournaturalgassystem/ 169 Florida Public Utilities. “Florida Public Utilities Service Area.” Accessed May 31, 2019. https://fpuc.com/customerservice/areas-we-serve/ 170 Florida Public Utilities. “FPU Fact Sheet.” May 31, 2019. https://fpuc.com/about/corporate-fact-sheet/

service/areas-we-serve/ 170 Florida Public Utilities. “FPU Fact Sheet.” May 31, 2019. https://fpuc.com/about/corporate-fact-sheet/ 171 US Energy Information Administration. “Annual Electric Power Industry Report, Form EIA-861 detailed data files.” EIA

Florida Public Utilities. “FPU Fact Sheet.” May 31, 2019. https://fpuc.com/about/corporate-fact-sheet/ 171 US Energy Information Administration. “Annual Electric Power Industry Report, Form EIA-861 detailed data files.” EIA Electricity, January 5, 2019. https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/ 172 Southern Company. (2019). Service Territory: Our Subsidiaries. Retrieved May 31, 2019, from

Electricity, January 5, 2019. https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/ 172 Southern Company. (2019). Service Territory: Our Subsidiaries. Retrieved May 31, 2019, from https://www.southerncompany.com/about-us/our-business/service-territory.html

https://www.southerncompany.com/about-us/our-business/service-territory.html 173 Gulf Power. “Our Company.” Accessed January 2018. https://www.gulfpower.com/about-us/our-company

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December 2017 Wildfires and Mudslides in Southern California

Dates: Starting December 4, 2017, 122 wildfires broke out in Southern California, five of which grew into large, fast-moving fires. The state of California put out Declarations of Emergency on December 5 and December 7, 2017, and a federal Emergency Declaration was issued on December 8, 2017, after declaring Fire Management Assistance Declarations from December 5-7, 2017 for the Thomas176, Creek177, Rye178, Skirball179, Gas crews work a damaged line after an RV was and Lilac180 fires. carried by the mudslides into a home. Source: 174 Standout features: The Santa Ana winds and Roa.

critically dry conditions aided the rapid growth and spread of these fires. The state experienced a record for continuous red flag fire conditions, topping at 13 days. On one 181, 182 day, humidity registered as 0%. Wildfire scorched 4,100 acres in San Diego County. The Lilac Fire destroyed at least 151 183 structures and damaged 56 buildings. Ultimately, the Thomas fire grew to be the largest recorded California wildfire, burning 184 281,893 acres and 1,063 structures. Heavy Satellite imagery of smoke from the December 175 rains on January 9, 2018, followed this wildfires. Image Source: NOAA. destruction. The lack of vegetation and hydrophobic soils in the wake of the burns, combined with the intensity of precipitation, led to hillside-scouring downpours, resulting in flash flooding and deadly mudslides (Figure 14). Thousands of tons of mud and

174 Roa, Paul. “Photo Gallery: Mudslide clean up on Country Club Drive.” The LA Times, January 10, 2018. https://www.latimes.com/socal/burbank-leader/photos/la-mudslide-clean-up-on-country-club-drive- photogallery.html??dssReturn=true. 175 Liberto, Tom. “December wildfires scorch southern California in 2017.” NOAA Climate.gov, December 15, 2017. December wildfires scorch southern California in 2017 | NOAA Climate.gov 176 FEMA. “California Thomas Fire (FM-5224).” December 5, 2017. https://www.fema.gov/disaster/5224. 177 FEMA. “California Creek Fire (FM-5225).” December 13, 2017. https://www.fema.gov/disaster/5225. 178 FEMA. “California Rye Fire (FM-5226).” December 8, 2017. https://www.fema.gov/disaster/5226. 179 FEMA. “California Skirball Fire (FM-5227).” December 8, 2017. https://www.fema.gov/disaster/5227. 180 FEMA. “California Lilac Fire (FM-5228).” December 8, 2017. https://www.fema.gov/disaster/5228. 181 CPUC. “Fire Safety and Utility Infrastructure En Banc.” January 31, 2018. http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/2018FireEnBanc/ 182 Tchekmedyian, Alene; Melissa Etehad and Javier Panzar. “As Montecito cleanup continues, a search for where to dump thousands of tons of mud.” Los Angeles Times, January 17, 2018. http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-montecito- mud-20180117-story.html Nikolewski, R. “California fires: SDG&E expects to fully restore power Tuesday.” The San Diego Union Tribune, December 11 2017. https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/public-safety/sd-fi-power-restoration-20171211- story.html CPUC. “Fire Safety and Utility Infrastructure En Banc.” January 31, 2018. http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/2018FireEnBanc/

debris swept through the Montecito community, carrying along boulders, cars, and anything else in its path. The disaster destroyed over 100 homes and tragically led 185 to 22 deaths.

Area affected: FEMA expanded the Presidential Major Disaster Declaration in affect for areas damaged by the December 2017 wildfires to include the mud and debris slides.

Utilities: SoCalGas completed its service restoration efforts to available customers in 186 Montecito on January 31, 2018.

Damage to a home on Country Club Drive in Burbank, CA. Image source: Rob Kay/ICF.

Figure 13. Counties included in FEMA's Major Disaster Declaration for the December –January California wildfires, flooding, mudflows and debris flows.

FEMA-4353-DR, California Disaster Declaration as of 01/15/2018

187 Source: FEMA.

Data Sources: FEMA, ESRI. Initial Declaration: 01/02/2018 Disaster Federal Registry Notice: Amendment #2 01/15/2018 Datum: North American 1983 Projection: Lambert Conformal Conic

185 Tchekmedyian, Alene; Melissa Etehad and Javier Panzar. “As Montecito cleanup continues, a search for where to dump thousands of tons of mud.” Los Angeles Times, January 17, 2018. http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-montecitomud-20180117-story.html 186 SoCalGas. “Montecito Updates.” February 2, 2018.

mud-20180117-story.html 186 SoCalGas. “Montecito Updates.” February 2, 2018. https://www.socalgas.com/cs/Satellite?c=Page&cid=1443741422311&pagename=SoCalGas%2Fscg%2Flayout&rendermo de=pre 187 FEMA. “California Wildfires, Flooding, Mudflows, And Debris Flows (DR-4353).” September 7, 2018.

de=pre 187 FEMA. “California Wildfires, Flooding, Mudflows, And Debris Flows (DR-4353).” September 7, 2018. https://www.fema.gov/disaster/4353.

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Figure 14. Before and after satellite images of the damage wrought by the Thomas

Fire and mudslides in the San Ysidro Creek area.

Source: Karklis, Tierney, & Meko.

Karklis, Laris; Tierney, Laura; and Meko, Tim. “Before and after the mudslides in Montecito.” The Washington Post, Updated January 19, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/national/montecito-before- after/?utm_term=.34f49efadc26

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Figure 15. Map of Thomas Fire and adjacent fires.

Image courtesy of CalFire. Source: Google Maps.189

San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E) and Southern California Gas (SoCalGas) are the major natural gas providers in the counties affected by the December wildfires and January mudslides. Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E), SDG&E, Southern California Edison (SCE), and Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP) are the major electric utilities for this area (Table 4).

Google Maps. “2017 Statewide Fire Map.” https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/viewer?ll=33.94353536469569%2C

Table 4. Relevant California natural gas and electric utilities whose service territories overlap with the counties included in FEMA’s disaster declaration for the December- January wildfires and mudslides.

Examples of Resilience

Natural Gas Automatic shut off valves and advanced meter network avoided potential impacts from breaches during

● Automatic shut off valves and advanced meter network avoided potential impacts from breaches during mudslides Satellite and drone imagery were used to pinpoint impacted pipeline areas

● Satellite and drone imagery were used to pinpoint impacted pipeline areas Electricity

Electricity Mutual assistance programs supported utilities in need of emergency personnel

● Mutual assistance programs supported utilities in need of emergency personnel

October 2017 Wildfires in Northern California

Dates: Starting Sunday, October 8, 2017, multiple conflagrations that finally totaled one hundred and seventy-two wildfires burned northern California. There were ultimately 21 major wildfires that raged through the month of October. On October 9 and 10, 2017, California issued a state emergency declaration, and on October 10 FEMA issued 192 a federal Major Disaster Declaration.

Standout features: There were ultimately 21 major wildfires that burned a total area greater than 245,000 acres, destroyed an estimated 8,920 structures and damaged an additional 736 structures, taking 44 lives. Four of the October wildfires are now among the top 20 most destructive fires in terms of structures burned in the history of California, with the Tubbs fire alone burning 5,636 structures. Hurricane Michael was one of the costliest

Hurricane Michael was one of the costliest weather and climate disasters of 2018 – a year that saw 14 weather and climate disasters with

losses each exceeding $1 billion in the United 193 States. Estimated insured losses from Hurricane Michael exceeded $5.5 billion, and FEMA approved over 31,000 individual 195 assistance applications.

losses each exceeding $1 billion in the United Estimated insured losses from 194 Hurricane Michael exceeded $5.5 billion, and FEMA approved over 31,000 individual 195

A burned out and collapsed neighborhood in Napa, CA after the Nuns fire. Source: Peter DaSilva/Special to the Chronicle190

Damage to a hotel in Santa Rosa, California. 191 Source: Adam Grossberg/KQED.

Area affected: A The fires affected Napa, Sonoma, Butte, Humboldt, Mendocino, and Del Norte Counties, as well as in the areas surrounding Grass Valley and Yuba City.

Utilities: The major utility in these affected counties is Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E), which provides both natural gas and electricity to the area.

190 Ho, Vivian, Jenna Lyons, and Steve Rubenstein. “Live updates: Firefighter dies in Napa County crash; more evacuations lifted.” SF Gate, October 16, 2017. http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Live-updates-4-more-names-of-people-killed-in- 12279908.php#photo-14341576 191 Marks, David. “PHOTOS: Massive Wildfires Tear Through Wine Country.” KQED, October 9, 2017.

12279908.php#photo-14341576 191 Marks, David. “PHOTOS: Massive Wildfires Tear Through Wine Country.” KQED, October 9, 2017. https://www.kqed.org/news/11621829/photos-massive-wildfires-tear-through-north-bay 192 CPUC. “Fire Safety and Utility Infrastructure En Banc.” January 31, 2018. http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/2018FireEnBanc/

192 CPUC. “Fire Safety and Utility Infrastructure En Banc.” January 31, 2018. http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/2018FireEnBanc/ 193 NOAA. “Assessing the U.S. Climate in 2018.” NOAA National Center for Environmental Information, February 6, 2019. https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/news/national-climate-201812. 194 The News Service of Florida. “Hurricane Michael insured losses near $5.53 billion.” News Herald, February 7, 2019.

https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/news/national-climate-201812. 194 The News Service of Florida. “Hurricane Michael insured losses near $5.53 billion.” News Herald, February 7, 2019. https://www.newsherald.com/news/20190207/hurricane-michael-insured-losses-near-553-billion 195 FEMA. “Florida Hurricane Michael (DR-4399).” October 23, 2018. https://www.fema.gov/disaster/4399

https://www.newsherald.com/news/20190207/hurricane-michael-insured-losses-near-553-billion 195 FEMA. “Florida Hurricane Michael (DR-4399).” October 23, 2018. https://www.fema.gov/disaster/4399

Figure 16. Counties included in FEMA's Major Disaster Declaration for the October wildfires.

FEMA-4344-DR, California Disaster Declaration as of 10/14/2017

Source: FEMA196

Table 5. Relevant California natural gas and electric utilities whose service territories overlap with the counties included in FEMA’s disaster declaration.

Examples of Resilience

Electricity Mutual assistance programs supported utilities in need of emergency personnel

Natural Gas ● Gas utilities were able to bring semitrailers of gas to specific locations in order to feed systems that needed the natural gas

Natural Gas Gas utilities were able to bring semitrailers of gas to specific locations in order to feed systems that

● Mutual assistance programs supported utilities in need of emergency personnel

196 FEMA. California Wildfires (DR-4344). November 7, 2018. https://www.fema.gov/disaster/4344

September 2017 Hurricane Irma in Florida

Dates: Irma made landfall over the Florida Keys on September 10, 2017 as a Category 4 hurricane then again on the coast of Florida later that same day as a Category 3 storm. Ultimately, the incident lasted from September 4 – October 18, 2017.

Standout features: Hurricane Irma approached Florida as a Category 5 hurricane and one of the strongest Atlantic storms on record, with maximum winds of 185 mph sustained over 35 hours. When Irma first made landfall as a Category 4 storm, maximum sustained winds of 130 mph were registered. When it landed on the coast of Florida later that same day as a Category 3 storm Irma had 115 mph winds. By the following day it had weakened to tropical storm status. Florida experienced a recordbreaking 5.57 feet of storm surge flooding.

Irma was the strongest hurricane to hit the continental United States since Hurricane Katrina in 2005. FEMA approved 771,071 individual assistance applications to help cope with the damage. Area affected: FEMA issued a Major Disaster

Area affected: FEMA issued a Major Disaster Declaration on September 10, 2017, for all of Florida (Figure 17). The northeastern Caribbean and Florida Keys experienced widespread damage and flooding.

Utilities: Major utilities impacted by Hurricane Irma in Florida include Duke Energy, Emera, Florida Power and Light, Florida Public Utilities, and Southern Co. (Table 6). Figure 19 shows the geographic distribution of natural gas pipelines and local distribution companies (LDCs) in Florida. Because Irma’s path covered nearly all of Florida, it can be reasonably assumed that all pipelines represented in this map experienced the hurricane.

197 Flooding in Jacksonville, FL. Source: Reuters.

Flooding in the Florida Keys. Source: Getty 198 Images.

Damage in Naples, FL. Source: Daniel William 199 McKnight/Polaris.

197 BBC. “Hurricane Irma: Damage mapped.” September 12, 2017. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-41175312 198 Ibid. 199 Shapiro, Emily; Allen, Karma; Jacobo, Julia. “Irma death toll in US climbs to 22 as power is restored to over 2 million

Case Studies of Multi-Sectoral Resilience to Natural Disasters CHAPTER 2 |

Figure 17. Counties included in FEMA’s disaster declaration for Hurricane Irma.

Source: FEMA.

FEMA. “Florida Hurricane Irma (DR-4337).” October 20, 2017. Accessed February 12, 2018. https://www.fema.gov/disaster/4337

Table 6. Relevant Florida natural gas and electric utilities whose service territories overlap with the counties included in FEMA’s disaster declaration.

Examples of Resilience

● Use of backup natural gas generators helped to keep critical functionality online at hospitals No Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) incident data reported for natural

● Use of backup natural gas generators helped to keep critical functionality online at hospitals ● No Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) incident data reported for natural gas systems impacted Electricity

Electricity Mutual assistance programs supported utilities in need of emergency personnel

● Mutual assistance programs supported utilities in need of emergency personnel

201 TECO Tampa Electric. “Vital Statistics.” 2019. Accessed January 2019. https://www.tampaelectric.com/company/about/vitalstatistics/ 202 US Energy Information Administration. “Annual Electric Power Industry Report, Form EIA-861 detailed data files.” EIA

https://www.tampaelectric.com/company/about/vitalstatistics/ 202 US Energy Information Administration. “Annual Electric Power Industry Report, Form EIA-861 detailed data files.” EIA Electricity, January 5, 2019. https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/ 203 TECO Tampa Electric. “Vital Statistics.” 2019. Accessed January 2019.

Southern Company 2019. 211 Gulf Power. “Our Company.” Accessed January 2018. https://www.gulfpower.com/about-us/our-company 212 Ibid. 213 US Energy Information Administration. “Annual Electric Power Industry Report, Form EIA-861 detailed data files.” EIA

Ibid. 213 US Energy Information Administration. “Annual Electric Power Industry Report, Form EIA-861 detailed data files.” EIA Electricity, January 5, 2019. https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/ 214 Florida Power and Light. “FPL Service Territory - Address Search.” 2011. Accessed January 2018.

Electricity, January 5, 2019. https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/ 214 Florida Power and Light. “FPL Service Territory - Address Search.” 2011. Accessed January 2018. http://www.fplmaps.com/service_map/map.shtml 215 Next Era Energy. “Our Subsidiaries.” 2019. http://www.nexteraenergy.com/company/subsidiaries.html

Next Era Energy. “Our Subsidiaries.” 2019. http://www.nexteraenergy.com/company/subsidiaries.html 216 US Energy Information Administration. “Annual Electric Power Industry Report, Form EIA-861 detailed data files.” EIA Electricity, January 5, 2019. https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/

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Figure 18. Investor-owned utilities in Florida.

Note that this map does not include municipal electric utilities or rural electric cooperatives.

Source: Florida Public Service Commission.

Florida Public Service Commission. “Facts and Figures of the Florida Utility Industry.” 2016. http://www.psc.state.fl.us/Files/PDF/Publications/Reports/General/Factsandfigures/March%202016.pdf

Case Studies of Multi-Sectoral Resilience to Natural Disasters CHAPTER 3 |

Figure 19. Locations of natural gas pipelines and local distribution companies (LDCs)

in Florida.

Note that the FPUC is a subsidiary of Chesapeake Utilities Corp.

Source: Florida Public Service Commission, March 2016.

August 2017 Hurricane Harvey in Texas

Dates: Hurricane Harvey made landfall on the coast of South Texas as a Category 4 storm on August 25, 2017.

Standout features: Wind gusts up to 132 mph and storm tides over 12 feet above ground level were observed as Harvey stalled over the region, with record-breaking precipitation dropping as much as 51.88 inches of rainfall. The storm lasted 4 days, leaving many south Texans flooded out of their homes and many structures destroyed. While typical hurricanes move quickly through their path, Harvey stalled over the Houston area, which worsened flooding there. Examples of this immense flooding and destruction are shown in the photos, with homes flooded nearly to their roofs and structures destroyed. Power lines throughout the storm’s path were downed and caused major outages.

Area affected: Hurricane Harvey impacted a deep section of coastal and southeast Texas, stretching inland toward central Texas – see Figure 20 for the counties included in FEMA’s disaster declaration. The Texas cities of Rockport and Fulton sustained the greatest damages, as 221 they directly experienced the eyewall. This area has a large concentration of Texas’ oil, natural gas, and other liquid pipelines (Figure 22).

Utilities: Major utilities whose service territory overlaps with these counties include American Electric Power Company, Inc. (AEP Texas), CenterPoint Energy, Entergy, and Texas New Mexico Power Company. See Table 7 for a description of their system details, including areas and populations served in Texas. CenterPoint Energy represents the natural gas and electric utility for the affected area, while the others are solely electric utilities.

Damage to electric infrastructure in Texas. 218 Source: Adrees Latif/Reuters.

Flooding in Texas. Source: Alex 219 Scott/Bloomberg.

218 Sputnik. “Texas Town Residents Told to Take Shelter After Chemical Leak.” Sputnik, August 29, 2017. https://sputniknews.com/environment/201708291056871653-la-porte-texas-chemical-leak/ 219 Bloomberg. “Harvey's 'Catastrophic' Flooding Could Cost Billions in Damage.” Fortune, August 27, 2017.

219 Bloomberg. “Harvey's 'Catastrophic' Flooding Could Cost Billions in Damage.” Fortune, August 27, 2017. http://fortune.com/2017/08/27/harvey-economic-damage-texas/ 220 Mosher, Dave. “This incredible map lets you explore Texas before and after Harvey's flooding.” Business Insider,

http://fortune.com/2017/08/27/harvey-economic-damage-texas/ 220 Mosher, Dave. “This incredible map lets you explore Texas before and after Harvey's flooding.” Business Insider, September 1, 2017. http://www.businessinsider.com/harvey-damage-aerial-survey-photos-map-2017-9 221 National Weather Service. “Major Hurricane Harvey - August 25-29, 2017.” Accessed April 30, 2018.

September 1, 2017. http://www.businessinsider.com/harvey-damage-aerial-survey-photos-map-2017-9 221 National Weather Service. “Major Hurricane Harvey - August 25-29, 2017.” Accessed April 30, 2018. https://www.weather.gov/crp/hurricane_harvey

Case Studies of Multi-Sectoral Resilience to Natural Disasters CHAPTER 3 | 54

Figure 20. Counties included in FEMA's disaster declaration for Hurricane Harvey.

Source: FEMA.

FEMA. September 15, 2017. Texas Hurricane Harvey (DR-4332) https://www.fema.gov/disaster/4332

Case Studies of Multi-Sectoral Resilience to Natural Disasters CHAPTER 3 |

Table 7. Relevant Texas natural gas and electric utilities whose service territories

overlap with the counties included in FEMA’s disaster declaration.

Utility Overview

CenterPoint Energy ● Provides energy services in Texas and 31 other states (natural gas and electric) ● Natural gas distribution in southeast Texas

• Electric transmission and delivery services cover 5,000 square miles in the Houston area
• Distributes natural gas to over 3,400,000 customers annuall y American Electric Power ● Serves 92 counties and 372 cities and towns in south and west Texas Company, Inc. (AEP Texas) (97,000 mi2) (electric) ● Part of the American Electric Power system, a large national electric utility

Entergy (electric) ● Serves roughly 447,000 electric customers223

Oncor (electric) ● Serves over 13 million customers in 98 counties

• Network consists of 140,000 miles of transmission and distribution lines in north central and west Texas224 Texas New Mexico Power ● Network includes pockets in western Texas, and around Dallas and Company (electric) Houston, serving 20 communities

• Provides electricity to over 245,000 homes and businesses225

Examples of Resilience

Natural Gas

• CenterPoint emergency operations heightened inspection and maintenance operations ahead of Harvey landfall, with only one breach recorded
• Colonial Pipeline Company used satellite data to optimize maintenance efforts along a critical pipeline and short-term disruptions
• Large hospital campuses in Texas were able to remain online due to on-site natural gas-fueled CHP system
• CNG stations remained open and provided fuel to fleets Electricity
• Intelligent grid switches quickly isolated grid issues and remotely restored service
• Used drone imagery to inform real time decision making during the restoration process
• Flood walls protected substations for critical services
• Mutual assistance programs supported utilities in need of emergency personnel US Energy Information Administration. “Annual Electric Power Industry Report, Form EIA-861 detailed data files.” EIA Electricity, January 5, 2019. https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/ Oncor. “About Us.” Accessed July 19, 2022. https://www.oncor.com/content/oncorwww/us/en/home/about-us.html Texas New Mexico Power Company. “About Us.” Accessed January 2018 http://www.tnmp.com/about/

Case Studies of Multi-Sectoral Resilience to Natural Disasters CHAPTER 3 |

Figure 21. Electric transmission and distribution utilities in Texas.

Source: Public Utility Commission of Texas.

Public Utility Commission of Texas. “Electric Maps.” 2019. https://www.puc.texas.gov/industry/maps/Electricity.aspx

Case Studies of Multi-Sectoral Resilience to Natural Disasters CHAPTER 3 |

Figure 22. Pipelines in Texas.

Source: Texas Department of Transportation.

Case Studies of Multi-Sectoral Resilience to Natural Disasters CHAPTER 3 |

CHAPTER 3

Original 2019 Report: Summary of Impacts and Resilience

This chapter presents findings from the original 2019 case studies, which included all events except Winter Storm Uri. ICF examined damage and service disruptions, compounding consequences, and examples of resilience for key infrastructural sectors: energy supply, backup generation, mobility and transportation, water and wastewater services, and telecommunications.

Energy Supply

Damage and Service Disruptions: Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Michael

Natural Gas

Natural gas supply infrastructure and consumer systems were largely found to be resilient in the face of the hurricanes, with a few instances of vulnerability. The US DOT Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) pipeline incident data concerning gas distribution for the Gulf Coast region included reports of one incident for each hurricane: in Boca Raton, Florida during Irma, in Vidor, Texas during Harvey, and in Colquitt, GA during Michael.

In Florida, a downed power line – likely damaged by Hurricane Irma – arced a hole in an underground Florida Public Utilities Co. gas main, igniting the escaping natural gas. The line was shut down from the evening of September 12, 2017, to the afternoon of September 15, 2017, and a total of two customers (both commercial) experienced an interruption in service. In Texas, an underground rupture to a CenterPoint Energy pipeline resulted in the release of 14,000 thousand cubic feet (MCF) of natural gas. However, the affected section was isolated with valves, and a shutdown of the pipeline was avoided due to the fact that this was a two-way fed line. Even so, two industrial customers were affected by the incident. The cause of the damage is under investigation but is likely related to the high flood waters and severe turbulence during Hurricane Harvey.

During Hurricane Michael, uprooted trees from the high winds damaged City of Colquitt Gas System underground lines and released natural gas in the City of Colquitt, GA, resulting in the City shutting off the gas distribution system. 227 Other reports noted relatively few impacts where there was physical damage to assets but no service disruptions or releases of natural gas. For example, an

USDOT and Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). “Pipeline Incident Flagged Files.” PHMSA, June 5, 2019. https://www.PHMSA.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/pipeline-incident-flagged-files

LNG terminal under construction in Corpus Christi, TX, only suffered minor cosmetic damages during Hurricane Harvey, and LNG production continued at that company’s Sabine Pass facility west 228 of Houston.

The PHMSA gas transmission, gas gathering, and underground natural gas storage incident report data included a few reports linked to the hurricanes. In Texas during Hurricane Harvey, one of the Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company’s compressor stations was shut down and placed in by-pass mode as a precautionary measure. Later, a power outage caused an emergency shut down at this station, which caused a by-pass valve to open and 17,811 MCF of natural gas to be released. During Hurricane Michael, a power outage resulted in service interruption at a Florida Gas 229 Transmission Company station in Chipley, Florida. There were no reported gas transmission, gathering, or underground storage incidents reported to PHMSA during Hurricane Irma.

230 There were neither fatalities nor injuries involved in any of these reported incidents. Incidents involving the release of natural gas do carry the risk of fires, explosions, and other impacts that could lead to injuries and even fatalities. For example, in October 2012, Keyspan Energy Delivery of Long Island, NY reported that Superstorm Sandy uprooted a tree at a house, which pulled out the gas service at the house foundation wall. Some natural gas escaped, which led to ignition and an explosion, non-fatally injuring one member of the general public and resulting in “significant 231 damage to the [house]”. This is the only gas distribution incident reported to PHMSA from 2010- 2019 resulting from a natural disaster (hurricane or wildfire) that involved an injury.

Two cities in Florida (Chipley and Chattahoochee), however, did report their local gas distribution systems to be out of service due to Hurricane Michael. Chipley’s interruption was due to the power outage discussed above and lasted from October 11, 2018 to October 15, 2018. Service was 232 restored quickly to critical facilities such as a water well pump and hospitals.

Offshore production of natural gas and petroleum products was shut down in the Gulf region due to evacuations in anticipation of hurricanes Harvey and Irma (Figure 23), but lowered demand due to power being out (also known as “demand destruction”) muted the domestic impact of this 233,234, 235 shutdown.

231 Ibid. 232 U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). “US Department of Transportation Resources for Hurricane Michael, Storm Response Highlight Report.” USDOT, October 15, 2018. https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/us-departmenttransportation-resources-hurricane-michael 233 Clemente, Jude. “Hurricane Harvey's Impact On Natural Gas Prices.” Forbes, September 3, 2017.

hurricane-harvey-damaged-texas-infrastructure 229 USDOT and Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). “Pipeline Incident Flagged Files.” PHMSA, June 5, 2019. https://www.PHMSA.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/pipeline-incident-flagged-files 230 Ibid. 231 Ibid.

231 Ibid. 232 U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). “US Department of Transportation Resources for Hurricane Michael, Storm

https://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2017/09/03/hurricane-harveys-impact-on-natural-gas-prices/#76ba015b5230 234 Natural Gas Intel Staff Reports. “Irma Takes Down Power, Lowers NatGas Demand for Millions in Florida, Georgia.” Natural Gas Intel, September 11, 2017. https://www.naturalgasintel.com/articles/111692-irma-takes-down-power-lowersnatgas-demand-for-millions-in-florida-georgia 235 Clemente, Jude. “Hurricanes Harvey and Irma and the Impact to Natural Gas Prices.” Trane, September 20, 2017.

natgas-demand-for-millions-in-florida-georgia 235 Clemente, Jude. “Hurricanes Harvey and Irma and the Impact to Natural Gas Prices.” Trane, September 20, 2017. https://www.trane.com/commercial/north-america/us/en/about-us/newsroom/blogs/Hurricane-Harvey-Irma-NG-Prices.html

Figure 23. Daily curtailed oil and gas production in the Gulf of Mexico due to Hurricane Harvey.

Gulf Of Mexico Daily Curtailed Production - Hurricane Harvey

Source: U.S. Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement236

Onshore, several force majeure declarations (a clause that exempts contracting parties from fulfilling their contractual obligations in the face of unanticipated or uncontrollable circumstances, such as a natural disaster237) were put into place in anticipation of the 2017 hurricanes: one was by Tennessee Gas Pipeline on August 24, 2017 and another was by Natural Gas Pipeline Company on 238,239 August 26, 2017, limiting flow from compressor stations. A larger impact was felt as Gulf ports were shut in during Harvey, making the United States a net importer of natural gas for the first six 240 days of September 2017 as exports from the Gulf were cut off. During Hurricane Michael in 2018, roughly one-third of natural gas production in the Gulf was shut in and 13% of manned platforms in 241 the Gulf of Mexico were evacuated.

Demand destruction, as mentioned above, was experienced in Florida during Irma, where aggregate natural gas demand fell by 1.69 Bcf/d, over 40% of the previous 30-day average. This drop occurred between September 7 and September 11, 2017, largely due to lost demand from 242 electric power. In fact, due in part to demand destruction, natural gas prices fell slightly when

236 Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement. “BSEE Tropical Storm Harvey Activity Statistics Update.” September 2, 2017. https://www.bsee.gov/newsroom/latest-news/statements-and-releases/press-releases/bsee-tropical-storm-harveyactivity-7 237 “Force Majeure.” Business Dictionary. Accessed February 2018. http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/force-

activity-7 237 “Force Majeure.” Business Dictionary. Accessed February 2018. http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/forcemajeure.html 238 Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, LLC. “Notice Detail.” August 24, 2017. 2017.

Ibid. 240 IHS Markit. “IHS Markit Hurricane Harvey Update.” IHS Markit, September 6, 2017. http://news.ihsmarkit.com/pressrelease/energy-power-media/ihs-markit-hurricane-harvey-update-september-6-2017 241 Hart Energy. “HEADLINES: Hurricane Michael's Effect on Oil, Gas Production.” Hart Energy, October 11, 2018.

238 Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, LLC. “Notice Detail.” August 24, 2017. 2017. https://pipeline2.kindermorgan.com/Notices/NoticeDetail.aspx?code=NGPL&notc_nbr=37735 239 Ibid. 240 IHS Markit. “IHS Markit Hurricane Harvey Update.” IHS Markit, September 6, 2017. http://news.ihsmarkit.com/press-

release/energy-power-media/ihs-markit-hurricane-harvey-update-september-6-2017 241 Hart Energy. “HEADLINES: Hurricane Michael's Effect on Oil, Gas Production.” Hart Energy, October 11, 2018. https://www.hartenergy.com/exclusives/headlines-hurricane-michaels-effect-oil-gas-production-135307 242 Natural Gas Intel Staff Reports. “Irma Takes Down Power, Lowers NatGas Demand for Millions in Florida, Georgia.”

https://www.hartenergy.com/exclusives/headlines-hurricane-michaels-effect-oil-gas-production-135307 242 Natural Gas Intel Staff Reports. “Irma Takes Down Power, Lowers NatGas Demand for Millions in Florida, Georgia.” Natural Gas Intel, September 11, 2017. https://www.naturalgasintel.com/articles/111692-irma-takes-down-power-lowersnatgas-demand-for-millions-in-florida-georgia

Hurricane Harvey hit Texas. However, this shift in prices is negligible when compared with the spike caused by previous storms243 (Figure 24, Figure 25).

Figure 24. Natural gas prices dipped slightly at the onset of Hurricane Harvey.

Source: EIA. Image source: Forbes244

Figure 25. Harvey's impact on natural gas prices is negligible in comparison to that of other storms.

Source: EIA. Image source: Forbes245

Electricity

Electrical infrastructure was relatively less resilient than natural gas systems during these recent hurricanes. While natural gas service disruptions were limited to isolated cases and customers, electricity disruptions were widespread. The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) reported widespread outages, with more than 293,000 customers suffering outages and an estimated 157 circuits out of service on August 26, 246 2017, one day after Harvey made landfall. In Florida during Hurricane Irma, 6.1 million customers lost power, including 3.6 million Florida 247 Power and Light customers alone. In some coastal areas, Irma pushed outage rates as high as 248 97 percent. During Hurricane Michael, about 2 million electric customers in affected states (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South

Electric Service Fared W orse Than G as Service While natural gas service disruptions were limited to isolated cases and customers, electricity disruptions were widespread. The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) reported widespread outages, with more than 293,000 customers suffering outages and an estimated 157 circuits out of service on August 26, 2017, one day after Harvey made landfall.

243 Clemente, Jude. “Hurricane Harvey's Impact On Natural Gas Prices.” Forbes, September 3, 2017. https://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2017/09/03/hurricane-harveys-impact-on-natural-gas-prices/#76ba015b5230 244 Clemente, Jude. “Hurricane Harvey's Impact On Natural Gas Prices.” Forbes, September 3, 2017. https://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2017/09/03/hurricane-harveys-impact-on-natural-gas-prices/#76ba015b5230 245 Ibid. 246 ERCOT. (2017, September 6). ERCOT Responds to Hurricane Harvey. Retrieved May 31, 2019, from

Ibid. 246 ERCOT. (2017, September 6). ERCOT Responds to Hurricane Harvey. Retrieved May 31, 2019, from http://www.ercot.com/help/harvey 247 “Irma knocks out power to about 5.8 million: Authorities.” Reuters/CNBC, September 11, 2017.

http://www.ercot.com/help/harvey 247 “Irma knocks out power to about 5.8 million: Authorities.” Reuters/CNBC, September 11, 2017. https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/11/irma-knocks-out-power-to-nearly-four-million-in-florida-utilities.html 248 St. John, J. “Post-Irma, Utilities Face ‘One of the Largest Industry Restoration Efforts in US History.” Greentech Media, 2017, September 11, 2017. https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/post-hurricane-irma-utilities-face-one-oflargest-industry-restoration-effo

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Carolina, and Virginia) were without power. 249 Downed trees were a major cause of outages in North Carolina, 250 and damage to electric transmission and distribution facilities (e.g., substations, utility poles, and power lines) were a main cause in Florida. 251 Electric outages from Hurricane Michael lasted from a few days to 2 or more weeks. 252, 253 One reason for the prolonged outages was customer infrastructure – for example, some homes were damaged such that it would have been dangerous to turn the power on, 254 and some water utilities wanted to storm-harden and elevate their infrastructure before re-connecting to the grid, leaving them on diesel generator power for 6 months after the hurricane. 255

For some, such power outages had deadly consequences. Twelve nursing home residents in Hollywood, FL, died due to heat exposure after the facility’s air conditioning’s power was knocked out during Hurricane Irma. The portable cooling units and fans set up by nursing home staff were not enough to keep the heat at bay. Governor Scott responded to this tragedy with an emergency order that all nursing homes and assisted-living facilities install backup generators and keep four days’ worth of fuel on hand in case of power outages. This ruling did not require a certain type of generator, only stipulating that the equipment must be available to maintain a “safe indoor temperature.” 256, 257 In the nursing homes that had been able to meet this new state generator requirement by the time Hurricane Michael hit Florida, this requirement had helped with their preparation and resilience. However, not all nursing centers had been able to install permanent generators in time, and mobile generators and coolers had to be brought in. 258

Other sectors were impacted by the electric outages. In Florida, cellphone service outages were as high as 82 percent (in Monroe County) due to the widespread electric power outages experienced by the state during Hurricane Irma. Such cell outages were less of an issue in Texas, where there were fewer electric outages. 259, 260 Cell phone outages from electricity disruptions impede the response time and coordination of emergency responders, which is discussed later in this report.

U.S. DOE. “Tropical Cyclone Michael | Report #5.” US Department of Energy Infrastructure Security and Energy Restoration, October 12, 2018. https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2018/10/f56/Michael%20DOE%20Event%20Summary%20Report%20%235%20Mo rning%20October%2012%2C%202018.pdf 250 Henderson, B. “More than 286,000 in Carolinas still without power after Tropical Storm Michael.” The Charlotte Observer, October 12, 2018. https://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article219910430.html 251 Wells, J. (2018, October 12). Hurricane Michael damage so extensive, company inspecting with boats and drones. Duke Energy. https://illumination.duke-energy.com/articles/hurricane-michael-damage-so-extensive-company-inspecting-with- boats-and-drones 252 Panettieri, J. (2018, October 10). Hurricane Michael Power Outages: Electric Service Restored to More than 1.2 Million Customers. https://www.channele2e.com/technology/business-continuity/hurricane-michael-power-outages/ 253 Reeves, B. F. (2018, October 22). Power Outages Still Plague Florida Panhandle Nearly 2 Weeks After Michael. Retrieved May 3, 2019, from https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2018/10/22/505288.htm 254 Rogers, E. (2018, October 16). Hurricane Michael power outages being restored at rapid pace. Pensacola News Journal. Retrieved from https://www.pnj.com/story/news/2018/10/16/hurricane-michael-power-outages-being-restored-panama- city-rapid-pace/1660275002/ 255 Personal communication. (2019, April 19). Florida Rural Water Association. 256 Allen, G. (2017, December 24). After Deaths During Hurricane Irma, Florida Requiring Changes For Nursing Homes. NPR. Retrieved from https://www.npr.org/2017/12/24/573275516/after-deaths-during-hurricane-irma-florida-requiring- changes-for-nursing-homes 257 http://ahca.myflorida.com/MCHQ/Health_Facility_Regulation/Long_Term_Care/docs/Nursing_Homes/Final- Ratified_59A-4.1265.pdf 258 Fausset, Richard, Sheri Fink, and Matthew Haag. “Hospitals Pummeled by Hurricane Michael Scramble to Evacuate Patients.” The New York Times, October 11, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/us/hurricane-michael-hospitals- damage-florida.html Reid, A. (2017, September 14). Hurricane Irma testing South Florida's cell service patience | Opinion. Sun Sentinel. Retrieved from http://www.sun-sentinel.com/opinion/todays-buzz/fl-op-buzz-irma-cellphones-20170914-story.html Shannon, T. “What Hurricanes Harvey and Irma Tell Us about Wireless Carrier Preparedness.” Battery Power Online, n.d.

Damage and Service Disruptions: California Wildfires 2017 and 2018

Natural Gas

Most natural gas infrastructure is sub-surface and therefore has limited exposure to wildfires. The biggest risk, then, is to self-supporting structures that span above-ground over canyons. At these points, not only does the gas line become exposed but so does the supporting infrastructure. If support structures burn, or if flame retardants are dropped in canyons, the pipelines could be 261 damaged.

During the October 2017 wildfires, some natural gas infrastructure in northern California was damaged. The research team’s contact at PG&E reported that the company suffered damage to “above-ground measurement and control assets, as well as damage to meter set assemblies and 262 some damage to distribution assets.” One PHMSA report detailed such damage, stating that 263 meters in several locations had melted away, allowing gas to ignite. PG&E voluntarily disrupted service beginning October 9, 2017, to 30,000 customers (and ultimately to 42,000 customers) in 264 order to isolate damaged assets and to prevent further damage. The initial October 9 shut-in occurred before PG&E was able to assess damage to gas facilities, meaning that it was a proactive 265 safety decision. This meant that customers both with and without damaged properties 266 experienced an interruption in service for several days. Gas restoration efforts began on October 11, 2017, with the help of mutual assistance crews from SoCalGas and San Diego Gas and Electric, 267 which allowed for faster service inspections and restorations. By October 19, PG&E had either restored or made at least one attempted relight to all affected customers whose property could 268 accept gas service. Properties that could not accept gas service were primarily those destroyed by the fire, rendering restoration of service unnecessary.

Table 8. Timeline of October wildfire, natural gas outages and restoration of power.

261 Personal communication with CUEA. April 23, 2019. 262 Personal communication with PG&E. January 15-16, 2018. 263 USDOT and Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). “Pipeline Incident Flagged Files.”

Personal communication with PG&E. January 15-16, 2018. 263 USDOT and Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). “Pipeline Incident Flagged Files.” PHMSA, June 5, 2019. https://www.PHMSA.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/pipeline-incident-flagged-files 264 CPUC. “Oct. 9-27, 2017: Status updates from PG&E to the CPUC.” October 27, 2017. http://cpuc.ca.gov/general.aspx?id=6442454971 265 Ibid.

http://cpuc.ca.gov/general.aspx?id=6442454971 268 USDOT and Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). “Pipeline Incident Flagged Files.” PHMSA, June 5, 2019. https://www.PHMSA.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/pipeline-incident-flagged-files 269 CAL FIRE. California Statewide Fire Summary. October 30, 2017. http://calfire.ca.gov/communications/communications_StatewideFireSummary 270 CPUC. “Oct. 9-27, 2017: Status updates from PG&E to the CPUC.” October 27, 2017.

Ibid. 272 USDOT and Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). “Pipeline Incident Flagged Files.” PHMSA, June 5, 2019. https://www.PHMSA.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/pipeline-incident-flagged-files 273 CAL FIRE. “Incident Information.” n.d. Accessed April 24, 2018. http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/incidents/incidents_cur_search_results?search=2017

SoCalGas reported that the December 2017 fires in Southern California were a limited threat to equipment, as facilities are mostly underground. Disruptions occurred when SoCalGas worked with first responders to turn off gas preemptively before fires reached houses, shutting off service for about 4,800 274 customers. Thus, most of the natural gas impacts from the December fires were voluntary and preemptive. SoCalGas reported that these service shutoffs were well coordinated via the overall incident command structure established to tackle the blaze.

M ost Natural Gas O utages Due to Pre-emptive Turn O ffs Most of the natural gas outages were due to SoCalGas taking the preemptive safety measure of shutting off service before fires reached houses, since gas is flammable and could explode. These safety shutoffs affected around 4,800 customers.

During the 2018 Woolsey Fire, SoCalGas had to shut off natural gas service to the Peter Strauss Ranch community, Oak Forest Mobile Home Park, Seminole Mobile Home Park, and in the vicinity of Morning View Drive and Bonsall Drive in Malibu as a safety

Mobile Home Park, and in the vicinity of Morning View Drive and Bonsall Drive in Malibu as a safety 275 precaution. At Peter Strauss Ranch, SoCalGas’ 4-inch steel main crossing a bridge along Mulholland was impacted by structural failure of the bridge brought on by the fire. The service isolation for Oak Forest Mobile Home Park was preemptive, done at the request of the fire department. Service was shut down to Seminole Mobile Home Park because all mobile homes were destroyed by the fire, so SoCalGas isolated service at the master meter there.

The utility also had to respond to issues at homes where gas service lines were damaged or 276 destroyed but there were no reports of major breaks or leaks within the fire area. Shutoffs may also be required if aboveground infrastructure such as gas meters are incinerated; these shutoffs 277 affect both damaged and undamaged buildings in the affected area.

Electricity infrastructure suffered heavily during the California wildfires of 2017 and 2018. Since the infrastructure is aboveground, it is more exposed than natural gas systems. In addition, many electricity providers have been blamed for igniting wildfires due to faulty equipment or improper maintenance. CAL FIRE and Ventura County Fire Department found SCE’s lack of maintenance on 278 an electric transmission line the cause for the 2017 Thomas Fire. PG&E’s electricity infrastructure has been connected with over 1,500 wildfires between 2014 and 2017, including the Sonoma 279 County Tubbs Fire. CAL FIRE recently found PG&E’s electric infrastructure to be the cause of the 280 2018 Camp Fire.

281 An estimated 359,000 PG&E customers lost electric power in the October 2017 fires. This was partially attributed to the company proactively de-energizing lines, both voluntarily and at the

274 Personal communication with SoCalGas. January 22, 2018. 275 Shatkin, Elina. “Woolsey Fire Should Be Fully Contained By Thanksgiving.” LAist, November 19, 2018.

Ibid. 277 Personal communication with CUEA. February 14, 2018. 278 Ventura County Fire Department. Thomas Fire Investigation Report. Camarillo, CA (December 4, 2017). https://vcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Thomas-Fire-Investigation-Report_Redacted_3-14-19.pdf 279 Gold, Russell, Katherine Blunt, and Rebecca Smith. “PG&E Sparked at Least 1,500 California Fires. Now the Utility Faces Collapse.” The Wall Street Journal, January 13, 2019. https://www.wsj.com/articles/pg-e-sparked-at-least-1-500-californiafires-now-the-utility-faces-collapse-11547410768 280 Eavis, P. A. “California Says PG&E Power Lines Caused Camp Fire That Killed 85.” The New York Times, May 15, 2019.

fires-now-the-utility-faces-collapse-11547410768 280 Eavis, P. A. “California Says PG&E Power Lines Caused Camp Fire That Killed 85.” The New York Times, May 15, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/business/pge-fire.html 281 PG&E. “PG&E's Wildfire Response.” n.d. Accessed December 13, 2017

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/business/pge-fire.html 281 PG&E. “PG&E's Wildfire Response.” n.d. Accessed December 13, 2017

282 direction of CAL FIRE. During the October fires, major water leaks occurred in homes that had 283 burned because power was unavailable to shut off the water supply.

Restoration of electric service is less labor intensive than for gas. For example, PG&E crews were able to restore 5,000 power outages overnight from October 11-12, 2017 but relit just 700 pilots on th October 11. However, as mutual aid provided more and more technicians and further access was granted to affected areas, the electric and natural gas service restoration processes came to th proceed at a similar speed. As of October 26, 2017, there was only a small percentage of customers still without power or gas. The main difficulty in restoration at that point for either set of 284 assets was access to the area.

In Southern California, around 17,000 customers had their power lines preemptively de-energized by SDG&E in the days leading up to the December 2017 fires. Due to the power outages, some people were not able to receive calls about evacuations and many were not able to access well 285 water. Some customers went for more than a week without power. In addition, an estimated 286 85,000 Southern California Edison customers lost electric power in the December 2017 fires. A December lawsuit filed by residents of Southern California cities of Ventura, Santa Paul, and Ojai claims that water-pumping stations in the county of Ventura lost electrical power and the city did not have functional backup generators, making it impossible to take water from fire hydrants to 287 douse the blazes consuming homes.

In the wake of the December 2017 fires, some utilities were criticized for contributing to fire ignition. For example, the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP) faces lawsuits due to its alleged contribution to the Creek Fire. Plaintiffs allege that the utility was negligent in 288 maintenance of electrical equipment and power lines, although the LADWP denies these claims. These smaller publicly owned utilities may lack the resources to combat major wildfire damages and

During the Woolsey and Hill fires, fire damage to substations and electrical transmission lines resulted in power outages. In Los Angeles County, nearly 24,000 SCE customers were without

culpability/. 289 Stein, Joshua, Andrew Teras, and Christopher Woodward. “Municipal Implications of the California Wildfires.” Breckinridge Capital Advisors. Accessed June 25, 2019. 290 Carlson, Cheri. “Water Agencies Band Together, Seek Changes after Destructive Woolsey, Thomas Fires.” Ventura

Breckinridge Capital Advisors. Accessed June 25, 2019. 290 Carlson, Cheri. “Water Agencies Band Together, Seek Changes after Destructive Woolsey, Thomas Fires.” Ventura County Star, March 4, 2019. https://www.vcstar.com/story/news/local/2019/03/04/california-water-agencies-band-togetherafter-destructive-woolsey-thomas-fires/2957790002/. 291 “Baron & Budd Sues Southern California Edison on Behalf of Los Angeles County and Malibu for Damages from

after-destructive-woolsey-thomas-fires/2957790002/. 291 “Baron & Budd Sues Southern California Edison on Behalf of Los Angeles County and Malibu for Damages from Devastating Woolsey Fire.” Business Wire and AP News, April 29, 2019. Accessed June 25, 2019. https://www.apnews.com/Business%20Wire/eafd087f14844e2182534c8f51b5e574.

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292 power, as well as 3,238 customers in Ventura County. Initial assessments found that around 500 poles, 750,000 feet of wire, and other electrical equipment were destroyed or damaged in the 293 Woolsey and Hill fires. In addition to outages due to damage, SCE also had to schedule 294, 295 additional power outages to make repairs to transmission lines.

Multiple lawsuits have been filed against SCE for its alleged partial responsibility for the Woolsey Fire. SCE reported to the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) that they experienced power outages minutes before the ignition of the Woolsey fire. After investigations, SCE indicated 296 that electrical issues at the Chatsworth Substation may have contributed to the start of the fire.

Damage and Service Disruptions: California Mudslides

Natural Gas

The mudslides resulted in some damage to natural gas assets. For example, a vehicle was carried 297 into and damaged above-ground infrastructure that served a home. Debris flow caused a gas 298 leak, resulting in a house fire on January 9, 2018. Fast-moving water that was scouring the earth exposed two natural gas pipelines. One pipeline was battered by boulders in one creek and shut down to prevent future incidents, then was replaced in 2018. The other remained unharmed, though its protective concrete slab was destroyed. SoCalGas depressurized this second line until a safety inspection took place. Approximately 2,900 SoCalGas customers in Montecito experienced disruption to their gas service due to requests from first responders to isolate service to areas for 299,300, 301, 302 safety reasons, and restoration efforts were completed in about three weeks. Generally speaking, areas in which sub-surface infrastructure becomes exposed (e.g., creek crossings) are more vulnerable to damage from both the elements and the disaster itself (e.g., water, mudflow, 303 and debris in the case of the mudslides). Restoring service in the wake of the mudslides posed a greater challenge than after the fires, as boulders had to be removed and damage had to be 304 assessed before pipes could be re-pressurized.

To delve further into the impacts to utility customers during the disasters, we conducted a social listening exercise. This included a systematic review of social media posts using refined search strings and resulted in an analysis of nearly 900 posts. For more information on the methodology, see Appendix A.

292 Gutierrez-Jaime, Nisha. “Thousands of Residents in Vicinity of Woolsey Fire Without Power.” KTLA News, November 9,

2018. https://ktla.com/2018/11/09/thousands-of-residents-in-vicinity-of-woosley-fire-without-power/. 293 Milbourn, Mary Ann. “SCE Works with Fire Officials to Restore Power.” Energized by Edison, November 9, 2018. Accessed June 25, 2019. https://energized.edison.com/sce-works-with-fire-officials-to-restore-power 294 Southern California Edison. “Outage Center.” Accessed June 26, 2019. https://www.sce.com/outage-center. 295 “Large Swath Of Malibu Without Power Monday Due to Woolsey Fire Repairs.” CBS Los Angeles, November 19, 2018. https://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2018/11/19/large-swath-of-malibu-without-power-monday-due-to-woolsey-fire-repairs/ 296 “SCE Provides Update on Woolsey and Hill Wildfires,” November 16, 2018. https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20181115006114/en/SCE-Update-Woolsey-Hill-Wildfires. 297 Gazzar, Brenda. “SoCalGas crews work to restore service to dozens of customers after gas line damaged in Burbank.” Daily News, January 10, 2018. https://www.dailynews.com/2018/01/10/socalgas-crews-work-to-restore-power-to-dozens- of-customers-after-gas-line-damaged-in-burbank/ 298 Staff Report. “Thirteen Dead in Powerful Storm, Mudslides in Santa Barbara County.” NBC Los Angeles, January 9,
2019. https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/Explosion-Debris-Flow-Reported-After-House-Fire-in-Montecito- 468430023.html 299 SoCalGas. Twitter Post. January 13, 2018, 3:42 PM. https://twitter.com/socalgas/status/952279697529872384 300 SoCalGas. Twitter Post, January 16, 2018, 7:28 PM. https://twitter.com/socalgas/status/953423811604488192 SoCalGas. Twitter Post. January 30, 2018, 3:26 PM. https://twitter.com/socalgas/status/958436290873176064 Southern California Gas. “Montecito Updates.” Updated February 2, 2018. Accessed February 20, 2018 and April 18,
2020. https://www.socalgas.com/newsroom/montecito. Personal communication with CUEA. February 14, 2018. Personal communication with SoCalGas. January 22, 2018.

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The social listening results showed that despite the impacts described above, most of the discussion surrounding the fires and mudslides in relation to natural gas was to provide information regarding service restoration (e.g., in the form of tweets from SoCalGas). There were a few widely distributed articles dealing with the emotional impact felt by homeowners as they returned to their burnt residences, but natural gas was not a part of this narrative. These observations regarding how customers discussed natural gas (or did not mention it much) further supports the overall finding that natural gas is widely regarded as resilient.

The area was in high alert when rainstorms followed the November 2018 wildfires. However, the impacts of rainfall on the fire-stricken land was less severe than the previous year. SoCalGas increased its patrolling and monitoring of its pipelines during the rainy season as a proactive measure.

Compounding Consequences

There also compounding effects to natural gas and fuel when electricity outages occur. Electrical power outages can affect petroleum refineries, gas processing plants, fuel storage facilities, petroleum pipeline pump stations, terminals, and retail gas stations, potentially affecting supply of petroleum fuels and natural gas. 305 Natural gas compression systems may also be impacted by outages, but this can vary depending on facility and system. In the Hurricane Harvey example previously discussed, Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company created service disruptions and a gas release from a power outage at a compression station. 306 Other compression stations, such as those operated by SoCalGas, can be operated without grid electricity using on-site generation. 307

Electricity generation is dependent on supply from natural gas. As mentioned previously, this is particularly true in California where electricity is primarily based on natural gas.

Power outages can result in a variety of consequences for other sectors, including mobility and telecommunications. For example, downed power lines may shut off streetlights and traffic signals, which can affect mobility. 308 Without power, gasoline stations may also be affected, which could affect people who need to evacuate. 309 Additionally, electricity and telecommunications lines are co-located and, in some cases, telecommunications will depend on electricity supply. 310 This can prevent residents from receiving communications and instructions from emergency managers. Examples of these interdependencies are shown in Figure 26. These issues will be discussed further in the following sections.

305 Department of Homeland Security. “California Wildfires: Woolsey and Hill – Projected Infrastructure Impact Summary.” National Protection and Programs Directorate, November 10, 2018. https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=818743 306 USDOT and Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). “Pipeline Incident Flagged Files.” PHMSA, June 5, 2019. https://www.PHMSA.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/pipeline-incident-flagged-files 307 SoCalGas. North-South Project: Updated Report, Adelanto Compressor Station. Los Angeles, CA (November 2014). https://www.socalgas.com/regulatory/documents/a-13-12- 013/Attachment%20A_%20Updated%20Buczkowski%20Supplemental%20Testimony%20Final%20Redacted.pdf Moser, Susanne and Juliette Finzi Hart. “The Adaptation Blindspot: Teleconnected and Cascading Impacts of Climate Change on the Electrical Grid and Lifelines in Los Angeles.” California’s Fourth Climate Assessment, August 2018. https://www.energy.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2019-11/Energy_CCCA4-CEC-2018-008_ADA.pdf Ibid. Ibid.

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Figure 26. Reinforcing loops that show the impact of electrical power provision on

different sectors.

311

Damages to the electricity supply can have severe consequences for public health, particularly for vulnerable populations who are dependent on life support or other critical services. There is a small but significant population on respirators and intravenous machines, many of whom are housed at home, who would be trapped. Many do not have the financial resources necessary to purchase and maintain a backup power source to support these services. 312 Power outages could also result in risks to food safety due to losses of refrigeration. 313

One such patient was unable to evacuate during the Woolsey fire due to old age and concern for her health. This family was able to shelter in place with a HEPA filter and a backup generator connected to the gas grid. While her electricity was down for four to seven days, she was able to use the backup generator to provide essential services. 314

Examples of Resilience

Natural Gas

In general, there is very little evidence that loss of natural gas service negatively impacted the response to events or caused further harm in the case examples we explored. The interviewee at the California Utilities Emergency Association (CUEA), which coordinated all utility responses in the California wildfires and mudslides, reported that he did not know of any infrastructure or functions that were impacted by a lack of natural gas. Part of the reason for this is that in response to service isolations, gas utilities were able to bring semitrailers of gas to specific locations in order to feed systems that315needed the natural gas. 316 For example, in response to the service disruptions, PG&E

311 Moser, Susanne and Juliette Finzi Hart. “The Adaptation Blindspot: Teleconnected and Cascading Impacts of Climate Change on the Electrical Grid and Lifelines in Los Angeles.” California’s Fourth Climate Assessment, August 2018. https://www.energy.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2019-11/Energy_CCCA4-CEC-2018-008_ADA.pdf 312 Personal communication with CUEA. April 23, 2019. 313 Moser, Susanne and Juliette Finzi Hart. “The Adaptation Blindspot: Teleconnected and Cascading Impacts of Climate Change on the Electrical Grid and Lifelines in Los Angeles.” California’s Fourth Climate Assessment, August 2018. https://www.energy.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2019-11/Energy_CCCA4-CEC-2018-008_ADA.pdf California Energy Commission. “Joint Agency Workshop on Building Decarbonization.” April 8, 2019. Youtube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=76L_tNDXSQI&feature=youtu.be&t=2h46m48s Ellison, James F., Corbet, Thomas Frank, and Robert E. Brooks. “Natural Gas Network Resiliency to a ‘Shakeout Scenario’ Earthquake.” Sandia National Laboratories, June 1, 2013. https://doi.org/10.2172/1089984. Personal communication with CUEA, February 14, 2018.

provided temporary LNG/CNG service to critical customers, such as hospitals, in their area as soon 317 as transport access was restored.

After Hurricane Harvey, Colonial Pipeline Company needed to determine flooding impacts to a shutdown pipeline between Louisiana and Texas facilities. Weather conditions made it impossible to use standard methods of aircraft and helicopter flyovers to collect data. Colonial turned to satellite imagery to rapidly assess the extent of flooding along the pipeline, which allowed Colonial to perform targeted follow-up inspections on-site. This allowed Colonial to better allocate its personnel and resources, shortening the disruption period on 318 the pipeline.

SoCalGas assets were resilient to the wildfires and performed well overall during the mudslides. As outlined above, the mudslides caused significant, albeit localized, impacts. Pipelines shut off automatically after sensing a drop-in pressure when damaged during the January mudslides; their pressure sensors, which detect dramatic pressure drops and send signals to valves that immediately shut off flows for specific lines, functioned as intended. SoCalGas’ Advanced Meter network provided meter responses and meter throughput data that were used to identify possible impacted areas and to support search and rescue activities in 319 tandem with first responders. As a result of the Montecito event, SoCalGas now has an Emergency Response Operations Protocol to proactively lower the pressure of a transmission pipeline prior to a predicted disaster event based on information from the National Weather Service and local alerts. Furthermore, SoCalGas was able to make good use

Natural Disasters and Gas Storage A 2013 Sandia National Laboratories study found that under a “ShakeOut” scenario (magnitude 7.8 earthquake on the southernmost 200 miles of the San Andreas Faul t), it is likely that SoCalGas transmission pipelines conveying gas from the Arizona border into Southern California would fail. Impacts could involve greatly reducing the supply to the Los Angeles Basin (by 40-50%) if storage levels in the Aliso Canyon st orage facility are constrained to historical levels. If the Aliso Canyon storage facility were allowed to increase its withdrawal levels to compensate for the reduced supply into Southern California, then the supply would only be reduced by 15-25%. Based on these findings, Sandia recommends “the most important action that could be taken prior to an earthquake such as this” is to conduct stakeholder discussions on the use of gas in the Aliso Canyon storage facility and the possibility of emergency arrangements for 315 increased withdrawal rates.

Furthermore, SoCalGas was able to make good use of satellite and drone imagery during these recent events, similar to the post-Harvey flooding satellite assessment performed by Colonial Pipeline

events, similar to the post-Harvey flooding satellite assessment performed by Colonial Pipeline Company. These technologies allowed access to terrain not physically accessible to humans as well as to pinpoint geographic areas needing attention and to stay up to date on impacts. SoCalGas obtained their satellite images from a private company with whom they hold a contract. Based on an analysis of these images, SoCalGas was able to pinpoint where mudslides had occurred and how

317 Personal communication with PG&E. January 15-16, 2018. 318 Piazza, Mark, Karineh Gregorian, Gillian Robert, Nicolas Svacina, and Lesley Gamble. “Satellite Data Analytics for Natural

Personal communication with PG&E. January 15-16, 2018. 318 Piazza, Mark, Karineh Gregorian, Gillian Robert, Nicolas Svacina, and Lesley Gamble. “Satellite Data Analytics for Natural th Disaster Assessment and Application to Pipeline Safety.” 2018 12 International Pipeline Conference (September 2018). 10.1115/IPC2018-78695. 319 SoCalGas. “Natural Gas System Operator Safety Plan: Chapter 8.” SoCalGas, February 22, 2018. Obtained via personal

10.1115/IPC2018-78695. 319 SoCalGas. “Natural Gas System Operator Safety Plan: Chapter 8.” SoCalGas, February 22, 2018. Obtained via personal communication with SoCalGas.

those locations overlapped with their pipeline network, facilitating more targeted responses. Importantly, by sending utility staff and external resources to the locations identified as highly affected by the mudslides, SoCalGas was able to efficiently use resources in the time-critical post- 320 event assessment. Similarly, their aerial drones with methane radar sensors and GoPro high 321 definition cameras were able to detect leaks and rapidly assess damage. SoCalGas now performs post-wildfire reconnaissance to determine areas of high risk that need greater monitoring and/or preventative measures.

Figure 27. SoCalGas employees, including CEO Patti Wagner (right) survey damage and prepare for repair and restoration work after the Montecito mudslides.

Sources: SoCalGas Twitter https://twitter.com/socalgas/status/953423811604488192 (left) and https://twitter.com/socalgas/status/956622591090868224 (right).

In Texas, CenterPoint Energy activated their Electric and Gas Operations Emergency Operating Plans a day in advance of Harvey’s landfall. During the hurricane, the company activated their Incident Command Center, coordinated mutual assistance crews, and issued news on damage assessments and restoration updates. In total, the Gas Operations team inspected 460 gas crossings, of which only 7 required remediation. They also inspected 130,016 gas meters for damage and found that 53,000 gas meters that were submerged under water and required remediation. Of the 863 gas stations inspected, 83 were submerged under flood waters, 75 of which required remediation such as relief valves, debris removal, and fencing. The Gas Operations team also helped the City of Beaumont address a breach in the 18-inch pipeline below the Neches River. A remote methane leak detector mounted on a drone to check methane levels helped to 322 alert CenterPoint and the City to the issue. After Harvey made landfall on August 25, 2017, Gas Operations resumed normal operations on

The destruction caused by fires provided electric companies with an opportunity to build resilience. For example, SDG&E crews replaced damaged wooden poles with fire-resistant steel poles and thicker, stronger wires through the wood-to-steel replacement program in the wake of the December

After Harvey made landfall on August 25, 2017, Gas Operations resumed normal operations on 323 September 8.

320 Piazza, Mark, Karineh Gregorian, Gillian Robert, Nicolas Svacina, and Lesley Gamble. “Satellite Data Analytics for Natural th Disaster Assessment and Application to Pipeline Safety.” 2018 12 International Pipeline Conference (September 2018). 10.1115/IPC2018-78695. 321 Personal communication with SoCalGas. January 22, 2018.

10.1115/IPC2018-78695. 321 Personal communication with SoCalGas. January 22, 2018. 322 Greenley, Steve. “Texas Strong: Hurricane Harvey Response and Restoration.” CenterPoint Energy, February 21, 2018.

Personal communication with SoCalGas. January 22, 2018. 322 Greenley, Steve. “Texas Strong: Hurricane Harvey Response and Restoration.” CenterPoint Energy, February 21, 2018. https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2018/02/f49/2_Emergency 323 Ibid.

324 2017 wildfires. After the 2017 fires in the SCE service area, the utility created a program for Grid Safety and Resilience, with the goal of improving system resilience to wildfires. This program included system hardening, including replacing standard “bare” overhead wire with insulated wires and 325,326 replacing traditional wooden poles with composite, fire-resistant poles.

CenterPoint Energy’s Electricity Operations team worked diligently and coordinated with mutual assistance workers to respond to Hurricane Harvey. The utility hailed grid modernization as key to its resilience during the event, citing smart grid technology such as distribution automation devices (e.g., intelligent grid switches) that allowed them to quickly isolate grid issues and remotely restore service to customers, which increased performance and upheld safety. The utility estimated that using this technology avoided almost 41 million outage minutes for their customers. The smart grid technology, plus use of drones, also created greater situational 327 awareness and better inform decision-making.

G rid Modernization Reduces Storm Impact

CenterPoint Energy’s Memorial substation was impacted by several feet of floodwater. In response, the utility installed a 50 MVA mobile substation in a week, which provided electric service to more than 9,000 customers without power. At CenterPoint’s Grant substation, the flood wall helped to protect

CenterPoint Energy estimated that during Hurricane Harvey, its use of grid modernization technology such as distribution automation devices (e.g., intelligent grid switches) that allowed them to quickly isolate grid issues and remotely restore service to customers, avoided almost 41 million outage minutes for their customers.

9,000 customers without power. At CenterPoint’s Grant substation, the flood wall helped to protect 328 the substation and maintain service for Texas Medical Center.

In total, CenterPoint Energy experienced a 10-day outage (755 million total minutes out). Electric Operations resumed normal operations on September 7 after performing more than 1.27 million 329 restorations.

324 Nikolewski, Rob. “California fires: SDG&E expects to fully restore power Tuesday.” The San Diego Union Tribune, December 11, 2017. https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/public-safety/sd-fi-power-restoration-20171211- story.html 325 Fadia, Khoury R., Russell Archer, and Margarita Genvondyan. “Southern California Edison Company's (U 338-E) 2019 Wildfire

story.html 325 Fadia, Khoury R., Russell Archer, and Margarita Genvondyan. “Southern California Edison Company's (U 338-E) 2019 Wildfire Mitigation Plan.” Southern California Edison Company, February 6. 2019. https://www.edison.com/content/dam/eix/documents/investors/wildfires-document-library/20190206-wildfire-mitigation-plan.pdf

Southern California Edison. “Grid Resiliency.” Accessed June 25, 2019. http://www.sce.com/ko/safety/wildfire 327 Greenley, Steve. “Texas Strong: Hurricane Harvey Response and Restoration.” CenterPoint Energy, February 21, 2018. https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2018/02/f49/2_Emergency 328 Ibid. 329 Ibid.

Ibid. 330 Edison Electric Institute. “Harvey Response: Power Restoration Is a Team Effort.” August 30, 2017. www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/electricreliability/mutualassistance/Documents/ma_map.pdf 331 Holly, Derrill E. “Texas Co-ops Continue Hurricane Recovery.” National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, August

328 Ibid. 329 Ibid. 330 Edison Electric Institute. “Harvey Response: Power Restoration Is a Team Effort.” August 30, 2017.

www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/electricreliability/mutualassistance/Documents/ma_map.pdf 331 Holly, Derrill E. “Texas Co-ops Continue Hurricane Recovery.” National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, August 29, 2017. https://www.electric.coop/texas-co-ops-continue-hurricane-recovery/

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with restoration and repair efforts. 332 In response to Hurricane Michael, 35,000 workers from 27 states and Canada worked together to restore electricity to roughly 95% of affected customers within a week of the storm’s landfall. 333

However, some federal resources that had been sent to Texas in response to Hurricane Harvey had to be pulled out in order to go to areas affected by Hurricane Irma, which did put a strain on federal aid resources. 334

According to the CUEA, gas companies were able to send technicians and other personnel and supplies to one another in order to support the necessary response forces after both the October and December 2017 wildfires in California. It is not always feasible for utilities to each maintain emergency-level workforces and resource bases, and so they have successfully relied on such mutual aid agreements to build up personnel and supplies when and where necessary in times of emergency. 335

Backup Generation

Damage and Service Disruptions: Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Michael

The Arkema chemical plant in Crosby, TX, lost both its grid electric power and backup diesel- powered trailers due to floods from Hurricane Harvey. When volatile compounds being stored at the plant were no longer refrigerated, noxious fumes were emitted into the atmosphere and created the possibility for explosions. 336

In Florida during Hurricane Michael, some remote water systems with natural gas generators lost service when tree roots pulled up the gas lines. 337 A television station in Panama City, FL lost its main power and its backup generator, leaving the area without local television news. 338

Damage and Service Disruptions: California Wildfires

Overall, there was very little information about disruptions or damage in relation to backup generation. However, contacts at CUEA confirmed that thousands of generators were distributed during the California wildfires. In remote, mountainous areas, propane generators dominate because they are easier and cleaner energy sources. Yet, they are difficult to transport because the FAA bans transport by air. Therefore, most major facilities use diesel generators. 339 The main challenge of using generators is that they require refueling. During an active wildfire and recovery, accessing the sites to refuel may be impossible. 340 In addition, diesel has a shelf life and cannot be kept on-site indefinitely.

332 Baltz, Tripp. “50,000 Utility Workers Strive to Get Power Back Up After Irma.” Bloomberg Bureau of National Affairs, September 12, 2017. https://www.bna.com/50000-utility-workers-n57982087838/ 333 “Power Restored to 95 Percent of Customers as Industry Works to Rebuild the Most Severely Damaged Infrastructure.” T&D World, October 17, 2018. Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council. https://www.tdworld.com/electric-utility- operations/article/20971805/power-restored-to-95-of-customers-after-hurricane-michael 334 Personal communication with the Greater Harris County Local Emergency Planning Committee. February 19, 2018. 335 Personal communication with CUEA, February 14, 2018. 336 St. John, Jeff. “Harvey’s Devastation Shows the Need for Distributed Energy, Microgrids During Disasters.” Greentech Media, September 1, 2017. https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/harveys-devastation-shows-the-need-for- distributed-energy-microgrids-during#gs.Gln6KiE Personal communication with the Florida Rural Water Association. April 19, 2019. Venta, Lance. “Hurricane Michael Takes Panama City Off the Air.” RadioInsight, October 10, 2018. Accessed April 10,

2019. https://radioinsight.com/headlines/171070/hurricane-michael-takes-panama-city-off-the-air/ Personal communication with CUEA, April 23, 2019. Ibid.

Lawsuits filed by residents of Ventura, Santa Paul and Ojai claim that functional backup generators were not available during the Thomas Fire, and so loss of electrical power from the grid made it 341 impossible for water pumping stations to function. According to the CUEA, these water pumps 342 are reliant on the electrical grid and do not have backup generators.

Compounding Consequences

Backup diesel, propane, and natural gas generators were generally found to be resilient during the events discussed in this report and enhanced resilience where they were used. However, since they pose a line of defense (hence “backup” generators) against power outages, impacts to generators have compounding consequences.

This has been especially true at critical facilities such as hospitals. While most hospitals have back-up power for critical functions, these generators, which are primarily diesel, need to be refueled frequently to remain operational. Also, in some cases, even the generators fail. During Tropical Storm Irene in 2011, Johnson Memorial Medical Center in Stafford, CT suffered a power outage as well as a generator failure. The hospital evacuated 43 patients – every patient except those in the emergency and obstetrics departments – over the course of 4.5 hours. While the cause of the generator failure was uncertain, hospital officials did acknowledge that the generator was decades old. Luckily, no 343 patients suffered negative consequences from the loss of power and generator failure.

During Hurricane Sandy in 2012, New York University Langone Medical Center and Bellevue Hospital center both lost power as well as their backup diesel generators. In these cases, the generators had been situated on high floors, protected from floodwaters, but other critical system components (e.g., diesel fuel pumps and tanks) were located in the basement and suffered flood 344 damage. Roughly 1,000 patients between the two hospitals were safely evacuated.

However, the picture was much darker at Memorial Hospital during Hurricane Katrina in 2005. There, 45 patients died as power outages and generator failures left the facility in a severe state of emergency. The generators stopped working roughly two days after Katrina made landfall near New Orleans. As the hospital struggled over the course of three days to evacuate its patients, difficult conditions created by the civil unrest throughout the city, the hurricane, and the power 345 outages led doctors and hospital officials to make difficult triage decisions.

Examples of Resilience

Customer Resilience

In Florida and Texas, hospitals with natural gas-fired backup generators cited these systems as an important disaster response strategy. Memorial hospital in Florida was able to maintain critical

341 Harris, Mike. “Lawsuits allege Southern California Edison negligently started Thomas Fire.” Ventura County Star, January 4, 2018. http://www.vcstar.com/story/news/local/2018/01/04/lawsuits-allege-southern-california-edison-negligently-startedthomas-fire/991192001/ 342 Personal communication with CUEA, February 14, 2018.

Personal communication with CUEA, February 14, 2018. 343 Weir, W. “When Power Generator Fails, Hospital Takes Extreme Measure of Evacuation.” Hartford Courant, August 29, 2011. https://www.courant.com/health/hc-xpm-2011-08-29-hc-jmh-hurricane-evacuation-0830-20110829-story.html 344 CBS and AP. “What caused generators to fail at NYC hospitals?” CBS News, November 2, 2012.

344 CBS and AP. “What caused generators to fail at NYC hospitals?” CBS News, November 2, 2012. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/what-caused-generators-to-fail-at-nyc-hospitals/ 345 Fink, Sheri. “The Deadly Choices at Memorial.” ProPublica, August 27, 2009. https://www.propublica.org/article/the-

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/what-caused-generators-to-fail-at-nyc-hospitals/ 345 Fink, Sheri. “The Deadly Choices at Memorial.” ProPublica, August 27, 2009. https://www.propublica.org/article/thedeadly-choices-at-memorial-826

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functionality throughout Irma, as it had fuel trucks on standby to refill their two generators’ gas 346 cylinders and had a third backup generator tied into their power plant.

Combined Heat and Power (CHP) has allowed emergency services to improve resilience where 347 implemented during instances of electricity disruptions. CHP is a form of distributed generation and is generally located at or near the building or facility using the energy, often powered by natural gas. In CHP systems, the heat of generation is recaptured and used to provide thermal energy for space and process heating, cooling, and dehumidification, thus increasing energy efficiency. These systems can increase resiliency when they use generators that are capable of starting and operating in the face of grid outages, and when the system is able to disconnect from 348 the grid and support critical loads when necessary.

Medical Center (a large hospital campus) “was able to sustain its air conditioning, refrigeration, heating, sterilization, laundry, and hot water needs throughout [Harvey]” due to their on-site CHP system fueled by natural gas, despite grid outages and major flooding. The University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston fared quite well during Harvey despite electrical grid outages due to its ability to operate in “island mode” on its on-site CHP system, which was installed post-Hurricane Ike to build resilience. This enhanced resilience from CHP avoided impacts from the previous loss of its underground steam distribution system, which was unable to operate for 90 days due to 349 Hurricane Ike in 2008.

During Hurricane Michael, medical services relied heavily on backup generation, even when buildings were damaged and flooded and water and electric services were down. In Georgia, 20 350 hospitals and 15 nursing homes were left on generator power. Some hospitals in Florida were able to remain partially open due to generator power but having partial power from generators was not the main challenge faced by these hospitals. Rather, structural damage and subsequent risk to patients resulted in the greatest impacts. Such damages were experienced by Sacred Heart (where 351 a collapsed roof posed the greatest challenge) and Bay Medical (where no water and a flooded 352 fourth floor made care difficult to administer).

Other important infrastructure was able to rely on backup generation. For example, the H-E-B grocery store chain had 18 stores operating in “island mode,” where they were able to maintain power via natural gas-fired backup generators fueled by underground pipelines while being

346 Cravey, Beth Reese. “Hurricane Irma: How Jacksonville-area hospitals responded to latest weather crisis.” The Florida Times Union, September 15, 2017 (updated September 18, 2017). 347 EPA. Combined Heat and Power (CHP) Partnership. May 10, 2019. https://www.epa.gov/chp 348 Kogan, Gene. “Mitigating Risks & Resiliency with Combined Heat and Power (CHP).” U.S. DOE Pacific CHP Technical Assistance Partnership, January 18, 2018. 349 Schuett, Jerry A. PE. “The University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB) at Galveston: Energy Security on a Barrier Island.” Presented to Energy Master Planning for Resilient Military Installations. Affiliated Engineers, December 6, 2017. https://www.iea-ebc.org/Data/Sites/4/media/events/2017-12/presentations/16--schuette--energy-security-on-barrier- island.pdf 350 Evans, Melanie. “Hurricane Michael Forces Florida Hospitals to Shut Down.” The Wall Street Journal, October 12, 2018. https://www.wsj.com/articles/hurricane-michael-forces-florida-hospitals-to-shut-down-1539287788 Lohr, David. “Hurricane Michael Forces Florida Hospitals to Evacuate.” Huffington Post, October 11, 2018. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/hurricane-michael-forces-florida-hospitals-to-evacuate_n_5bbfbcb5e4b040bb4e805efe Fausset, Richard, Sheri Fink, and Matthew Haag. “Hospitals Pummeled by Hurricane Michael Scramble to Evacuate Patients.” The New York Times, October 11, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/us/hurricane-michael-hospitals- damage-florida.html disconnected from the grid. This allowed them to maintain full power and keep refrigerators 353,354 running, avoiding losses.

During Hurricane Michael, the Florida Rural Water Association supplied mobile generators to water systems in affected counties to help restore power and functionality to these systems. By October 16 (six days after landfall), their inventory of generators had been depleted. The Association worked 355 to move generators from system to system as power was restored. Similarly, the Florida State Emergency Response Team purchased generators to run traffic signals in impacted areas, with 700 356 generators available in total.

During the Woolsey and Hill Fires, water utilities in Southern California relied on backup generators to maintain water pressure when the power went out. Especially in areas of varied terrain, the utilities normally rely heavily on booster stations to maintain pressure and flow throughout their service territories. Having backup generators at these stations meant that water could be made available 357 where it was needed (barring other factors such as physical damage to pipes or stations.)

An important consideration in back up generation is the reliability of resources. In our research and interviews, we found that diesel generators were much more commonly used that natural gas generators during emergencies. However, interviewees noted issues in the reliability in diesel supply during events, and natural gas supplied through a pipeline would be preferable. In California, natural gas generators can allow generators to operate without concerns over local air quality permit issues.

While not a part of our case study research, generators can also provide long-term reliability advantages over current available technologies for commercial battery back-up systems, which 358 can have a limited amount supply capacity. Natural gas powered generators provide a combination of advantages (i.e., air quality, supply reliability, long-term capacity) over diesel and battery back-up systems.

Utility Actions

Utility Actions It is also a regular practice for gas utilities to supply cylinders of gas to areas that have had their service isolated (once access is allowed). Having these cylinders on hand allows for continuity of supply despite network outages. This mobile gas supply can also be set up in locations that suddenly need gas in the face of natural disasters. For example, an ambulatory nursing home in Napa, CA, had to be evacuated and the residents were relocated to a building that was not built to provide care for the additional residents. Having both backup water and natural gas cylinders and generators brought to this evacuation site meant that the residents had continuous access to air conditioning, power, fresh water, and other necessities. This sort of standby generation is available 359 for other critical infrastructure, such as city halls and police stations. Southern California Edison

353 St. John, Jeff. “Harvey’s Devastation Shows the Need for Distributed Energy, Microgrids During Disasters.” Greentech Media, September 1, 2017. https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/harveys-devastation-shows-the-need-fordistributed-energy-microgrids-during#gs.Gln6KiE 354 Chapa, Sergio. “Microgrids pass crucial test for H-E-B during Hurricane Harvey in Houston.” San Antonio Business

distributed-energy-microgrids-during#gs.Gln6KiE 354 Chapa, Sergio. “Microgrids pass crucial test for H-E-B during Hurricane Harvey in Houston.” San Antonio Business Journal, August 28, 2017. https://www.bizjournals.com/sanantonio/news/2017/08/28/microgrids-pass-crucial-test-for-hebduring-harvey.html?msclkid=9c46fe60caea11ecafbbb5cd69a2caf8 355 Florida Rural Water Association. 2018. Hurricane Michael. October 19. Accessed April 22, 2019.

355 Florida Rural Water Association. 2018. Hurricane Michael. October 19. Accessed April 22, 2019. https://www.frwa.net/hurricane-michael-updates.html.

356 Florida Association of Counties. 2019. Hurricane Michael. Accessed April 22, 2019. http://www.fl-

https://www.frwa.net/hurricane-michael-updates.html.

356 Florida Association of Counties. 2019. Hurricane Michael. Accessed April 22, 2019. http://www.flcounties.com/hurricane-michael. 357 Personal communication with LA Water Board. May 1, 2019.

358 USDOE. “Using Backup Generators: Alternative Backup Power Options.” Accessed August 7, 2019. https://www.energy.gov/ceser/emergency-preparedness/community-guidelines-energy-emergencies/using-backupgenerators-0 359 Personal communication with CUEA. February 14, 2018.

generators-0 359 Personal communication with CUEA. February 14, 2018.

contacted all its Medical Baseline, Critical Care, and Essential Use customers during the Thomas 360 Fire and subsequent outages, providing generators to all but the three customers who declined. In Montecito, SoCalGas provided a temporary gas supply cylinder to residents until service was reestablished after the mudslides.

Backup generation was also key in one case of keeping gas compressors online to maintain pipeline functionality. In California, hydrocarbon gas had to be moved to a Kinder Morgan pipeline, which required an additional power input, some of which was provided by backup 361 generation from natural gas.

SoCalGas’s compression stations have the ability to operate during electricity outages. Stations can source energy generated on-site to self-start during these instances.

Mobility and Transportation

Damage and Service Disruptions

The impacts to natural gas did not translate into changes in mobility during or after any of the disaster events (e.g., there were no reports of customers with liquefied natural gas fleets being impacted by disruptions in natural gas service). In fact, the greatest impact to mobility came from the disasters themselves: floodwaters, fire areas, and mud all created unsafe and physically inaccessible conditions.

For example, Governor Scott advised Floridians against returning to their homes immediately after Hurricane Michael due to road closures from flooding, downed trees, and power lines. US-98 along the Florida coastline experienced numerous washouts, and as of October 15, 2018 (5 days after 362 Michael made landfall), there was no time estimate for reopening of the interstate. Similarly, the Federal Rail Administration reported that “significant concerns” for restoration efforts included wind damage and downed trees, as well as heavy rainfall and potential flooding. The CSX Railroad 363 experienced related issues, with thousands of downed trees and power lines crossing the tracks.

The mudslides in Santa Barbara blocked Highway 101 with water, mud, and debris, forcing nd Caltrans to close a large chunk of the highway through January 22. As a major thoroughfare, disruptions to these key transportation routes disrupts trade and mobility for the region. Many people had to take detours.

Due to the Woolsey Fire, the Pacific Coast Highway was closed for multiple days, and then access was limited while Caltrans completed repairs. The fire burned hundreds of feet of guardrail, 364 damaged signs, and resulted in closures of US-101 and SR 23. Many other roads in the area were 365 impassible, blocked by debris, obscured by heavy smoke, or cut off to prevent access. After the

360 Aoyagi-Stom, Caroline. “SCE Conducts Damage Assessments as SoCal Wildfires Continue to Burn.” Inside Edison, December 8, 2017. https://www.insideedison.com/stories/sce-begins-damage-assessments-as-socal-wildfires-continue-toburn 361 Personal communication with CUEA. February 14, 2018.

361 Personal communication with CUEA. February 14, 2018. 362 U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). “US Department of Transportation Resources for Hurricane Michael, Storm Response Highlight Report.” USDOT, October 15, 2018. https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/us-departmenttransportation-resources-hurricane-michael 363 Ibid. 364 Caltrans. “Caltrans District 7.” Accessed August 7, 2019. https://dot.ca.gov/caltrans-near-me/district-7

Ibid. 364 Caltrans. “Caltrans District 7.” Accessed August 7, 2019. https://dot.ca.gov/caltrans-near-me/district-7 365 Department of Homeland Security. “California Wildfires: Woolsey and Hill – Projected Infrastructure Impact Summary.”

365 Department of Homeland Security. “California Wildfires: Woolsey and Hill – Projected Infrastructure Impact Summary.” National Protection and Programs Directorate, November 10, 2018. https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=818743

366 wildfires, many roads were also at risk of flooding and mudslides. Although not documented in 367 reports, power outages may also impact traffic signals.

During the wildfires and mudslides, the utilities were able to coordinate through the CUEA to receive permission to access damaged areas, be escorted by emergency personnel, and work with 368 the Department of Transportation to find accessible pathways. The situational awareness compiled and disseminated by the CUEA was critical to the success of response efforts. The main issue restricting responders’ mobility during and after the fires was the navigability of roads.

In Malibu, the narrow roads and steep terrain made it difficult for emergency responders to reach 369 their destinations and also made it challenging for residents to evacuate. The Pacific Coast Highway, the only road south of the Santa Monica Mountains, experienced major traffic jams as 370 people funneled in. People trapped on the road could have been especially vulnerable if the wildfire moved south, as occurred during the Camp Fire in Northern California (Paradise, CA) where 371 three of the five roads leading out of town were closed. While residents drove down the mountain, emergency responders had to move against traffic to fight the fire, maintain safety, and 372 remove debris.

Compounding Consequences

The obstruction of and damage to roads and other transportation infrastructure meant that other elements of the disaster response were hindered or slowed. For example, it took peninsular water utilities in Florida a week to travel 100 miles up to affected panhandle counties to provide 373 assistance due to downed trees and other damage to transportation infrastructure.

The largest psychiatric hospital in Florida was physically cut off due to Hurricane Michael’s 374 destruction, and water and food had to be airdropped via helicopters.

Disruptions to major transportation thoroughfares in Southern California caused logistical challenges for trade and mobility through the region. Truckers, in particular, were affected. All drivers had to take lengthy detours to find ways around damaged highways that were closed for extended periods. In addition, the region experienced economic losses due to transportation disruptions. One estimate found that every week Highway 101 was closed resulted in approximately 375 $6.6 million of visitor spending in Santa Barbara County.

Examples of Resilience

In Texas, Freedom CNG (a refueling station developer) reported that Texas’ over 150 natural gas stations all had supply during the storm, with no shortages or price fluctuations. Fleets such as

366 Los Angeles County Emergency Operations Center. “DEBRIS, MUD, OTHER HAZARDS EXPECTED IN WOOLSEY FIRE AREAS.” Press release, November 21, 2018. 367 Southern California Edison. “Outage Center.” Accessed June 26, 2019. https://www.sce.com/outage-center.

AREAS.” Press release, November 21, 2018. 367 Southern California Edison. “Outage Center.” Accessed June 26, 2019. https://www.sce.com/outage-center. 368 Ibid. 369 Personal communication with CUEA. April 23, 2019.

Personal communication with the Florida Rural Water Association. April 19, 2019. 374 CBS News. “Michael’s Death Toll Jumps as Crews Search for Survivors - Live Updates.” CBS News, October 12, 2018. https://www.cbsnews.com/live-news/hurricane-michael-damage-florida-flooding-georgia-power-outage-weather-deathstoday-live-updates/ 375 Baldwin, Gillian. “Santa Barbara Tourism Reels, Recovers After Fire, Mudslides.” The Santa Barbara Independent,

today-live-updates/ 375 Baldwin, Gillian. “Santa Barbara Tourism Reels, Recovers After Fire, Mudslides.” The Santa Barbara Independent, February 5, 2018. https://www.independent.com/2018/02/05/santa-barbara-tourism-reels-recovers-after-fire-mudslides/

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Houston METRO transit buses, garbage trucks, and AT&T service vehicles in the greater Houston area were able to be fueled in the face of disaster. 376

Caltrans, the state Department of Transportation for California, did not experience natural gas- related issues during the October or December 2017 wildfires. Even in the case of maintenance stations in areas that experienced interruptions in natural gas services, no issues were reported. 377

Water and Wastewater Services

Damage and Service Disruptions

Water and wastewater utilities were heavily affected by the hurricanes. Hurricane Irma traveled through the center of Florida, affecting roughly 85% of water utilities there. Utilities from other states, such as Alabama and Tennessee, had to be called upon to supplement the aid provided by the 15% of Florida water utilities that were unaffected by Irma. 378 While a smaller area of Florida was hit by Hurricane Michael, water utilities experienced widespread service disruptions. In Mexico Beach, FL, an elevated full water tank was blown down and created a wave that nearly washed away high service pumps and generators. 379 The Florida Rural Water Association (FRWA), which supplies equipment and aid to affected water and wastewater utilities during disasters, was also experiencing an equipment shortage during Hurricane Michael: some of their equipment was still in the Carolinas, where they had sent it to help with the response to Hurricane Florence just the month before.

The recovery from Hurricane Michael proved to be more challenging than the immediate disaster response. While generators were able to get water systems back online in relatively short order, permanent fixes were a longer time coming. The affected water utilities invested heavily in restoring infrastructure, which quickly exhausted financial reserves. Compounding this, water and wastewater utilities’ primary source of revenue comes from water sales and volume of wastewater treated. The reduction in customers due to evacuations and destruction of homes and commercial infrastructure meant that these utilities have not been bringing in the necessary revenue to recover their costs.

Physical asset recovery has been slow for water and wastewater utilities. In some cases, it took six months to replace control panels that had been destroyed. Some systems were still running off generators in late April 2019, half a year later, while replacement infrastructure was rebuilt and elevated. Due to the extreme strength of Hurricane Michael, damages were not limited to aboveground infrastructure: lines were washed out of the ground and had to be replaced. 380

California’s wildfires produced numerous issues for water utilities and overall water quality. During wildfires, firefighting efforts require a large amount of water, which can depressurize the system and create opportunities for contamination. For example, the Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 29, which serves Malibu, lost pressure in the water distribution system during the Woolsey Fire. This disrupted the ability of residents to protect their homes, and some reported that even firefighters lost water pressure from fire hydrants. 381 After the Woolsey Fire, customers of the Los

376 Bates, Michael. “Natural Gas Infrastructure in Good Shape During Harvey,” Next-Gen Transportation News, September 5, 2017. https://ngtnews.com/natural-gas-infrastructure-good-shape-harvey 377 Personal Communication with Caltrans. January 31, 2018. 378 Personal communication with the Florida Rural Water Association. April 19, 2019. 379 Florida Rural Water Association. “Hurricane Michael.” October 19, 2018. https://www.frwa.net/hurricane-michael- updates.html Personal communication with the Florida Rural Water Association. April 19, 2019. Hamilton, Matt, Alene Tchekmedyian, Benjamin Oreskes, Laura Nelson, Jaclyn Cosgrove. “As Toll Mounts from Malibu to Thousand Oaks, How Did the Woolsey Fire Become a Monster?” Los Angeles Times, November 13, 2018. https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-woolsey-fire-spread-20181113-story.html.

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Angeles County Waterworks District No. 29 and the Las Virgenes Municipal Water District were under boil water advisories due to low pressure in the system that could have introduced bacteria and other organisms into the supply. 382

Figure 28 shows the extent of the Las Virgenes Municipal

Water District (LVMWD) within the fire zone.

Figure 28. Overlay of Las Virgenes Water District service area with the Woolsey

Fire zone.

383

There are thousands of water companies in California, many of them very small. Since water and wastewater facilities are immobile, they are at greater risk due to wildfires. 384 Also, if they are damaged, there can be wide-ranging impacts, such as loss of potable drinking water or biohazard risks if wastewater facilities are affected. 385 For example, during the Tubbs Fire in 2017, plastic water supply pipes melted and leached toxic benzene into Santa Rosa’s drinking water supply. In the long-term, the water utility will have to replace the entire water system, including water mains that did not melt during the fire. 386 After the Woolsey Fire, the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health warned residents that septic tanks could have been damaged by the heat of the fire, and associated collapse or caving could cause contamination. 387 The Camp Fire in Paradise created

382 “Some Residents in Woolsey Fire Area Advised to Boil Water-NBC Southern California.” November 12, 2018. Accessed June 25, 2019. https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/Woolsey-Fire-Boil-Water-Wildfires-500265341.html. 383 Las Virgenes Municipal Water District, “Woolsey Fire – Recovery Information and Help,” January 15, 2019, https://www.lvmwd.com/for-customers/woolsey-fire-help-page 384 Personal communication with CUEA. April 23, 2019. 385 Ibid. Weiser, Matt. “After Deadly Wildfire, a New Problem for Santa Rosa: Contaminated Water.” Water, April 3, 2018. https://www.newsdeeply.com/water/articles/2018/04/03/after-deadly-wildfire-a-new-problem-for-santa-rosa-contaminated-water. County of Los Angeles Public Health. “Health Alert: Septic Tank Advisory; Advisory in effect for Woolsey Fire burn areas in unincorporated portions of Malibu.” November 30, 2018. https://www.lacounty.gov/wp-content/uploads/11.30.18- Septic-Tank-Advisory-1.pdf

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water contamination impacts where toxic releases entered the damaged distribution system, and 388 state agency representatives have estimated needed replacements at $300M. Las Virgenes MWD suffered some main breaks that contributed to their loss of pressure, and the utility had to make repairs before they could re-pressurize the affected system. Most of the physical damage to water infrastructure occurred close to the coast, where terrain is steeper and there are canyon and creek 389 crossings that can more easily expose otherwise underground water pipes.

Water and wastewater systems have many interdependencies with the power system. For example, if there is a power outage, residents who depend on wells will not be able to pump water. Likewise, wastewater collection systems often need to pump sewage to the final treatment plant if they are not gravity fed. Those who rely on local water and wastewater services may still have service access unless the local utilities lose power and do not have backup generation.

Before the Woolsey Fire, water utilities wanted to fill water tanks before any power outages 390 occurred so that they would be able to maintain pressure in the water system. Then, the water utilities coordinated with the County of Los Angeles and SCE to get generators to keep water going while the electricity was shut off in an effort to maintain pressure, as the firefighting efforts take a 391 toll on the water system. After the Woolsey Fire broke out, the Las Virgenes MWD lost power at nearly all of its facilities. Emergency generators were deployed to refill water storage tanks depleted by firefighting. However, many of these generators failed due to the extreme load for an 392 extended period. Previous annual testing of these generators had not been able to test the full generator capacity and predict these failures due to restrictions and regulations from the California Air Boards on the use of diesel fuel. Under the Airborne Toxic Control Measure (ATCM) for Stationary Compression Ignition Engines, there is a time limit of 20 hours per year for testing 393 generators, which restricts full testing ahead of emergencies. The failure of these generators meant that the Las Virgenes MWD had to place a last-minute request to borrow extra generators 394 from a neighboring utility, the City of Beverly Hills, and a mutual aid organization.

395 The fire and fire suppression activities can also contaminate the water supply. For example, the fire suppressant chemicals used to control a fire can make their way into the water supply and increase the demands for water treatment. In addition, the loss of forest cover and impact on soil can have effects on water quality. Particularly, when rainstorms follow wildfires, sediment and other surface particles can be washed downstream into surface water resources. This impacts a drinking 396 water quality and requires additional costs and resources in filtration and treatment. In one case, the Thomas Fire in 2017 scorched the ground, drying it out and creating a water-repellent surface, 397 which exacerbated the flooding and debris impacts downslope and downstream.

388 Nawaguna, Elvina. “Rare Toxic Cocktail from Camp Fire Is Poisoning Paradise Water. It Could Cost $300 Million to Fix.” The Sacramento Bee, April 18, 2019. https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/environment/article228969259.html. 389 Personal communication with the LA Water Board. May 1, 2019. 390 Personal communication with the LA Water Board. May 1, 2019. 391 Sawicki, Emily. “What Went Wrong With the Woolsey Fire?” Malibu Times, December 5, 2018. 392 Companion CARB Letter from Jeff O’Keefe. 393 Ibid. 394 Personal communication with the LA Water Board. May 1, 2019. 395 Department of Homeland Security. “California Wildfires: Woolsey and Hill – Projected Infrastructure Impact Summary.” National Protection and Programs Directorate, November 10, 2018. https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=818743 “When the Smoke Clears: Aftereffects of Wildfires on Communities’ Water Quality.” Babcock Laboratories, Inc, December 18, 2018. https://www.babcocklabs.com/news/when-the-smoke-clears-aftereffects-of-wildfires-on-communities- water-quality/2018. Staff, Indy. “Next Debris Flow Could Take Different, Unknown Path.” The Santa Barbara Independent, March 19, 2018. https://www.independent.com/2018/03/19/next-debris-flow-could-take-different-unknown-path/.

Compounding Consequences

A loss of water to several hospitals in Florida during Hurricane Michael’s devastation made an already difficult situation worse. A broken water line due to a downed tree at Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee, along with inaccessible roads, meant that food and water had to be airdropped via helicopters during Hurricane Michael. The Hospital is the oldest and largest hospital in the state, and houses patients that have been committed via civil and 398 criminal cases. The hospital itself did not suffer 399 breaches during the hurricane. Bay Medical, one of the largest hospitals in Panama City, FL, was able to run on partial electricity from generators and maintain some functionality. However, its water supply was cut off, and the building took physical damage, both of which 400 hindered its ability to serve patients. Damages to the water supply and wastewater

Drinking W ater C ontamination During Extreme Events

During Extreme Events During extreme events, loss of electric supply to municipal water systems as well as damage to water pipes can result in low pressure that allows sewage to enter pipes. As a result of the Camp Fire, 173 miles of water pipe was contaminated with benzene and other carcinogens caused by burnt plastic pipes and meters, or by toxic waste from burnt structures, requiring residents to find alternative sources of water until the system was tested and cleared.

Damages to the water supply and wastewater systems could cause contamination of drinking water and other biohazards that endanger public health. In some instances, during the hurricanes,

systems could cause contamination of drinking water and other biohazards that endanger public health. In some instances, during the hurricanes, wastewater utilities sewage collection was hampered because they are not gravity fed and outages 401 disabled pumps, creating public health concerns over untreated sewage. As discussed in the proceeding section, hundreds of people in the area affected by the Woolsey fire were under boil water advisories due to possible contaminants. However, if residents did not heed these warnings, 402 they may have experienced health complications. In many areas, multiple utilities serve neighboring areas and communicating with the public about public safety, including boil water 403 advisories; in these cases, some people may have not been aware of issues with their system.

In Paradise, CA, which was severely impacted by the Camp Fire, residents returning to the area had been strictly advised to not use tap water for any purposes. This was due to contamination of the water system with benzene and other volatile organic compounds – aka carcinogens. The contamination may have been caused by burnt plastic pipes and meters, or by toxic waste from burnt structures that was sucked into water pipes as the water system lost pressure due to high demand from firefighting. Up to 173 miles of pipeline in Paradise’s water system may be contaminated. The

398 CBS. “Michael's death toll jumps as crews search for survivors - live updates.” CBS News, October 12, 2018. https://www.cbsnews.com/live-news/hurricane-michael-damage-florida-flooding-georgia-power-outage-weather-deathstoday-live-updates/ 399 Fausset, Richard, Sheri Fink, and Matthew Haag. “Hospitals Pummeled by Hurricane Michael Scramble to Evacuate

400 Fausset, Richard, Sheri Fink, and Matthew Haag. “Hospitals Pummeled by Hurricane Michael Scramble to Evacuate Patients.” The New York Times, October 11, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/us/hurricane-michael-hospitalsdamage-florida.html 401 Personal communication with the Florida Rural Water Association. April 19, 2019.

damage-florida.html 401 Personal communication with the Florida Rural Water Association. April 19, 2019. 402 Atagi, Colin. “Woolsey Fire sparks recommendations to use bottled or boiled water in affected areas.” Palm Springs

Personal communication with the Florida Rural Water Association. April 19, 2019. 402 Atagi, Colin. “Woolsey Fire sparks recommendations to use bottled or boiled water in affected areas.” Palm Springs Desert Sun, November 12, 2018. https://www.desertsun.com/story/news/2018/11/12/woolsey-fire-sparksrecommendations-use-bottled-boil-water/1977261002/ 403 Personal communication with the LA Water Board. May 1, 2019.

recommendations-use-bottled-boil-water/1977261002/ 403 Personal communication with the LA Water Board. May 1, 2019.

testing process is likely to take at least two years, and in that time, residents are on their own to decide whether they want to take the risk of using and consuming potentially contaminated tap water 404,405 or to make the investment in other sources, such as on-site water tanks.

Examples of Resilience

As mentioned previously, the Los Virgenes Municipal Water District, which serves more than 65,000 residents, was affected by power outages during the Woolsey Fire. Las Virgenes utilized resources from CalWARN, a mutual assistance system that connects agencies statewide to borrow staff and equipment in case of emergency. The water company requested equipment, including generators, to maintain operations. This helped the District hold up while firefighting efforts were underway, although there were some water main breaks and leaks that lowered pressure in the system. 406 Roughly 500 customers were issued temporary boil water orders due to the loss of pressure.

While there were some instances of infrastructural damage to water utilities, other areas (such as closer to the origin point of the Woolsey and Hill Fires) fared better than expected. This resilience 407 was attributed to good defensible space around key facilities. In areas that did suffer physical impacts, such as Malibu, there were redundancies in the water distribution system the utility was 408 able to use to continue delivering water to customers.

In the case of the California wildfires, a key component of successful emergency response was coordination. Having a dedicated point of contact at the Emergency Operations Center and/or Governor’s Office was key to coordinating responses across areas and water systems and collating the various activity to ensure that response needs were being met and resources were being 409 allocated quickly and effectively.

Telecommunications

Damage and Service Disruptions

During the hurricanes, electric outages led to loss of cellphone and internet services. In the case of the fires, damage to telecommunications assets themselves (e.g., melted fiber cables) contributed 410 further to these outages. This was a key impact in both scenarios, as reliable communication and information-sharing networks are a vital component of response and recovery.

Hurricanes had a severe impact on telecommunications infrastructure. The same day Hurricane Michael made landfall in Florida, almost all radio broadcast facilities were offline due to downed 411 towers and power outages. In Bay County, where Hurricane Michael made landfall, all modes of

404 Siegler, Kirk. “Paradise, Calif., Water is Contaminated but Residents are Moving Back Anyway.” NPR, April 16, 2019. https://www.npr.org/2019/04/16/713430751/paradise-calif-water-is-contaminated-but-residents-are-moving-back-anyway 405 Associated Press. “Water in Paradise, site of worst California fire, contaminated with cancer chemical.” San Francisco

405 Associated Press. “Water in Paradise, site of worst California fire, contaminated with cancer chemical.” San Francisco Chronicle, April 18, 2019. https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Water-in-Paradise-site-of-worst-California-fire- 13779109.php#photo-16588392 406 Carlson, Cheri. “Water Agencies Band Together, Seek Changes after Destructive Woolsey, Thomas Fires.” Ventura

409 Ibid. 410 Baron, Ethan. “Danger, road closures hamper efforts to restore phone and internet service in North Bay fire areas.” The Mercury News, October 10, 2017 (updated October 13, 2017), https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/10/10/danger-roadclosures-hamper-efforts-to-restore-phone-and-internet-service-in-fire-areas/ 411 Venta, Lance. “Hurricane Michael Takes Panama City Off the Air.” RadioInsight, October 10, 2018. Accessed April 10,

408 Ibid. 409 Ibid. 410 Baron, Ethan. “Danger, road closures hamper efforts to restore phone and internet service in North Bay fire areas.” The

closures-hamper-efforts-to-restore-phone-and-internet-service-in-fire-areas/ 411 Venta, Lance. “Hurricane Michael Takes Panama City Off the Air.” RadioInsight, October 10, 2018. Accessed April 10, 2019. https://radioinsight.com/headlines/171070/hurricane-michael-takes-panama-city-off-the-air/ communication (satellite, fiber, and cellular) went down, largely due to destructive high winds damaging above ground infrastructure and causing uprooted trees to damage belowground infrastructure. Even eleven days after landfall, a third of cell service remained out in the county (initial 412,413 outages peaked around two-thirds). Lines were downed due to the high winds, and uprooted trees damaged or destroyed underground fiber lines. Verizon stated that they faced “unprecedented 414 damage.”

Competing response efforts contributed to the ongoing challenge of restoring telecommunications service in the wake of Hurricane Michael. In some cases, including Tyndall Air Force Base, fibers that had been restored or replaced by Verizon were freshly cut by other response teams trying to 415 work around equipment, causing setback and delays in restoration efforts.

Failure of communications equipment can have serious implications during disasters, particularly during evacuations. Wildfires cause physical damages to telecommunications networks due to damage to pole-mounted systems and cellular towers. In addition, dense smoke can disrupt line-of- 416 sight transmissions. For example, during the October 2017 wildfires, counties in northern California lost service to around 160,000 landline and 85,000 wireless connections, including Public 417 Safety Answering points; over 340 cell sites were completely destroyed or damaged. More than 418 45% of survey respondents reported losing all cellular service during the October 2017 fire. Then, during the Tubbs Fire in 2017, cell towers burned down; Verizon service was down and Comcast was out for a week. During the Woolsey Fires, Verizon and T-Mobile lost service in many areas. In particular, fiber damage impacted network performance for several days, cell sites relied on backup diesel generators or batteries, and access to cell sites was limited due to the extent of the 419, 420, 421 fire. In some cases, major carriers depended on third-party companies for backhaul (transmitting a signal from a remote site or network to a central one). Thus, damage to the infrastructure of these third-party companies can disrupt telecommunications, and it is not always 422 clear which companies run these systems to facilitate recovery.

Ibid. 419 The Wall Street Transcript. Verizon Communications Inc: California wildfire network updates. https://www.twst.com/update/verizon-communications-inc-california-wildfire-network-updates-2/ 420 Verizon. “California wildfire network updates.” November 21, 2018. Accessed April 30, 2019.

communications-systems-has-slowed-recovery 413 Brodkin, Jon. “Verizon fiber suffered “unprecedented” damage from Hurricane Michael.” ARS Technica, October 15, 2018. Accessed April 22, 2019. https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/10/verizon-fiber-sufferedunprecedented-damage-from-hurricane-michael/ 414 Chang, Alisa. “Hurricane Michael's Damage to Communications Systems Has Slowed Recovery.” NPR, October 22,

communications-systems-has-slowed-recovery 415 Verizon. “Hurricane Michael network updates.” October 23, 2018. Accessed April 22, 2019. https://www.verizon.com/about/news/hurricane-michael-network-updates 416 Department of Homeland Security. “California Wildfires: Woolsey and Hill – Projected Infrastructure Impact Summary.”

unprecedented-damage-from-hurricane-michael/ 414 Chang, Alisa. “Hurricane Michael's Damage to Communications Systems Has Slowed Recovery.” NPR, October 22, 2018. Accesed April 22, 2019. https://www.npr.org/2018/10/22/659611105/hurricane-michaels-damage-tocommunications-systems-has-slowed-recovery 415 Verizon. “Hurricane Michael network updates.” October 23, 2018. Accessed April 22, 2019.

https://www.verizon.com/about/news/hurricane-michael-network-updates 416 Department of Homeland Security. “California Wildfires: Woolsey and Hill – Projected Infrastructure Impact Summary.” National Protection and Programs Directorate, November 10, 2018. https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=818743 417 North Bay/North Coast Broadband Consortium. Northern California Firestorm 2017. Telecommunications Outage

National Protection and Programs Directorate, November 10, 2018. https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=818743 417 North Bay/North Coast Broadband Consortium. Northern California Firestorm 2017. Telecommunications Outage Report, April 2018. http://www.mendocinobroadband.org/wp-content/uploads/1.-NBNCBC-Telecommunications-Outage- Report-2017-Firestorm.pdf 418 Ibid. The Wall Street Transcript. Verizon Communications Inc: California wildfire network updates.

mobile.com/news/cal-wildfire 422 Personal communication with CUEA. April 23, 2019.

423 networks during the fires. In addition to endangering residents by making it more difficult to receive updates and evacuation notices, it hinders communications between utilities and agencies coordinating emergency response. Additional limitations set on communications can also be disruptive. For example, Verizon Wireless has been widely criticized for throttling the data service speed for the Santa Clara County Fire Department while it was responding to the Mendocino Complex Fire in 2018 because the department had reached certain data limits. Until the department updated to a newer plan, their communication was slowed, and these disruptions had significant effects on the department’s

D ata Plan Limit Impacts Fire D epartment Response The response of the Santa Clara County Fire Department to the Mendocino Complex Fire in 2018 was impacted as a result of their service provider reducing the data service speed for the department because the department had reached certain data limits.

communication was slowed, and these disruptions had significant effects on the department’s 424 ability to provide emergency services.

There were also issues with the emergency warning systems themselves. For example, a survey of residents in areas affected by the October 2017 wildfires found that over 23% of people did not 425 receive any warning to evacuate. During the December 2017 wildfires, Los Angeles did not use the Wireless Emergency Alert System, which left people unaware of the dangers. Many people were 426,427 warned by emergency personnel coming house-to-house or friends informing them to evacuate. The Ventura County Sheriff’s Office sent out three Wireless Emergency Alerts during the Hill and 428 Woolsey fires, although some of these just reached landlines. Due to these fires, many weaknesses in the emergency alert systems were identified which has sparked changes, such as opt-out enrollment in emergency alerts and fewer restrictions on data usage by emergency personnel. Compounding Consequences

Compounding Consequences

Loss of communications was called an “Achilles’ heel” of response efforts during Hurricane 429 Michael. Bay County’s emergency services chief Mark Bowen cited the downed communication as a challenge for distributing humanitarian aid: “Here’s all these resources flooding in, but you 430 can’t even find out where to go get them.” In addition, first responders couldn’t communicate among teams, which posed a hurdle to search and rescue operations. Fifteen answering points in

423 Ibid. 424 Brodkin, Jon. “Verizon fiber suffered “unprecedented” damage from Hurricane Michael. ARS Technica,” October 15,

Ibid. 424 Brodkin, Jon. “Verizon fiber suffered “unprecedented” damage from Hurricane Michael. ARS Technica,” October 15, 2018. Accessed April 22, 2019. https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/10/verizon-fiber-sufferedunprecedented-damage-from-hurricane-michael/ 425 North Bay/North Coast Broadband Consortium. Northern California Firestorm 2017. Telecommunications Outage

unprecedented-damage-from-hurricane-michael/ 425 North Bay/North Coast Broadband Consortium. Northern California Firestorm 2017. Telecommunications Outage Report, April 2018. http://www.mendocinobroadband.org/wp-content/uploads/1.-NBNCBC-Telecommunications-Outage- Report-2017-Firestorm.pdf 426 Ibid.

Ibid. 427 Burkitt, Bree, and Perry Vandell. “As California wildfires force evacuations, lawmakers hope new alert system will save lives.” VC Start, November 9, 2018. https://www.vcstar.com/story/news/local/california/2018/11/09/how-effectiveemergency-alerts-natural-disasters/1950249002/ 428 Serna, Joseph, Paige St. John, and Rong-Gong Lin II. “Alert systems aren’t working.” Los Angeles Times, November 20, 2018.

Report-2017-Firestorm.pdf 426 Ibid. 427 Burkitt, Bree, and Perry Vandell. “As California wildfires force evacuations, lawmakers hope new alert system will save

emergency-alerts-natural-disasters/1950249002/ 428 Serna, Joseph, Paige St. John, and Rong-Gong Lin II. “Alert systems aren’t working.” Los Angeles Times, November 20, 2018. 429 Chang, Alisa. “Hurricane Michael's Damage to Communications Systems Has Slowed Recovery.” NPR, October 22, 2018. Accessed April 22, 2019. https://www.npr.org/2018/10/22/659611105/hurricane-michaels-damage-tocommunications-systems-has-slowed-recovery 430 Ibid.

Florida and Georgia had to reroute their calls, making it more difficult for people to find help and 431 alert first responders.

Similarly, disruptions to communication networks hindered emergency response and firefighting 432 efforts during the California wildfires. Many command centers and organizations wanted to reach employees in the affected areas to receive updates on damages, but this was impossible when communication networks went down. For example, members of the California State Water Resources Control Board found that they experienced the automated “busy circuits” message when they tried to use cell service due to the overloaded system; luckily, the Division of Drinking Water (which supplies municipalities) has a Guest Card that can give them telecommunications service 433 priority if necessary, during emergencies.

Telecommunications networks also depend on reliable power networks. During the October 2017 wildfire, residents reported that power outages resulted in the loss of their ability to access means 434 of communication, including phones, TVs, and internet (76% of survey respondents). In some cases, this impeded evacuation.

Examples of Resilience

Resilience strategies for telecommunications included the use of mobile service extenders. For example, AT&T deployed their “Flying COW,” or Cell on Wings, which hovered 200 feet above the ground in Mexico Beach, FL after Hurricane Michael and helped provide cell service to affected 435 residents and first responders. During the Woolsey and Hill Fires in Southern California, Verizon and T-Mobile deployed mobile communications trailers at fire stations, fire centers, and police 436 departments, and their “cell on light truck” (COLT) to make up for lost coverage. Verizon also dealt with widespread power outages by bringing portable generators to cell sites and having a refueling plan in place, and by bringing communications technology (internet-connected laptops, phones, and cell phone charging) to evacuation centers for community use and to emergency 437 response and relief organizations to facilitate emergency response. Verizon also loaned wireless 438 equipment to emergency responders to compensate for problems on the overloaded networks.

damage-florida.html 432 Department of Homeland Security. “California Wildfires: Woolsey and Hill – Projected Infrastructure Impact Summary.” National Protection and Programs Directorate, November 10, 2018. https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=818743 433 Personal communication with LA Water Board. May 1, 2019. 434 North Bay/North Coast Broadband Consortium. Northern California Firestorm 2017. Telecommunications Outage

Personal communication with LA Water Board. May 1, 2019. 434 North Bay/North Coast Broadband Consortium. Northern California Firestorm 2017. Telecommunications Outage Report, April 2018. http://www.mendocinobroadband.org/wp-content/uploads/1.-NBNCBC-Telecommunications-Outage- Report-2017-Firestorm.pdf 435 AT&T. “AT&T Response to Hurricane Michael.” October 31, 2018. Accessed April 22, 2019.

https://www.verizon.com/about/news/california-wildfire-network-updates 438 The Wall Street Transcript. “Verizon Communications Inc.: California wildfire network updates.” November 14, 2018.

CHAPTER 4

Post-Event Resilience—2022 Update

In 2022, ICF updated the original 2019 case studies to further examine resilience measures during and after the events described in Chapter 3 above. This chapter presents the findings—both updated information on how resilience measures fared during the events themselves, but also resilience measures implemented in response to the vulnerabilities laid bare by the events. The findings are organized by end user resilience (e.g., households, businesses), legislative and utility responses, resilience measures in subsequent events, and Federal-level support after the hurricanes.

End User Resilience

Hurricane Harvey – End User Resilience

Microgrids have proven useful for resilience against hurricanes as well as wildfires. In 2016, Enchanted Rock, a company that designs backup power systems for businesses, signed a deal with 439 the H-E-B supermarket chain and installed microgrids at locations throughout Houston. The systems receive natural gas from underground pipelines that are very resilient to flooding and high winds, increasing resilience to extreme weather events. H-E-B supermarkets made the decision to invest in microgrids after previous storms affected the chain’s ability to move its diesel-power backup generation sets among stores, as they needed to be transported by truck. These systems were among some of the first in the region to have natural gas as the primary fuel. When Hurricane Harvey hit in 2017, 18 H-E-B stores were able to disconnect from Houston’s main

When Hurricane Harvey hit in 2017, 18 H-E-B stores were able to disconnect from Houston’s main 440 power grid and switch to the on-site generators. Though not all stores remained open due to the storm, they were able to keep their refrigerators running and continue to receive shipments from suppliers after the storm had hit. Many H-E-Bs became community hubs for residents, and the H-E- B’s emergency preparedness team is reported to have fed thousands of evacuees and first 441 responders during the recovery period.

439 “Enchanted Rock / Texas Microgrid Powers H-E-B.” Business Wire, July 12, 2016. https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160712005443/en/Enchanted-Rock-Texas-Microgrid-Powers-H-E- B?msclkid=42c1999fcbb511ecaecd52c827b546c7 440 Marcacci, Silvio. “Hurricanes Harvey and Irma Show U.S. Must Boost Grid Resiliency. Energy Storage is Doing Just

B?msclkid=42c1999fcbb511ecaecd52c827b546c7 440 Marcacci, Silvio. “Hurricanes Harvey and Irma Show U.S. Must Boost Grid Resiliency. Energy Storage is Doing Just That.” Forbes, September 8, 2017. https://www.forbes.com/sites/energyinnovation/2017/09/08/hurricanes-harvey-andirma-show-u-s-must-boost-grid-resiliency-energy-storage-is-doing-just-that/?sh=7e1afe24c9f8 441 Knapp, Gwendolyn. “High Efficiency: How H-E-B Delivered Relief After Harvey”. Houston Press, October 11 2017.

irma-show-u-s-must-boost-grid-resiliency-energy-storage-is-doing-just-that/?sh=7e1afe24c9f8 441 Knapp, Gwendolyn. “High Efficiency: How H-E-B Delivered Relief After Harvey”. Houston Press, October 11 2017. https://www.houstonpress.com/restaurants/h-e-b-kept-houston-hydrated-and-nourished-after-hurricane-harvey-9865473

“Natural gas is more reliable after a weather event than diesel. It’s difficult to maintain two or three days’ worth of diesel on site.” — Thomas McAndrew, CEO of Enchanted Rock

— Thomas McAndrew, CEO of Enchanted Rock

Enchanted Rock CEO Thomas McAndrew stated that “Hurricane Harvey has served as a ‘proof of concept’ for the technology, which has allowed the H-E-B stores to have 100 percent of the 442 electricity they need at a time when power may be out in the surrounding area.” The on-site generators were fed by underground natural gas pipelines that remained unaffected by flooding and fallen trees.

“Natural gas has lower emissions,” McAndrew said. “Natural gas is also more reliable after a 443 weather event than diesel. It's difficult to maintain two to three days’ worth of diesel on site.”

Forbes notes that while natural gas-powered microgrids with on-site generation and storage were effective to keep power on for larger facilities during Hurricane Harvey, these systems are too expensive for smaller businesses and homeowners. Microgrids with solar and storage are getting cheaper as technology costs go down and can generate revenue by sending excess power back to the grid, with no need to refuel—potentially providing a more affordable solution for such 444 customers.

Understanding whether a backup power source can provide sufficient energy to last through a grid outage during a multi-day extreme event such as a hurricane is important to building resilience. However, comparing the relative reliability of different fuel types for on-site backup generators, microgrids, and distributed energy resources is an ongoing field of study among energy experts.

Backup emergency generators are usually diesel-fueled and require on-site fuel tanks to provide reliable power. The runtime of the generator is largely dependent on the size of the fuel tank, the load and capacity being used, and fuel consumption rate. During major events that require use of backup generators such as storms, users have the risk of running out of on-site fuel as the generator runs for an extended time—and then having difficulty refueling due to roadways being blocked or supply chains being disrupted. However, some backup generators can be fueled by natural gas lines—in which case, the duration of generator runtime is not limited by the need to refuel.

In terms of reliability, microgrids are generally more reliable than backup generators:

Ÿ As mentioned above, fuel supply introduces risk to diesel-fueled backup generators.

Ÿ Maintenance also plays a big role in the reliability of diesel generators: a recent study found that poorly maintained generators have only a 50% reliability at 48 hours of operations while 445 well-maintained generators have an 80% reliability at two weeks of operation. Note that this

442 Chapa, Sergio. “Microgrids pass crucial test for H-E-B during Hurricane Harvey in Houston.” San Antonio Business Journal, August 28, 2017. https://www.bizjournals.com/sanantonio/news/2017/08/28/microgrids-pass-crucial-test-for-hebduring-harvey.html?msclkid=9c46fe60caea11ecafbbb5cd69a2caf8 443 Ibid. 444 Marcacci Silvio. (2017). Hurricanes Harvey and Irma Show U.S. Must Boost Grid Resiliency. Energy Storage is Doing Just

Ibid. 444 Marcacci Silvio. (2017). Hurricanes Harvey and Irma Show U.S. Must Boost Grid Resiliency. Energy Storage is Doing Just That. https://www.forbes.com/sites/energyinnovation/2017/09/08/hurricanes-harvey-and-irma-show-u-s-must-boost-gridresiliency-energy-storage-is-doing-just-that/?sh=7e1afe24c9f8 445 Marqusee, Jeffrey, Sean Ericson, and Don Jenket. Emergency Diesel Generator Reliability and Installation Energy

445 Marqusee, Jeffrey, Sean Ericson, and Don Jenket. Emergency Diesel Generator Reliability and Installation Energy Security. (Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2020). NREL/TP-5C00-76553. https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy20osti/76553.pdf study measured failure of the generator itself and did not include events where the generator ran out of on-site fuel.

Ÿ A 2021 study found that hybrid systems were more resilient and cost-effective than diesel-only 446 systems.

Ÿ The authors of the 2021 study also found that during a hurricane, solar photovoltaic (PV) systems did experience decreases in solar irradiance, but only for a few days—which is shorter than often assumed. During the first 24 hours after the hurricane’s landfall, these systems experience the greatest dip in irradiance, but it rises steady over the next 48 hours to be back to normal within 3 447 days. Another study reported similar results, with PV generation ranging from 18 to 60% of clear sky potential during hurricanes, never going to zero during daytime hours, and rising to 46- 448 100% for the 72 hours following a hurricane.

When considering the best backup power solutions, emergency backup generators fueled by packaged diesel should not be relied on for long duration outages unless they are networked or combined with other distributed energy resources (DERs). Solar PV have relatively high reliability but should be used with batteries and spinning generation (which can be powered by natural gas) 449 for greatest reliability. Further, reliability is better for larger systems and worsens for smaller systems, so smaller customers and community resources should not rely on single backup sources to provide power throughout an extended outage. Utilities could work with smaller customers to help build greater resilience by installing microgrids and/or hybrid/double-backup systems.

Hurricane Irma - End User Resilience

Backup generators proved useful to bolstering the resilience of both larger and smaller businesses. “After the 2004–2005 hurricane season, we made a specific investment in generators for our stores,” said Maria Brous, director of media relations for Publix Super Markets. “During hurricane season, our job is ensuring that store generators are working and have fuel. Then it’s working on 450 logistics, looking at inventory levels and sending orders to the stores.”

“Every storm is different,” Brous continued. “Right before Irma you had Harvey, and many suppliers had already sent aid and product to Texas. That was an interesting challenge for us. Our team worked around the clock. We switched our production area to 24-hour runs. Water was a high-need 451 commodity, and there wasn’t enough of it in the supply chain. Brous applauded Publix for their ability to remain open, due to emergency generators installed at all Publix supermarkets in Tallahassee. The majority of these 500 generators included a 1,000-gallon diesel fuel tank and a bi- 452 fuel connection allowing them to switch to natural gas. This system allowed stores to operate for a 72-hour minimum, including all necessary refrigeration and air conditioning. This system also enabled them to provide spaces to receive and distribute emergency supplies to community members. Publix

447 Ibid. 448 Wheeler, Cole, Daniel Greer, and Katharine Lamb. “The potential for using local PV to meet critical loads during

Ibid. 448 Wheeler, Cole, Daniel Greer, and Katharine Lamb. “The potential for using local PV to meet critical loads during hurricanes.” Solar Energy (2020): 205: 37-43. DOI: 0.1016/j.solener.2020.04.094 449 Personal communication. June 7, 2022. 450 Hoover, Erin. “What Hurricanes Irma and Harvey Taught Us About the Business Impacts of Disaster.” 850 Business

Personal communication. June 7, 2022. 450 Hoover, Erin. “What Hurricanes Irma and Harvey Taught Us About the Business Impacts of Disaster.” 850 Business Magazine, March 7, 2018. https://www.850businessmagazine.com/what-hurricanes-irma-and-harvey-taught-us-about-thebusiness-impacts-of-disaster/?msclkid=902d38fecaea11ec9074f80342812d84 451 Ibid. FEMA. “Publix Powers Up When the Power Goes Down.” Last updated February 11, 2021. https://www.fema.gov/case-

Ibid. 452 FEMA. “Publix Powers Up When the Power Goes Down.” Last updated February 11, 2021. https://www.fema.gov/casestudy/publix-powers-when-power-goes-down has allocated more than 100 million dollars toward this generator program as part of their corporate mission, purchasing over 400 generators serving 575 different communities. Jonathan Marsh of Senior Helpers of South Palm Beach, a private homecare organization, reported his biggest concern after the 453 hurricane was to purchase a backup generator. He also considered the limitations with communication, which could be brought on by not having wi-fi or signal in the area after the hurricane hits. He stated he was changing post-storm procedures to deal with that contingency.

Hurricane Irma shed light on the end-user resilience of natural gas. Nearly 7 million people lost electric service during the historic event, compared to 300 customers who lost access to natural 454 gas. The study team found in an interview that this was mostly due to natural gas lines being underground, protecting them from high winds and downed trees that usually damage power lines. James Featherstone, Committee Chair for the Committee on Building Adaptable and Resilient Supply Chains After Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, reported “Hurricane Irma brought visibility to the limited number of major transit corridors, which impeded the availability of fuel in South 455 Florida.” Even those with diesel generators can be impacted by these shortages, whereas generators reliant on the continuous supply of natural gas can retain their access.

However, there is still room for improvements to natural gas resilience. The next step in furthering Underground G as Lines resilience is replacing steel pipes with flexible pipes, Resilient to Storms which are less likely to leak when there is ground shifting due to water flow from hurricanes. Personal While nearly 7 million people communication with Peoples Gas, a natural gas utility lost electric service in Hurricane in Florida, has confirmed their commitment to harden Irma, only 300 customers lost their system after each storm and looking for areas gas service, mainly due to that needed upgrades due to aging infrastructure, underground gas lines being specifically to reevaluate regulator station locations in 456resilient to high winds and the context of flooding. They are nearing the end damage from trees. of their bare steel replacement program and now intend to update meter sets and regulators in low lying areas to raise them for resilience against flooding. Some of the above ground crossings (on 457 bridges for instance) will be moved underground.

Further, there are disparities in access to resilience measures across demographic groups. The Natural Hazards Review interviewed residents in Highlands and Orange Counties, Florida, and found that households with “white respondents, higher incomes, and fewer elderly, very young, or non-English speaking” residents had increased resilience to Hurricane Irma as compared to other socioeconomic statuses, genders, ages and other neighborhood characteristics. White identifying respondents were 2.5 times more likely to use a generator than any other racial group. Households with children under the age of six were 5 times more likely to have difficulty accessing food and

453 Rosenburg, Joyce M. “Learning curve: Hard lessons for businesses in hurricanes.” AP News, October 4, 2017. https://apnews.com/article/65506ae60e1740b9b3fe437e7a6f5fac 454 Johnson, Mary. “The resiliency of natural gas boosts its growth for commercial and residential use”. Tampa Bay Business

https://apnews.com/article/65506ae60e1740b9b3fe437e7a6f5fac 454 Johnson, Mary. “The resiliency of natural gas boosts its growth for commercial and residential use”. Tampa Bay Business Journal, February 14, 2019. https://www.bizjournals.com/tampabay/news/2019/02/14/the-resiliency-of-natural-gas-boostsits-growth.html 455 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. Strengthening Post-Hurricane Supply Chain Resilience:

its-growth.html 455 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. Strengthening Post-Hurricane Supply Chain Resilience: Observations from Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2020. https://doi.org/10.17226/25490 456 Personal communication with Peoples Gas. 2022.

https://doi.org/10.17226/25490 456 Personal communication with Peoples Gas. 2022. 457 Ibid.

458 water. The findings from this study and similar studies could help provide insight to utilities seeking to harden infrastructure or fund areas with increased blackout hazards.

Hurricane Michael - End User Resilience

Prior to Hurricane Michael, the U.S. Department of Defense had tasked the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) with developing a framework “to identify hazards and threats to the energy grid, analyze risks to energy infrastructure, and identify and prioritize investments in making 460 bases and installations more resilient.” NREL’s study notes that “because federal agencies are diverse and specialized, national resilience depends on each agency implementing a resilience program that anticipates critical service-specific vulnerabilities and fosters recovery and adaptation 461 to new hazards.” NREL’s approach to resilience analysis is to “(1) identify and score hazards and vulnerabilities at the site level (e.g., a building, campus, or base); (2) analyze risks to energy – and in 462 some cases, water – infrastructure; and (3) identify and prioritize energy resilience investments.”

NREL was able to validate its approach when Hurricane Michael swept through the Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida. An initial resilience assessment of the base was completed two months before Hurricane Michael hit, allowing NREL to evaluate where the initial assessment effectively identified risks and mitigation strategies. NREL found that Tyndall’s diesel backup power options were adequate during and immediately after the storm, but that a reliance on a single type of fuel for backup generators and transportation creates more risk in the event that the fuel becomes unavailable during a weather event due to supply chain issues. Energy-related mitigation actions recommended

Fuel Diversity Supports Resilience at Tyndall Air Force Base Increasing the diversity of fuel sources for backup generation and transportation systems to improve resilience at Tyndall Air Force base was one of the key recommendations in an analysis conducted for the Department of Energy by The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL).

Energy-related mitigation actions recommended for Tyndall by NREL included implementing a base-wide microgrid to serve all critical loads,

Energy-related mitigation actions recommended for Tyndall by NREL included implementing a base-wide microgrid to serve all critical loads, implementing critical load-specific backup power, purchasing flexible and alternative fuel vehicles,

458 Chakalain, Paul M., Liza C. Kurtz, and David M. Hondula. “After the Lights Go Out: Household Resilience to Electrical Grid Failure Following Hurricane Irma.” Natural Hazards Review 20(4):05019001 (November 2019). DOI:10.1061/(ASCE)NH.1527-6996.0000335 459 Personal Communication with Dale Calhoun. 2022.

459 Personal Communication with Dale Calhoun. 2022. 460 National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). “Hurricane Puts NREL Resilience Analysis Tool to the Test.” NREL, September 2, 2020. https://www.nrel.gov/news/program/2020/hurricane-puts-nrel-resilience-analysis-tool-to-test.html 461 Ibid. 462 Ibid.

Ibid. 462 Ibid.

along with the relevant infrastructure to support fuel diversification, and installing submeters and 463 advanced metering for great granularity of energy needs and management.

Local communities are also taking hardening requirements into their own hands. The City of Crescent City submitted a notice of intent to apply to the Florida Department of Economic Opportunity (DEO) for a grant, funded by the Community Development Block Grant – Mitigation program (CDGB-MIT), to harden existing infrastructure from the impacts of rain, wind, and future hurricanes by addressing at-risk areas of the main line, new regulator stations, a new odorized and 464 static suppression system, and two new service lines to nursing homes.

October 2017 Wildfires - End User Resilience

Microgrids that operate on island power, or independently from the grid, provide significant resilience during response and recovery phase of natural disasters; such was the case during the October 2017 wildfires in northern California. For example, the Stone Edge microgrid in Sonoma, CA provides power to the Stone Edge Farm Estate Vineyards and Winery’s 16-acre farm, whose property survived the 2017 Northern California fires. The microgrid is a combined 600 kW system that includes 160 kW of total solar capacity, three batteries, three fuel cell hives and a hybrid natural gas and hydrogen-fired 65 kW 465 microturbine. The microturbine can provide backup power within three minutes and function in a master role during island mode, designed for long-term operation. Of note, the microgrid’s communications loop and trunk line are underground, further increasing resilience against wildfires.

The Stone Edge Farm Microgrid

The Stone Edge Microgrid is an example of achieving resilience by integrating a variety of technologies and energy sources including solar, hydrogen and natural gas. The microgrid allowed the farm’s irrigation system to continue operation during a power outage as a wildfire raged just five miles away.

During the October 2017 wildfires, the Stone Edge microgrid ran islanded for ten days while surrounding areas experienced utility outages and nearby infrastructure burned. The islanded microgrid allowed the farm’s irrigation system to continue operation via remote monitoring and coordination, as the load from the microgrid included the pumps that supplied water from wells

463 Anderson, Kate, Eliza Hotchkiss, Lissa Myers, Sherry Stout, Nick Grue, Nicholas Gilroy, Josh R. Aldred, and Michael Rits. ”After the hurricane: Validating a resilience assessment methodology.” International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction Volume 51 (December 2021). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101781 464 Florida Division of Emergency Management. n.d. Mutual Aid Branch Standard Operating Guide (SOG). February 2020.

464 Florida Division of Emergency Management. n.d. Mutual Aid Branch Standard Operating Guide (SOG). February 2020. https://www.floridadisaster.org/globalassets/dem/response/logistics/smaa/mutual-aid-sog-published.pdf 465 Stone Edge Farm Microgrid Website. (n.d). “A Continuous Power Loop.” https://sefmicrogrid.com/overview/tour/ 466 Danigelis, Alyssa. “Developing a Self-Sustaining Microgrid: Q&A with Stone Edge Farm’s Craig Wooster.”

Stone Edge Farm Microgrid Website. (n.d). “A Continuous Power Loop.” https://sefmicrogrid.com/overview/tour/ 466 Danigelis, Alyssa. “Developing a Self-Sustaining Microgrid: Q&A with Stone Edge Farm’s Craig Wooster.” Environmental Leader, January 29, 2018. https://www.environmentalleader.com/2018/01/stone-edge-farm-microgrid-craigwooster/ 467 Cohn, Lisa. “Microgrid Kept Power On Even as the California Wildfires Caused Outages.” Microgrid Knowledge,

wooster/ 467 Cohn, Lisa. “Microgrid Kept Power On Even as the California Wildfires Caused Outages.” Microgrid Knowledge, October 17, 2017. https://microgridknowledge.com/islanded-microgrid-fires/

468 to the vineyard. This enabled irrigation lines to spray water on the farm as the wildfire raged just five miles away.

The experience illustrated the microgrid could operate as a shelter during future fires. With more preparation in other facets of resilience such as stocking up on face masks and high efficiency particulate air filters, the farm could end up serving as a resilience hub for their community. The Urban Sustainability Directors Network (USDN) has identified resilience hubs as “community-serving facilities augmented to support residents, coordinate communication, distribute resources and 469 reduce carbon pollution while enhancing quality of life.” These hubs are valuable assets for community resilience and emergency management, among other goals. The USDN has partnered with organizations such as American Microgrid Solutions to deliver microgrid systems and ensure 470 these resilience hubs have reliable power during emergency events.

Another lesson shared was the necessary curtailment of solar during the height of the fire burning through the property. The farm invested in a smart inverter system that enabled the operator to toggle individual panels on or off during an event, which could help draining batteries reach saturation charges. Detailed levels of data monitoring give a level of visibility and control over assets during disasters which can promote energy resilience.

Further collaboration with local agencies and communication stations could better prepare Stone Edge and similar islanded properties for subsequent events. Other groups may seek to partner with

Edge and similar islanded properties for subsequent events. Other groups may seek to partner with utilities to help ensure resilience hubs have reliable power. For example, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) offers a Resilience Hubs Grant Program that allocates funding for communities who are actively scoping or building resilience hubs. During the 2021 grant cycle, the City of Richmond, CA won a grant to install portable solar panels at existing community centers to create ‘power hubs’ to provide community members with power and Wi-Fi during outages and emergencies.

California utilities have also taken steps to improve the safety and resilience of the grid during extreme weather events. For example, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) issued a decision in January of 2020 authorizing ratepayer collections to fund the Self-Generation Incentive Program (SGIP) which provides incentives for battery storage to increase resilience benefits during 471 service outages. The program can provide additional funding for Equity or Equity Resiliency rebates that lower the cost of energy storage technologies to minimal or no costs, especially to disadvantaged communities, those living in a Tier 2 or Tier 3 High Fire Threat District, communities facing more than two Power Safety Public Shutoff (PSPS) events, or low income and medically 472 vulnerable customers. These are available through Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E), Southern California Edison (SCE), Southern California Gas Company (SoCalGas), and San Diego Gas and Electric Company (SDG&E). CPUC Commissioner Clifford Rechtschaffen noted “These programs will provide resiliency for

CPUC Commissioner Clifford Rechtschaffen noted “These programs will provide resiliency for customers and critical facilities that are most likely to experience wildfires and PSPS events, and most in need of financial assistance.” Commissioner Genevieve Shiroma added, “Today’s decision

468 Ibid. 469 Urban Sustainability Directors Network. “Resilience Hubs.” Accessed June 4, 2022. http://resilience-hub.org/

Ibid. 469 Urban Sustainability Directors Network. “Resilience Hubs.” Accessed June 4, 2022. http://resilience-hub.org/ 470 American Microgrid Solutions. “Powering Security, Savings & Sustainability.” Accessed June 4, 2022.

470 American Microgrid Solutions. “Powering Security, Savings & Sustainability.” Accessed June 4, 2022. https://www.americanmicrogridsolutions.com/ 471 California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). “Self-Generation Incentive Program Revisions Pursuant to Senate Bill 700

471 California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). “Self-Generation Incentive Program Revisions Pursuant to Senate Bill 700 and Other Program Changes.” R.12-11-005. 472 CPUC. “Self-Generation Incentive Program (SGIP) Fact Sheet.” Self-Generation Incentive Program (SGIP): Energy

and Other Program Changes.” R.12-11-005. 472 CPUC. “Self-Generation Incentive Program (SGIP) Fact Sheet.” Self-Generation Incentive Program (SGIP): Energy Storage Rebates for Homes and Critical Care Facilities Available NOW reflects the CPUC’s continuing commitment to assist vulnerable customers through Public Safety 473 Power Shut-offs.”

Furthermore, in 2020 the CPUC approved the framework for a community microgrid enablement 474 program. Program eligibility targeted communities located in Tier 2 to 3 High Fire-Threat Districts (HFTDs), prior PSPS events, or those prone to outages that serve at least one critical facility and one additional customer. Eligible equipment includes sections of the grid that disconnect from the larger grid (isolation devices), equipment to operate the microgrid, and equipment to ensure 475 safe operation (fault protection devices and hardening).

Eligible microgrids in the program include systems that run solely on fuels such as natural gas, solar-plusstorage, and hybrid systems. A report completed by the Brattle Group indicated natural gas serves as one go-to energy source for sustained backup power from microgrids, citing high battery capacity would be needed to provide electricity for extended periods of time. The analysis indicated hybrid systems combining solar, storage and gas generators can provide an optimal mix of resilience during outage events while 476 maintaining greenhouse gas benefits.

Hybrid microgrid systems are attracting investment for pilot programs across the country. For example, in Downey California, SoCalGas is presently in the developmental phase of a project dubbed “[H2] Hydrogen Home”, a house powered by a hybrid clean energy system.

A Diverse Fuel Mix is Best for Microgrids

A study by the Brattle group found that hybrid microgrids with a diverse fuel mix, including natural gas, solar and energy storage, would provide optimal resilience while maintaining greenhouse gas benefits.

477 Hydrogen Home”, a house powered by a hybrid clean energy system. Operable as a microgrid, this system utilizes solar energy collected by photovoltaic cells in combination with battery storage to partially power the home when energy is sufficient. Excess energy is passed through an electrolyzer, where the solar energy is converted into hydrogen in an on-site fuel cell to power the house. The fuel cell can also be used when the solar or batteries may be insufficient due to factors such as weather. Additionally, the hydrogen may be blended with up to 20% natural gas to power 478 home appliances and the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system. The investments from both the PGE grants and SoCalGas’ Hydrogen Home project demonstrate

The investments from both the PGE grants and SoCalGas’ Hydrogen Home project demonstrate growing recognition in the energy industry that alternative fuels will play a key role in on-site 479 generators and microgrids to support local resilience.

473 CPUC. (2020). CPUC Further Expands Energy Programs In Advance Of Next Wildfire Season.” 474 California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). Docket: D.20.06.017.

474 California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). Docket: D.20.06.017. 475 Pacific Gas and Electric Co (PG&E). “Community Microgrid Enablement Program: Disadvantaged Communities Advisory Group Meeting.” CPUC, 2020. 476 Ryan Hledik et. al. (2020). “Decarbonized Resilience: Assessing Alternatives to Diesel Backup Power”. The Brattle Group.

477 Arnes Biogradlija. (2022). “SoCalGas begins assembling H2 hydrogen home in Downey.” Webpage. https://energynews.biz/socalgas-begins-assembling-h2-hydrogen-home-in-downey/ 478 Ibid. 479 In their report “Decarbonized Resilience: Assessing Alternatives to Diesel Backup Power”, The Brattle Group, sponsored

Ibid. 479 In their report “Decarbonized Resilience: Assessing Alternatives to Diesel Backup Power”, The Brattle Group, sponsored by Enchanted Rock, performed an analysis indicating that providing two to four days of backup power for 10-megawatt community microgrid from battery and solar would require up to 350 MWh of batteries for only 10 MW of load, and up to 90 acres of solar PV to reliably charge over that time.

Case Studies of Multi-Sectoral Resilience to Natural Disasters CHAPTER 4 |

December 2017 Wildfires-End User Resilience

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) coordinates with local and state entities to provide federal aid before, during and after disasters to local communities. To be eligible for certain non-emergency disaster assistance grants from FEMA, communities must have an approved 480 Local Hazard Mitigation Plan. During the 2017 wildfires, FEMA dispatched assets such as Mobile Emergency Response Vehicles to provide internet and radio communications while conducting site 481 assessments, despite destroyed cell towers that knocked out service. Though providing resilience, these vehicles still rely on gasoline as a primary fuel source during extreme events, which can experience disruptions and shortages during these types of events and thus limit resilience benefits. To improve the resilience of emergency vehicles, organizations may invest in vehicles that run on fuel types that are less likely to experience disruptions.

Mudslides caused massive destruction in residential areas after the December 2017 wildfires. During the FEMA Survivor Story video series, members of the Montecito-based Marcillac family recalled how quickly trees fell in their living space and created space for mudflow, rocks and debris 482 to quickly begin filling their house—despite the nearest creek being several miles away. Post- event, the Marcillac family used flood insurance from the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) to rebuild their home on an elevated surface, add flood vents, and work with their county flood 483 control team. These infrastructure hardening actions exemplify a way to rebuild beyond previous conditions to bolster resilience to future events.

“This is game-changing technology. It will help keep our communities safe and

allow us to more quickly address accidental dig-ins by third-party contractors and service outages that happen every year.”

—Jimmie Cho, senior vice president of gas operations & system integrity, SoCalGas484

SoCal has installed fiber optic cable along miles of gas pipelines to send early warning of pressure changes or vibrations, such as those caused by ground movement or contractors, that could indicate a leak or an impact to the gas line.

The monitoring technology will help the company quickly identify threats to a pipeline from heavy equipment operation, unexpected earth movement, or physical impact to an accuracy of 20 ft. When a threat is detected, information will be sent via the fiber cable to a remote monitoring station. Early warning will improve resilience by giving SoCalGas crews and first responders more time to plan, allocate resource and respond to events.

November 2018 Wildfires-End User Resilience

California counties have created emergency notification systems that offer detailed information for local counties, but not all residents register for or know about the offerings. The Camp Fire hit the

480 FEMA. “Mitigation Planning and Grants.” Accessed December 2021. https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/risk- management/hazard-mitigation-planning/requirements FEMA. “FEMA’s Mobile Emergency Response Support Vehicle”. YouTube, October 15, 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HdGZdZRKg_o&list=PL720Kw_OojlK_KATjYeDJxlAI86Xbe5mR&index=3 FEMA. “Survivor Story: The Marcillas Family (90).” YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=chN3EknzQPw Ibid. Available at: SoCalGas Will Use Fiber Optics to Monitor its System (napipelines.com)

town of Paradise within four hours of ignition. City officials issued evacuation orders, but only a quarter of the town’s 26,000 residents had opted to receive them. Of 6,000 cell phone calls in the 485 first ten minutes of the evacuation, only 60% connected to a person or voicemail. Paradise resident Zachary Byrd further reported losing AT&T and Verizon service on the morning of the 486 blaze, during the time evacuation orders were being issued.

The State of California Alert and Warning Guidelines were updated in 2019, as recent disasters had exposed inconsistencies among various alert and warning programs across California. These guidelines set minimum expectations and authorities for jurisdictions to implement alert and warning programs, including coordinating Red Flag warnings, weather alerts, evacuation orders, and locations 487 of points of distribution for food, water, medicine, and other necessities during extreme events. This effort aimed to increase organization and coordination between state, local, and tribal governments to communicate during extreme events, a key foundation of community resilience.

To help fill in the emergency communications gap, utility companies can consider dispatching their own emergency messages during disasters to increase the likelihood of reaching customers before communication services experience outages.

In October 2019, Governor Newsom announced the launch of a new state website, RESPONSE.CA.GOV, which serves as a one-stop portal for tools and resources available to Californians who have been impacted by wildfires and utility-directed power shutoffs, as well as 488 community and business partnerships to support residents impacted by wildfires and shutoffs. Tools such as the California Department of Public Health and Emergency Medical Services Authority “Realtime Situational Awareness” application were developed for end users to see a map of available facilities and agencies for residents to access emergency services and shelter during 489 extreme events. The infrastructure highlighted in tools such as these can help identify key facilities where implementing resilience measures such as on-site backup power can confer the greatest benefits.

Legislative and Utility Responses

Hurricane Harvey – Legislative and Utility Responses

th As a direct response to Hurricane Harvey, House Bill 6 from the 86 Legislative Session created the Disaster Recovery Task Force (DRTF) for the State of Texas. This group was created to assist jurisdictions that have been impacted by emergencies or disasters and catalyze efficient recovery by 490 starting the recovery process early in the response phase. The DRTF is a state resource that is

Ibid. 487 Governor’s Office of Emergency Services. (2019). “State of California Alert and Warning Guidelines.” State of California. 488 Office of Governor Gavin Newsom. (2019). “Governor Newsom Announces California Wildfire Safety Advisory Board and California Catastrophe Response Council Members.” State of California. 489 California Department of Public Health and California Emergency Medical Services Authority. “Realtime Situational

and California Catastrophe Response Council Members.” State of California. 489 California Department of Public Health and California Emergency Medical Services Authority. “Realtime Situational Awareness Application (Version 8).” ArcGIS. https://cdphdata.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=b51b90ede1a04039830701fa4d17834a 490 The Texas A&M University System. “Disaster Recovery Task Force”. https://www.tdem.texas.gov/recovery/disaster-

490 The Texas A&M University System. “Disaster Recovery Task Force”. https://www.tdem.texas.gov/recovery/disasterrecovery-task-force?msclkid=1f8c5e2ecbcf11ec9a55aede449ddde5 comprised of the Texas Department of Emergency Management and rosters of local subject matter experts to 491 assist with mission requests.

Resilience from CNG

On a local level, compressed natural gas (CNG) vehicles can provide local transportation options in the aftermath of extreme weather events. Faced with fuel shortages and loss of power after Harvey’s landfall, the Metropolitan Transit Authority of Harris County (METRO) ran their CNG transit buses thanks to generators at CNG stations and an uninterrupted fuel supply. METRO transported 10,000 people to emergency shelters and assisted organizations 492 such as the Red Cross to move supplies to local hubs.

Resilience from CNG After Hurricane Harvey made landfall , CNG vehicles were still able to be fueled and transported 10,000 people to emergency shelters and assisted organizations such as the Red Cross to move supplies t o local hubs.

Officials like Andrew DeCandis, Houston-Galveston Clean Cities coordinator, were monitoring the situation. In an interview for the Alternative Fuels Data

Cities coordinator, were monitoring the situation. In an interview for the Alternative Fuels Data Center, DeCandis noted that “following its emergency plan, METRO was able to pre-position buses to save them from flooding, prepare facilities, and stock them with supplies for overnight stays and 493 sheltering.”

Eddie Murray, who leads Business Development and Operations for Freedom CNG, noted Harvey served as a clear proof of concept that natural gas transit buses are reliable. “Hurricane Harvey put METRO’s decision to use CNG buses to the test,” Murray said.

“When the power went out, our generator went on but the CNG never ran out. Our supply to the station was not interrupted and natural gas flowed through the underground pipe network without interruption.” —Eddie Murray, Business Development and Operations, Freedom CNG269

—Eddie Murray, Business Development and Operations, Freedom CNG269

Fleets with alternative fuel such as CNG vehicles can provide local transportation options for residents, communication services, and other community services such as waste pickups. METRO

“When the power went out, our generator went on but the CNG never ran out. Our supply to the station was not interrupted and natural gas flowed through the underground pipe network without 494 interruption.” He noted that all their CNG stations have backup diesel generators to ensure their CNG fueling service is available at all times, including during major events such as hurricanes. The generators range in size between 400 to 1800 kVA. To ensure they can run the generators for days at a time during prolonged outages (such as during a natural disaster), Mr. Murray reported that Freedom CNG runs the generators monthly to ensure they remain operable, has 600-gallon tanks to store fuel on-site, and purchases and stages additional fuel when they expect an event that will 495 require prolonged generator usage.

491 The Texas A&M University System. “Texas Emergency Management Assistance Team”. https://www.tdem.texas.gov/response/temat#: 492 Department of Energy. (2019). “Compressed Natural Gas Fuels Houston’s Recovery”. Alternative Fuels Data Center,

https://www.tdem.texas.gov/response/temat#: 492 Department of Energy. (2019). “Compressed Natural Gas Fuels Houston’s Recovery”. Alternative Fuels Data Center, Department of Energy. https://afdc.energy.gov/case/3078 493 Ibid. 494 Department of Energy. (2019). “Compressed Natural Gas Fuels Houston’s Recovery”. Alternative Fuels Data Center,

Ibid. 494 Department of Energy. (2019). “Compressed Natural Gas Fuels Houston’s Recovery”. Alternative Fuels Data Center, Department of Energy. https://afdc.energy.gov/case/3078 495 Personal communication. June 17, 2022.

will continue to explore other alternative fuel options, such as testing three to five hydrogen Fuel 496 Cell Electric Buses during the 2022 – 2023 fiscal year.

Hurricane Irma - Legislative and Utility Responses

After Hurricane Irma, Florida House Bill 7099 required emergency generators be provided at all nursing 497 homes in light of the fatalities such facilities suffered. The original proposal would have required a minimum amount of on-site fuel. However, the Florida Natural Gas Association interviewed all the gas utilities in the state and learned that there were 307 gas meters impacted during the hurricane (most resolved within 24 hours) out of 800,000 total gas meters in the state. As a result of the survey, the final legislation allowed for natural gas as a backup fuel for the generators rather than mandating on-site fuel. As an additional bonus to this strategy, natural gas-powered generators have a smaller carbon footprint than typical on-site fuel types.

Improving the Resilience of N ursing Homes in Florida By expanding the permissible fuels for backup generation to include natural gas, the Florida Legislature improved the resilience of nursing homes by addressing issues such as limited space for storage tanks and the uncertainty of obtaining fuel resupply after an extreme event.

Legislation similar to this was proposed in California State Bill 1207, which would have required skilled nursing facilities to have an alternative source of power to protect resident health and safety for at least 96 hours after a power outage. However, the

to protect resident health and safety for at least 96 hours after a power outage. However, the governor vetoed the bill on the grounds that it used an unclear federal standard as justification and .498 did not give facilities enough time to complete renovations to install backup generation.

Florida also encouraged used of the Emergency Bridge Loan Program to cope with the hurricane’s aftermath. This program is administrated by the Small Business Development Center (SBDC) and has been activated more than 20 times since its first deployment following Hurricane Andrew in 1992.

“The loan helps small businesses bridge that time between a disaster and receiving FEMA money or a long-term loan from SBA [U.S. Small Business Administration] or insurance proceeds. It’s quick money. If you’re a restaurant that flooded and your refrigerator went out, the program could help you open up again,” said Cissy Proctor, executive director of Florida Department of Economic 499 Opportunity.

Loss of refrigerator power is exactly what happened to Patrick Ko, owner of a local grocery store in Sarasota. “Two walk in coolers and two freezers, none of it is working right now; air conditioner, 500 none of it is working right now,” said Ko after the storm. Ko had to throw away over $35,000 of

496 Houston METRO. (2022). “Houston METRO Climate Action Plan.” Page 17. https://www.ridemetro.org/MetroPDFs/News/Houston-METRO-Climate-Action-Plan.pdf 497 Florida Senate. (2018). HB 7099: Ratification of Agency for Health Care Administration Rules.

https://www.ridemetro.org/MetroPDFs/News/Houston-METRO-Climate-Action-Plan.pdf 497 Florida Senate. (2018). HB 7099: Ratification of Agency for Health Care Administration Rules. https://www.bizjournals.com/tampabay/news/2019/02/14/the-resiliency-of-natural-gas-boosts-its-growth.html

California Legislative Information. SB-1207 Skilled nursing facilities: backup power system (2019 – 2020). https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billStatusClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200SB1207 499 Erin Hoover. (2018). “What Hurricanes Irma and Harvey Taught Us About the Business Impacts Of Disaster.” 850

https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billStatusClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200SB1207 499 Erin Hoover. (2018). “What Hurricanes Irma and Harvey Taught Us About the Business Impacts Of Disaster.” 850 Business Magazine. https://www.850businessmagazine.com/what-hurricanes-irma-and-harvey-taught-us-about-thebusiness-impacts-of-disaster/?msclkid=902d38fecaea11ec9074f80342812d84 500 Paul LaGrone. (2017). “Hurricane Irma’s impact on small businesses cuts deep into the community.” ABC Action News.

business-impacts-of-disaster/?msclkid=902d38fecaea11ec9074f80342812d84 500 Paul LaGrone. (2017). “Hurricane Irma’s impact on small businesses cuts deep into the community.” ABC Action News. https://www.abcactionnews.com/news/hurricane-irmas-impact-on-small-businesses-cuts-deep-into-thecommunity?msclkid=239af89dcbd111ecae3638e82f583d60 meat, not only a waste of food for his customers but a huge financial loss for a small business. He then applied for a relief loan.

Florida Power and Light (FPL) officials say that investments made in software technology and grid hardening allowed the utility to restore power to customers more quickly following Hurricane Irma. It took the utility 10 days to restore power to all customers, whereas it took them 18 days following Hurricane Wilma in 2005. From 2013-2016, FPL focused on investing in infrastructure updates, including its “Smart Grid Investment Grant” to connect customers with a modernized electric grid 501 with strengthened cybersecurity enhancements and detailed operational data. This advancement allowed operators to pinpoint outages in real time, making the restoration process more efficient.

Hardening investments meant enhancing infrastructure to withstand weather events more effectively, such as replacing wooden power poles with concrete ones, and constructing hurricaneproof buildings. Pole failure, typically driven by trees which fall on wires, breaking utility poles, is a significant cause of storm driven outages. FPL also installed smart circuit breakers which allowed lines to turn themselves back on if a branch circuit short-circuited. The successful use of the circuit breakers kept 5,000 customers on during and after the storm. Following Hurricane Irma, FPL admits there is still more to be done and will continue to make progress in improving grid resilience, such as the “Right Tree, Right Place” program which will work to place trees in positions where they are . 502 less likely to topple over into electricity lines during a weather event

Hurricane Michael - Legislative and Utility Responses

New legislation introduced after the disasters included the federal 2018 Disaster Recovery Reform Act, which mandated numerous relevant reforms and changes to FEMA processes. Of relevance is the establishment of the National Public Infrastructure Pre-Disaster Hazard Mitigation fund. This program requires FEMA to set aside up to 6 percent of the money it spends on disaster relief for local projects aimed at improving community resilience and to reduce the likelihood of damage 503 during future disasters.

As a direct result of Hurricane Michael, Florida Division of Emergency Management introduced a Mutual Aid branch to set guidelines on collaboration and coordinating aid in Florida, including 504 training and fast-tracking emergency authorizations during state disasters. Cross-sectoral training and resilience prove critical to responding to disasters locally. Dale Calhoun spoke to the great coordination with FNGA and with other utilities. Depending on the scale of the incident, Peoples Gas may use their own resources to respond or may call on mutual assistance, such as when they used their own resources for Hurricane Michael in their Panama City office.

501 Department of Energy Website. “Recovery Act: Smart Grid Investment Grant (SGIG) Program.” https://www.energy.gov/oe/recovery-act-smart-grid-investment-grant-sgig-program 502 Von Ancken, Erik. (2017). FPL shares lessons learned after Hurricane Irma knocked out power

Von Ancken, Erik. (2017). FPL shares lessons learned after Hurricane Irma knocked out power statewide. https://www.clickorlando.com/news/2017/10/17/fpl-shares-lessons-learned-after-hurricane-irma-knocked-outpower-statewide/ 503 Consensus Study Report. (2020). Strengthening Post-Hurricane Supply Chain

503 Consensus Study Report. (2020). Strengthening Post-Hurricane Supply Chain Resilience. https://www.nap.edu/catalog/25490/strengthening-post-hurricane-supply-chain-resilience-observations-fromhurricanes-harvey 504 Florida Division of Emergency Management. (2020). Mutual Aid Branch Standard Operating Guide (SOG) Version 1.0.

hurricanes-harvey 504 Florida Division of Emergency Management. (2020). Mutual Aid Branch Standard Operating Guide (SOG) Version 1.0. https://www.floridadisaster.org/globalassets/dem/response/logistics/smaa/mutual-aid-sog-published.pdf

December 2017 Wildfires - Legislative and Utility Responses

In response to growing wildfire danger and other climate concerns, California passed SB 379 in January 2022 requiring all cities and counties to include climate adaptation in general plans and local hazard mitigation plans.

For example, Liberty Utilities, which serves about 50,000 customers near Lake Tahoe in California, was considering how to improve the wildfire resilience of its at-risk transmission lines. However, the utility found that it would be more cost-effective to de-energize the lines during high-risk weather, and instead provide power through a 20-kW, 68kWh solar/battery system 505 with propane backup. Installation of the system began in fall 2020. The short-term goal, besides reducing fire risk, is to allow the utility to not to

Microgrids Minimize the Impact of PSPS Utilities such as PG&E and Liberty Utilities are deploying multi-fuel microgrids using solar, battery storage and fossil fuels to maintain service to customers during wildfire events where the utilities implement Public Safety Power Shutoffs (PSPS).

with propane backup. Installation of the system began in fall 2020. The short-term goal, besides reducing fire risk, is to allow the utility to not to have to inspect the lines during fire season, and the longer-term goal is to eventually rely fully on the system rather than the transmission lines themselves once more generation is in place.

Similarly, as part of PG&E’s 2021 Wildfire Safety Plan, the utility is deploying microgrids to help avert PSPS events. Remote microgrids are to be deployed at the end of wildfire-prone distribution lines, key resources, and substations, with a target to install 20 systems by Q4 of 506 2022. Ten of these systems will be installed as distribution microgrids designed to keep key community resources, such as gas stations and hospitals, operating during PSPS events. “This is a new approach to utility service,” said Paul Doherty, spokesman for PG&E. “The whole point of 507 the remote microgrid is to remove those power lines that run through high fire threat areas.”

November 2018 Wildfires - Legislative and Utility Responses

Building on lessons learned from previous catastrophic wildfires, in 2019 California Governor Gavin Newsom proclaimed a State of Emergency on Wildfires to protect over 200 communities most prone to fire risk and unlock a $50 million public campaign on preparedness to build resilience 508 among vulnerable populations. Doing so provided time-saving waivers of administrative and regulatory requirements to protect public safety ahead of the wildfire season. A joint effort between Cal Volunteers and the Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, the “California for All Emergency Preparedness Campaign” proved to augment the efforts of first responders by reaching one million of the most vulnerable citizens to ensure they are connected to linguistically and culturally

505 BoxPower. (2022). “BoxPower Microgrid Proves to be Ideal Solution for Californian Utility.” https://boxpower.io/boxpower-microgrid-proves-to-be-ideal-solution-for-california-utility/ 506 Lisa Cohn. (2021). “PG&E Turns to 3 Kinds of Microgrids to Avert Wildfire Power Shutoffs.” Microgrid Knowledge. https://microgridknowledge.com/microgrid-strategy-pge-wildfire/ 507 Lisa Cohn. (2021). “PG&E Turns to 3 Kinds of Microgrids to Avert Wildfire Power Shutoffs.” Microgrid Knowledge.

https://microgridknowledge.com/microgrid-strategy-pge-wildfire/ 507 Lisa Cohn. (2021). “PG&E Turns to 3 Kinds of Microgrids to Avert Wildfire Power Shutoffs.” Microgrid Knowledge. https://microgridknowledge.com/microgrid-strategy-pge-wildfire/ 508 Office of Governor Gavin Newsom. (2019). “Governor Newsom Proclaims State of Emergency on Wildfires to Protect

508 Office of Governor Gavin Newsom. (2019). “Governor Newsom Proclaims State of Emergency on Wildfires to Protect State’s Most Vulnerable Communities.” State of California.

509 competent support. Of the $50 million, $24.5 million was allotted to community-based organizations to prepare residents for natural disasters, including wildfires, through resources designed to bolster resilience. $12.6 million was allotted to assist local efforts to build resilience and respond to disasters by dispatching expert disaster teams to key regions and expand citizen emergency response teams.

State and federal funding continue to be allocated to wildfire prevention and resilience projects. In 2022, the California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES) has released funding to reduce long-term risks of disasters by investing in infrastructure improvements designed to protect communities. Ryan Buras, Deputy Director of Recovery Operations at Cal OES, mentioned in a brief that programs such as ‘Prepare California’ “targets funds to areas where they are needed most to 510 improve infrastructure, mitigate disasters, and save lives.” This include The CAL OES website identifies the types of projects that will be funded, including:

Ÿ Mitigation and Preparedness Planning

Ÿ Local Capacity Building

Ÿ Whole Community Planning

• Property Protection

Ÿ Public Education and Awareness

Ÿ Nature-Based Solutions to Hazard Risk

Ÿ Emergency Preparedness

Resilience Measures in Subsequent Events

December 2017 Wildfires - Resilience Measures in Subsequent Events

The 2017 CA Governor’s budget included critical resilience investments to help the state prepare for wildfires, including $75 million to build resilience and surge capacity among state and local agencies in the event of a utility-dictated PSPS, $60 million to upgrade California’s 9-1-1 system and first responder broadband network, $130.3 million for better communication equipment for first responders, and $24.7 million for CAL FIRE to procure innovation solutions to the wildfire crisis via the Innovation Procurement Sprint. The Innovation Procurement Sprint aimed to place and operate Fire Detection Cameras across the state, enhance situational awareness staffing and continue to 511 develop consistent early warning technologies. Such cameras have proven useful in battling wildfires. For example, ALERTWildfire is a network of fire detection cameras across the southwestern United States, including California. In 2019, the ALERT North Bay network allowed for monitoring of the Kincade Fire from its start and helped ensure that no lives were lost, or injuries 512 were sustained in the first 24 hours of the fire as widespread evacuations took place.

509 Ibid. 510 Governor’s Office of Emergency Services. (2021). “Prepare California – Building More Resilient Communities.” State of

Ibid. 510 Governor’s Office of Emergency Services. (2021). “Prepare California – Building More Resilient Communities.” State of California. 511 Office of Governor Gavin Newsom. (2019). “Governor Newsom Announces New Partnerships and Tools to Help

California. 511 Office of Governor Gavin Newsom. (2019). “Governor Newsom Announces New Partnerships and Tools to Help California’s Most Vulnerable Residents During Power Shutoffs.” State of California. 512 ALERTWildfire. (2022). “About.” https://www.alertwildfire.org/about/

Hurricane Harvey - Resilience Measures in Subsequent Events

Many residential and small business customers have learned the importance of having back-up generators from previous hurricanes. When Hurricane Harvey hit, many energy customers were prepared with on-site generators. For example, Crocker Moving and Storage in Corpus Christi had previously taken hurricane-readiness precautions that included having back-up generators in place. In the days after the storm, the company was already preparing for customers who may need to 513 have their furniture removed for storm repairs or debris removal.

Generators also play a large role in preventing communication outages at cell towers. Diesel generators are typically used to provide backup power to cell towers. When 95% of cell towers were out of service when Harvey made landfall, carriers such as Verizon provided refueling 514 trucks on standby to ensure they topped off fuel. Understanding from previous hurricanes that the primary reason generators were unable to maintain power to cell towers was due to running out of fuel, carriers purchased spare fuel and deployed extra crews at key locations in the hurricane’s path. As a result, Verizon self-reported over 98% of its sites were able to resume service, including those with backup generators and a command center to 515 assess damage. Note that this risk is specific to diesel emergency generators, which require sufficient supply of on-site fuel to work. Other options that afford greater resilience by avoiding this particular risk include

Preparing Strategically Deployed Generators Verizon transformed lessons learned from previous hurricanes to methodically dispatch spare fuel and crews to key locations in the hurricane’s path, allowing a self-reported 98% of sites to resume service.

on-site fuel to work. Other options that afford greater resilience by avoiding this particular risk include natural gas fuel cell backup generators, solar PV, and hybrid systems.

In 2017, wireless carriers in Florida noted that there was no regulatory requirement that mandated how much of telecommunications infrastructure must maintain minimum standards for backup power. Regina Costa, chair of the telecommunications committee of the National Association of State Utility Advocates, reported in an interview that having infrastructure reliant only on 516 commercial power can become a liability during natural disasters or even cyberattacks. Furthermore, diesel prices significantly increased, in part due to transportation challenges in the wake of the storm. In subsequent events, carriers can investigate hosting diverse fuel types to provide increased resilience.

In the last several years, other states have proposed or adopted requirements for backup power using a variety of state authorities and commissions. In 2019, California State Senate Bill 431 (SB431) was introduced to obligate carrier companies to provide battery backup to their cell towers

513 Ali Montag. (2017). “These small businesses in Texas are bracing to help others rebuild after Hurricane Harvey”. https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/25/small-business-owners-get-ready-for-hurricaneharvey.html?msclkid=cf4ea673caea11ecb60f1fc2736f9664 514 Worldwide Power Products. “How Did Backup Generators Keep Cell Phones Working During Hurricane Harvey?”.

harvey.html?msclkid=cf4ea673caea11ecb60f1fc2736f9664 514 Worldwide Power Products. “How Did Backup Generators Keep Cell Phones Working During Hurricane Harvey?”. https://www.wpowerproducts.com/news/generator-role-helping-cell-towers-duringharvey/?msclkid=b860d0becbb611ec934603e0745b9ea2 515 John Eggerton. (2018). “Verizon Offers communications Help to Harvey-Affected Customers”. Broadcasting+Cable.

harvey/?msclkid=b860d0becbb611ec934603e0745b9ea2 515 John Eggerton. (2018). “Verizon Offers communications Help to Harvey-Affected Customers”. Broadcasting+Cable. https://www.nexttv.com/news/verizon-offers-communications-help-harvey-affected-customers-168167 516 Marguerite Reardon. (2017). “How the wireless carriers fared during Hurricane Harvey”. CNET.

516 Marguerite Reardon. (2017). “How the wireless carriers fared during Hurricane Harvey”. CNET. https://www.cnet.com/tech/mobile/hurricane-harvey-phone-service/?msclkid=4d9fd460cbcd11ec8e4d2ef51337e266

517 and issue warnings to cellular users when backup is running low. However the bill became inactive 2020 and thus can take no further action.

Nevertheless in 2021, the CPUC issued Decision 21-02-029 to require all cell towers to have a minimum of 72-hours of emergency backup power for all facilities in Tier 2 (elevated risk) and Tier 3 518 (extreme risk) High Fire Threat Districts (HFTDs). Furthermore, this decision requires all wireline providers to submit annual Emergency Operations Plans and Resiliency Plans. All facilities in Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTDs must have the minimum backup power by August 2022. As of April 2022, 77% of all facilities had between 1 – 72 hours of backup power, 10% exceeding 72 hours, and 14% with no 519 backup power.

The U.S. Department of Energy’s National Renewable Energy Lab (NREL) fact sheet on Fuel Cells for Backup Power in Telecommunications Facilities indicates that fuel cells provide the best option for backup power to cell towers when considering the objectives of reliability, lifespan environmental impact and operations and maintenance 520 costs. Integrating hydrogen into the energy system is an integral part of SoCalGas’s longterm strategy, including the use of hydrogen 521 fuel cells in its H2 Hydrogen Home Project. Several manufacturers, such as GenSure, already offer hydrogen fuel cell based backup 522 power systems for critical services.

Hydrogen Supports Resilience for Cell Phone Towers

Cell phone towers are critical for managing and recovering from extreme events and fuel cells are particularly suited as backup generation for cell phone towers. The increasing integration of hydrogen into the energy system will help improve the resilience of telecommunications.

Hurricane Michael - Resilience Measures in Subsequent Events

As a result of the pandemic, there has been a tremendous uptick in purchases of residential emergency generators due to concerns about having to potentially evacuate to a crowded location. Dale Calhoun noted more electric co-ops are offering financing programs for backup generators to support the increasing number of remote employees working from residential areas brought on by the pandemic. Those programs were oversubscribed, with demand exceeding supply. This demand is further exacerbated by newer homes built to recent, more robust, construction standards, so people are more likely to want to ride out a storm in their homes rather than evacuate, increasing the demand for backup generation.

517 California Legislative Information. (2022). “SB-431 Telecommunications service: backup electrical supply rules.” https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billStatusClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200SB431 518 California Public Utilities Commission. (2021). “Decision Adopting Wireline Provider Resiliency Strategies.” R-18-03-011.

https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billStatusClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200SB431 518 California Public Utilities Commission. (2021). “Decision Adopting Wireline Provider Resiliency Strategies.” R-18-03-011. https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M366/K625/366625041.PDF 519 California Public Utilities Commission. (2022). “Wireline Resiliency - Service Quality & ETC”. https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-

https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M366/K625/366625041.PDF 519 California Public Utilities Commission. (2022). “Wireline Resiliency - Service Quality & ETC”. https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/- /media/cpuc-website/divisions/communications-division/meeting-documents/wireline-resiliency/webinar_wirelineresiliency-_040722.pdf 520 National Renewable Energy Laboratory. (2009). “Fuel Cells for Backup Power in Telecommunications Facilities.”

resiliency-_040722.pdf 520 National Renewable Energy Laboratory. (2009). “Fuel Cells for Backup Power in Telecommunications Facilities.” https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy09osti/44520.pdf 521 Southern California Gas Company. (2022). “Aspire 2045 SoCalGas Sustainability Strategy.”

521 Southern California Gas Company. (2022). “Aspire 2045 SoCalGas Sustainability Strategy.” https://www.socalgas.com/sites/default/files/2022-01/SoCalGas_Sustainability_Strategy-final.pdf 522 Plug. (2022). “Scalable Backup Power for Critical Applications.” https://www.plugpower.com/fuel-cell-power/gensurebackup-power/ 523 Personal interview with Dale Calhoun. 2022.

backup-power/ 523 Personal interview with Dale Calhoun. 2022.

While backup generators provide important power during emergencies, increased usage can negatively impact air quality. The California Air Resources Board (CARB) collected data on portable generator use during PSPS events. CARB tracks the nitrous oxide (NOx) and particulate matter (PM) from various types of backup generator assets. During the October 2019 PSPS events, a CARB report identified that an estimated 1,800 stationary diesel generators contributed an additional 125 tons of nitrous oxides (NOx) to the environment. The report indicates an average exhaust emissions factor of 6.7 grams of NOx per 524 braking horsepower-hour (g/bhp-hr.). Natural gas or propane powered generators can operate with significantly lower emissions of between 2.0

Reducing Emissions from Backup G eneration During PSPS Converting the estimated 1,800 stationary backup generators used during the October 2019, PG&E PSPS event from diesel to gas would have reduced emissions by 70%, avoiding 88 tons of NOx pollution.

gas or propane powered generators can operate with significantly lower emissions of between 2.0 525 and 0.5 g/bhp-hr., depending on conditions and electronic controls. Had the 1,800 generators been gas powered, NOx emissions during the October 2019 PSPS would have been reduced by 526 approximately 70% to 37.5 tons.

California utility companies offer incentives for residential and commercial customers who install onsite energy storage and distribution systems. Customers of PG&E, SDG&E, Southern California Edison, and SoCalGas are eligible to participate in the State of California Self-Generation Incentive Program (SGIP), which provides incentives to support distributed energy resources, including solar

Program (SGIP), which provides incentives to support distributed energy resources, including solar batteries. Qualifying equipment includes wind turbines, waste heat to power technologies, pressure reduction turbines, internal combustion engines, microturbines, and gas turbine, fuel cells, and 527 energy storage systems. The California State Emergency Program, launched in 2021, allows utilities to compensate customers for load reduction activities achieved through reduced usage or 528 backup generation. Additionally, the Net Energy Metering Program allows customers who generate their own energy to receive a financial credit on electric bills for surplus energy fed back to the utility. Energy must come from one of the following renewable energy sources: solar photovoltaic, wind, fuel cell, biogas, geothermal, hydroelectric, landfill gas, municipal solid waste 529 conversion, ocean thermal, or tidal current. The rebate rate is roughly two to four cents per kilowatt hour. These programs provide excellent examples of ways in which governments and utilities can accomplish the two goals of bolstering community energy resilience and reducing emissions associated with energy generation and usage.

Program (SGIP), which provides incentives to support distributed energy resources, including solar batteries. Qualifying equipment includes wind turbines, waste heat to power technologies, pressure reduction turbines, internal combustion engines, microturbines, and gas turbine, fuel cells, and The California State Emergency Program, launched in 2021, allows utilities to compensate customers for load reduction activities achieved through reduced usage or Additionally, the Net Energy Metering Program allows customers who generate their own energy to receive a financial credit on electric bills for surplus energy fed back to the utility. Energy must come from one of the following renewable energy sources: solar photovoltaic, wind, fuel cell, biogas, geothermal, hydroelectric, landfill gas, municipal solid waste The rebate rate is roughly two to four cents per kilowatt hour. These programs provide excellent examples of ways in which governments and utilities can accomplish the two goals of bolstering community energy resilience and reducing emissions associated with energy generation and usage.

524 California Air Resources Board. (2020). “Emission Impact: Additional Generator Usage Associated with Power Outage.” https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2020- 01/Emissions_Inventory_Generator_Demand%20Usage_During_Power_Outage_01_30_20.pdf 525 Kohler Power Systems. “Gas Generator Set Performance Characteristics”. Webpage.

01/Emissions_Inventory_Generator_Demand%20Usage_During_Power_Outage_01_30_20.pdf 525 Kohler Power Systems. “Gas Generator Set Performance Characteristics”. Webpage. https://resources.kohler.com/power/kohler/industrial/pdf/GasGeneratorSetPerformance_WhitePaper.pdf 526 ICF analysis. 527 San Diego Gas and Electric. “Self-Generation Incentive Program.” Webpage.

ICF analysis. 527 San Diego Gas and Electric. “Self-Generation Incentive Program.” Webpage. https://sites.energycenter.org/sgip/incentives 528 California Department of Finance. “California State Emergency Program”. Webpage.

https://sites.energycenter.org/sgip/incentives 528 California Department of Finance. “California State Emergency Program”. Webpage. https://dof.ca.gov/programs/california-state-emergency-program/ 529 Southern California Edison. “Net Energy Metering 101”. Webpage. https://www.sce.com/residential/generating-your-

https://dof.ca.gov/programs/california-state-emergency-program/ 529 Southern California Edison. “Net Energy Metering 101”. Webpage. https://www.sce.com/residential/generating-yourown-power/net-energy-metering/getting-started

October 2017 Wildfires - Resilience Measures in Subsequent Events

Additionally, in May 2018, a joint effort between CAL FIRE, California Natural Resources Agency, Cal EPA, and members of the California Forest Climate Action Team released the California Forest 530 Carbon Plan. Citing the October 2017 Tubbs Fire among one of the most destructive recent events in California history and reason for the initiative, the Forest Carbon Plan considers opportunities to establish California’s forests as resilient and reliable carbon sinks by strategic fuel treatments and forest restoration.

Under the direction of legislative responses such as the Forest Carbon Plan, organizations such as the Sierra Nevada Conservancy have funded numerous forest management projects for wildfire prevention in recent years. One such project in northeast California was completed in 2019 in the 531 Caples Creek watershed district. The prescribed burning practices over 8,800 acres were specifically accredited to protecting the Caples Creek area during the 2021 Caldor Fire, when surrounding communities remained largely unburned despite being surrounded by the rapidly 532 growing wildfire.

Other proactive measures include training individuals and community members, which are crucial to resilience during events. The Feather River Resource Conservation District (Feather River RCD) exemplifies the power of advancing organizational resilience and community-based disaster response. During the 2021 Dixie Fire, staff were able to utilize previous training to join on-call fire 533 crews and assist with fire suppression, structure preparation, and cutting hand lines. Staff had joined on-call fire crews with the Plumas National Forest to receive training in fire suppression, including cutting hand lines, structure preparation, initial attack, and mop-up. Additionally, the Feather River RCD was capable of previously providing community members with training to join 534 Forest Service fire crews. This was particularly valuable when the Feather River RCD lost staff due to the destruction of their homes and evacuation measures.

Federal Support after Hurricanes Michael, Irma, and Harvey

The National Business Emergency Operations Center (NBEOC), which is activated by FEMA following disasters or emergencies, engages stakeholders from the private sector and federal and state agencies to enhance communication and collaboration, to help FEMA offices with situational 535 awareness, and to facilitate exchange of information for response and recovery.

In the 2017 hurricane season, in conjunction with other state emergency management organizations, NBEOC hosted voice and web conferences, which allowed for a rapid distribution of high-level information to a broad audience. These NBEOC calls had upwards of 1,000 participants during the height of the storm activations and utilized a structured agenda for reporting, along with a question-and-answer component, and utilized an interactive web-based dashboard where static

530 California Natural Resources Agency. (2018). “California Forest Carbon Plan Managing Our Forest Landscapes in a Changing Climate.” 531 Sierra Nevada Conservancy. (2021). “Good fire project protects Caples watershed from Caldor Fire.” State of California.

Changing Climate.” 531 Sierra Nevada Conservancy. (2021). “Good fire project protects Caples watershed from Caldor Fire.” State of California. 532 Yoohyun Jung and Paula Friedrich. (2021). “These maps show where prescribed burns helped curb the Caldor Fire’s rapid growth”. San Francisco Chronicle. https://www.sfchronicle.com/projects/2021/caldor-fire-prescribed-burn/ 533 Sierra Nevada Conservancy. (2021). “Feather River Resource Conservation District’s capacity for resilience.” 534 Training included Basic 32 tests for citizens to become a volunteer firefighter.

534 Training included Basic 32 tests for citizens to become a volunteer firefighter. 535 FEMA. “National Business Emergency Operations Center.” Accessed April 29, 2019. https://www.fema.gov/business-

534 Training included Basic 32 tests for citizens to become a volunteer firefighter. 535 FEMA. “National Business Emergency Operations Center.” Accessed April 29, 2019. https://www.fema.gov/businessindustry/national-business-emergency-operations-center

536 information such as briefings or reports were published. There is evidence that in some cases the 537 web-based dashboard allowed for business-to-business mutual aid and resource sharing, though challenges identified include:

Ÿ Storm-related destruction of communications infrastructure impeded efforts to distribute information, coordinate activities, and identify arising problems.

Ÿ Small businesses are more likely to be unaware of these calls and more likely to not have the time and resources to participate.

Ÿ The natural gas sector can learn from these challenges as they plan future resilience measures.

Furthermore, in 2019 FEMA updated the 2008 National Response Framework to include what was 538 learned from the hurricanes and wildfires in 2017. As part of this update, FEMA has established a new emergency support function, ESF14, which “supports the coordination of cross-sector operations, including stabilization of key supply chains and community lifelines, among 539 infrastructure owners and operators, businesses, and their government partners.”

Conclusions

Successful resilience measures encompass both proactive and reactive actions from end-users. Preventative measures such as infrastructure upgrades or forest management can mitigate the extent of the damage faced by communities. During short-term recovery processes, it is critical for community hubs and small businesses to retain access to power to support community members and recovery activities, such as restoring communications, facilitating medical attention, or providing/distributing critical resources. In addition, California is expecting to see an increase in the need for cooling centers as climate change leads to hotter overall temperatures and an increase in the frequency and severity of heat waves—and so the need for cooling centers that have reliable power sources to stay functional during outages (which can be triggered by heat events) will also increase. As such, it is important for utilities to coordinate with community groups that run community hubs to ensure that these places not only provide traditional resilience benefits (shelter, food, water, potentially power or wi-fi) but are also physically cool and protect users from the heat.

Long-term processes tend to focus on rebuilding with larger investments in resilient infrastructure, as homes and businesses that are built to building codes with more stringent standards will fare better than their older counterparts.

The following observations indicate how natural gas can support these activities and bolster utility and community resilience to extreme climate events:

Ÿ Microgrids that rely on one fuel type are subject to risk from supply chain shortages (propane, gasoline, diesel) and resource scarcity (solar panels unable to produce during extreme weather events). Microgrids are increasingly incorporating hybrid fuel systems that provide better

536 The National Academic Press. “Strengthening Post-Hurricane Supply Chain Resilience: Observations from Hurricanes Harvey, Irma and Maria.” Congressional Briefings, January 30, 2020. https://www.nationalacademies.org/ocga/briefings-tocongress/strengthening-post-hurricane-supply-chain-resilience-observations-from-hurricanes-harvey-irma-and-maria 537 The National Academic Press. “Strengthening Post-Hurricane Supply Chain Resilience: Observations from Hurricanes

congress/strengthening-post-hurricane-supply-chain-resilience-observations-from-hurricanes-harvey-irma-and-maria 537 The National Academic Press. “Strengthening Post-Hurricane Supply Chain Resilience: Observations from Hurricanes Harvey, Irma and Maria.” Congressional Briefings, January 30, 2020. https://www.nationalacademies.org/ocga/briefings-tocongress/strengthening-post-hurricane-supply-chain-resilience-observations-from-hurricanes-harvey-irma-and-maria 538 U.S. Department of Homeland Security. National Response Framework, Fourth Edition. Washington, DC: FEMA, 2019.

congress/strengthening-post-hurricane-supply-chain-resilience-observations-from-hurricanes-harvey-irma-and-maria 538 U.S. Department of Homeland Security. National Response Framework, Fourth Edition. Washington, DC: FEMA, 2019. https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/NRF_FINALApproved_2011028.pdf 539 The National Academic Press. “Strengthening Post-Hurricane Supply Chain Resilience: Observations from Hurricanes

539 The National Academic Press. “Strengthening Post-Hurricane Supply Chain Resilience: Observations from Hurricanes Harvey, Irma and Maria.” Congressional Briefings, January 30, 2020. https://www.nationalacademies.org/ocga/briefings-tocongress/strengthening-post-hurricane-supply-chain-resilience-observations-from-hurricanes-harvey-irma-and-maria

Case Studies of Multi-Sectoral Resilience to Natural Disasters CHAPTER 4 |

resilience during disasters. Microgrids that include several fuel types have a higher likelihood of providing resilience during a variety of extreme weather events. Natural gas is one fuel type that demonstrated resilience during natural disasters. – Small businesses in particular benefitted from the ability of microgrids to provide power when the grid experienced outages, allowing them to provide services or even function as community hubs.

Ÿ Natural gas providers can foster collaboration with electric utilities, microgrid installers and community organizations to increase the use of hybrid fuel systems, especially in communities vulnerable to these events. As with microgrids, natural gas can serve as a more resilient and continuous fuel supply for backup generators when fuel scarcity drives up other fuel prices. Ÿ Gasoline and diesel-fueled backup generators are the most common types of generators in use. They do however have relatively unfavorable emissions profiles and contribute to air pollution; utilities can provide support to smaller customers seeking cleaner and greener backup power solutions. Ÿ Natural gas companies can support further deployment of CNG vehicles to support critical community activities such as transiting personnel or supplies during recovery. Ÿ There are several upgrades that can be made to existing gas networks such as replacing underground steel pipes with flexible materials to better withstand impacts from natural disasters like shifting soil during hurricanes. Ÿ Newer technologies, such as fiber optic cables, can be installed near existing infrastructure for a level of data monitoring and control that adds granularity to a utility’s response. This efficiency can aid in faster restoration timelines. Ÿ Increased use of technology such as drones and satellite monitoring allow for more detailed and up-to-date evaluation of vulnerabilities and real-time impacts from disasters. Ÿ Organizations have partnered with local community groups to provide fire suppression and emergency response training to specific communities. Natural gas companies can partner with community organizations to provide information on how natural gas lines may fare during these events, and better prepare local emergency response groups on safety and security during the response phase of extreme weather events.

Case Studies of Multi-Sectoral Resilience to Natural Disasters CHAPTER 5 |

CHAPTER 5

Lessons Learned

These case studies found that natural gas infrastructure and services were relatively resilient to hurricanes, wildfires, mudslides and severe winter storms. Most natural gas infrastructure is belowground, which is inherently less vulnerable to natural disasters than aboveground infrastructure. This was repeatedly demonstrated as natural gas pipelines largely remained online until utilities performed voluntary shutoffs for safety reasons.

However, extreme conditions can affect belowground infrastructure, and such was the case when severe mudslides carrying large boulders in California scoured channels and exposed pipelines, or when uprooted trees in Florida damaged pipelines and caused an interruption in natural gas service during Hurricane Michael. As such, it is important to protect the areas where natural gas infrastructure is suspended above ground such as over canyons. In these areas where pipelines are exposed, there is greater susceptibility for damage. Relatedly, critical aboveground infrastructure should be made resilient. This may include weatherizing wellhead and installing backup power at compressor stations.

Natural gas’ interdependence on other sectors is a greater point of weakness than the natural gas infrastructure itself. For example, ports closing in the Gulf of Mexico due to the hurricanes caused a bottleneck as shippers were not able to export their supplies, putting pressure on storage facilities. Natural gas production itself was also somewhat affected during hurricanes, as force majeures were put into place and personnel were evacuated from production facilities. The loss of electricity due to damages to grid infrastructure created “demand destruction” in some areas where natural gas provides fuel to power plants.

Clear communication and coordination between utilities across sectors and with emergency personnel is critical to a successful disaster response. Utilities cannot operate in siloes and they must recognize their interdependencies—particularly to address any weak points as mentioned above. Electric power is needed to support facilities that compress natural gas, and for telecommunications vital to coordinating workforces and emergency personnel. This power supports fueling infrastructure to ensure mobility for emergency responders and the transportation network to reach facilities for repairs. 540 Portable generators are also often needed when electrical power grids fair during emergency events. Such portable generators can be natural gas or diesel powered. Energy-system interdependency was emphasized in conversations with emergency response personnel. Access to infrastructure must be carefully coordinated when conditions are unsafe, and natural gas, electric and telecommunication utilities must communicate the locations of

Personal communication with CUEA. April 23, 2019.

Case Studies of Multi-Sectoral Resilience to Natural Disasters CHAPTER 5 |

their assets and potential risks to avoid further damage during response activities. Organizations such as the CUEA, in which points of contact for all utilities are brought together and facilitated by expert responders, are an excellent example of how organized, institutionalized coordination can streamline responses and minimize damage while maximizing efficiency.

The greatest impact to natural gas provision during the wildfires came from the utilities’ need to selectively isolate service by turning off the supply to targeted areas affected by fire. This process in and of itself is relatively quick and inexpensive, but the subsequent loss of service may impact critical infrastructure such as backup generators, and the process to restore service is time- consuming and expensive. Shut-offs must also carefully consider impacts to customers, and critical services (e.g., hospitals, generators) may need to be provided a separate source of gas before isolation can be completed. Pipelines must be assessed for leaks or other damages before they can be re-pressurized, and utility staff have to physically visit each house that experienced the service interruption and manually turn the gas back on, and they can only do this if occupants are present.

Additionally, given the relatively coarse distribution of gas shut-off valves in the distribution system, crews must dig new trenches to manually cap lines. A possible response to lessen this burden is to further sub-divide the system so that the utility can perform smaller and more targeted isolations when necessary. For example, SoCalGas added isolation valves during its restoration efforts to make it easier to isolate sections of the distribution system in the future. However, certain barriers will always remain, such as losing physical access to service areas when they are blocked by fire or floodwaters. Increasing the number of valves can also increase the amount of gas leaks throughout the system.

Natural gas contributed to resilience during emergencies. Backup generation during electricity service disruptions is an important component of overall resilience from climate hazards. In most examples of backup generation explored in these case studies, facilities successfully maintained power because of such investments, whether in the form of backup generators or microgrids. Natural gas provides a cleaner source of fuel for backup generators than diesel and can be more reliable than diesel in certain circumstances. Natural gas can be a reliable source of energy over long-term disruptions of electricity service (i.e., multiple days) where battery capacity for renewable systems may not be adequate. Diesel fuel supply can be interrupted by the very climate disasters that created the need for the use of generators because of supply disruptions or the inability for resupply vehicles to access roads. Further, microgrids that include several fuel types are more likely to maintain power and thus provide energy resilience during a variety of extreme events.

Compressed natural gas (CNG) and liquefied natural gas (LNG)-fueled vehicles can help to maintain functionality, especially when access to other fuel sources is disrupted by climate hazards. In the case of the hurricanes, backup generation was a key component to maintaining critical functionality, especially at hospitals. CNG remained online and was able to fuel response vehicles in Texas during hurricanes and California during wildfires.

Natural gas supply is significantly more reliable than electricity. A survey by the Texas Energy Poverty Research Institute (TERPI) found that During Winter Storm Uri, 75% of respondents lost electric service at some point during the storm while only 25% of respondents surveyed reported losing gas service.

The resilience of natural gas is addressed in a 2017 white paper released by the Natural Gas Council. This report found that natural gas can attribute its resilience to operational characteristics such as:

Ÿ The slow movement of natural gas through pipelines (relative to electricity), which gives pipeline operators time to react to disruptions should they occur;

Ÿ Natural gas’ ability to be stored after production, which provides a supply cushion and flexibility;

Ÿ Placing the majority of assets underground and therefore protecting them from weather-related events;

Ÿ Production facilities being largely onshore rather than offshore and therefore reducing vulnerability to hurricanes;

Ÿ Using modern monitoring and remote-control valve technology as well as pressure sensors that all work to quickly respond to incidents;

Ÿ The ability to flexibly adjust flows to meet changes in demand; and

Ÿ The ability to re-route deliveries among multiple pathways as well as maintaining pipeline loops 541 to increase resilience via redundancy.

This strong resilience was also reflected in the findings of the 2018 Gas Technology Institute (GTI) 542 report, “Assessment of Natural Gas and Electric Distribution Service Reliability.” GTI found that most natural gas outages are planned (e.g., natural gas outages are due to maintenance), and that natural gas systems often do not experience outages during extreme weather. In fact, only about 1 in 800 natural gas customers experience unplanned outages per year. For reference, electric distribution systems average one outage per year per customer. Pulling data from the PHMSA, GTI notes that excavation damage was the number one cause of serious incidents for natural gas distribution and transmission from 2005-2016. Altogether, natural gas transmission and distribution exhibit a very high standard of reliability. These results from the GTI study align with our findings in the case studies: natural gas had much shorter and fewer disruptions than electricity systems during extreme events.

541 Natural Gas Council. “Natural Gas Systems: Reliable & Resilient.” July 2017. https://www.ipaa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/07/NGC-Reliable-Resilient-Nat-Gas-WHITE-PAPER-Final.pdf 542 Gas Technology Institute. “Assessment of Natural Gas and Electric Distribution Service Reliability.” July 2018.

content/uploads/2017/07/NGC-Reliable-Resilient-Nat-Gas-WHITE-PAPER-Final.pdf 542 Gas Technology Institute. “Assessment of Natural Gas and Electric Distribution Service Reliability.” July 2018. https://www.gti.energy/delivering-quantitative-data-to-support-natural-gas-standby-and-emergency-generators/

Figure 29. VOLL based on expected disruptions from electric utility and natural gas generator.

GTI Report Results and the Value of Lost Load (VOLL)

The GTI report results mentioned above provide estimated rates for annual outages for natural gas and electric distribution services. GTI found that natural gas is much more reliable in distribution (1 in 800 customers experience an outage annual) than electricity (every customer experiences an outage annually).

We applied the Value of Lost Load (VOLL) method recently used in the California Fourth Climate Change Assessment (CA4A) to determine the economic impact to residential, commercial, and industrial customers (Bruzgul et al. 2018). Using the CA4A data for the cost per unit energy lost by customer ($/kWh), we examined the annual expected costs from outages to three categories of customers: residential, small commercial and industrial (C&I), and medium/large C&I. The chart below shows the results based on a scenario where the customer used electricity from an electric utility and a natural gas generator. For all customer categories, the expected natural gas disruption impacts are insignificant compared to the electricity disruption costs.

SoCalGas’ use of drones and satellite imagery was also useful, as it gave them visibility into areas inaccessible by personnel to closely assess damage. Satellite imagery was particularly helpful immediately following these events, when FAA restrictions prohibited flights from third parties to avoid conflict with first responders’ rescue efforts. Colonial Pipeline Company also utilized satellite imagery in the Harvey aftermath to shorten disruptions in a critical gas pipeline. Such imagery allows for more detailed and up-to-date evaluation of vulnerabilities and real-time impacts from disasters.

Finally, the natural gas network itself can undergo upgrades to become more resilient, such as replacing underground steel pipes with flexible materials to better withstand impacts from natural disasters like shifting soil during hurricanes.

Safety investments in gas infrastructure are providing resilience benefits. As utilities address aging infrastructure and replace bare steel and cast-iron gas pipe, they reduce the potential for water entry and disruption of gas service, making the systems more resilient. Also, the plastic pipe used for many of these replacements is more flexible and less likely to break when there is ground shifting due to water flow from hurricanes or seismic activity.

Diversity in fuel supplies improve resilience. Energy backup systems with diverse fuel supplies such as onsite diesel storage with bi-fuel connections that allow a switch to natural gas will provide greater flexibility and higher levels of resilience. Recovery after an event can also be better supported with more diverse vehicle fleets that include compress natural gas fueled vehicles in addition to petroleum fueled vehicles since petroleum fuel supplies may be limited after an event. The PG&E remote microgrid program which improves reliability and significantly reduces wildfire risk by replacing the overhead distribution powerlines serving small groups of customers in High Fire-Threat Districts with microgrids, uses several resources including photovoltaic panels, batter storage and propane generation for backup supply.

The increasing focus on resilience and availability of backup generation may worsen air quality. As the number of extreme events continues to increase, more residents are installing backup generation in their homes. Since the majority of these generators still using petroleum fuels, it is likely that this increasing adoption will have an adverse impact on air quality. Converting the estimated 1,800 stationary backup generators used during the October 2019, PG&E PSPS event from diesel to gas would have reduced emissions by 70%, avoiding 88 tons of NOx pollution.

The increasing focus on resilience and availability of backup generation may worsen air quality. As the number of extreme events continues to increase, more residents are installing backup generation in their homes. Since the majority of these generators still using petroleum fuels, it is likely that this increasing adoption will have an adverse impact on air quality. Converting the estimated 1,800 stationary backup generators used during the October 2019, PG&E PSPS event 543 from diesel to gas would have reduced emissions by 70%, avoiding 88 tons of NOx pollution.

Inadequate consumer knowledge can limit the ability to reap the benefits of the resilience of natural gas. During Winter Storm Uri, many consumers were unaware that many gas stoves and fireplaces are capable of operating during a power outage, either by being lit with a match or by using a small 9-volt battery to power the electronics. Without such knowledge, some residents unnecessarily went without heat, hot water, or the ability to cook. On the flip side, some Texans suffered carbon monoxide poisoning when they ran outdoor generators indoors. Thus, it is of the utmost importance that residents understand what power source are and are not available during power outages—and how to use them safely.

power outages—and how to use them safely.

Marginalized communities suffered disproportionately. In Winter Storm Uri, the most marginalized communities with the poorest ability to withstand and recover from events were often the communities most affected by proactive load shedding and delayed restoration. Neighborhoods with long outages were more likely to have multifamily housing, more residents 544 who did not speak English, and more people who rely on public transportation for commuting. Disadvantaged populations were more likely to live in older homes with outdated plumbing and pipes. A survey found that 38% of low-income respondents experienced burst water pipes,

543 ICF analysis. 544 Nejat, Ali, Laura Solitare, Edward Pettitt. “Equitable Community Resilience: The Case of Winter Storm Uri in Texas.” 3

ICF analysis. 544 rd Nejat, Ali, Laura Solitare, Edward Pettitt. “Equitable Community Resilience: The Case of Winter Storm Uri in Texas.” 3 International Conference on Natural Hazards and Infrastructure, July 2022. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/357925305_Equitable_Community_Resilience_The_Case_of_Winter_Storm_Uri_i n_Texas compared to 25% of high-income respondents. Low-income respondents were also more likely to 545 have fallen trees, roof or structural damage, and damaged appliances.

Additional Research Needs to Better Understand and Improve Natural Gas Resilience

The list below illustrates areas for further research based on the findings from these case studies and other natural gas resilience work. Note that many of the recommended research activities would greatly benefit from or may even require engagement by utilities to ground them in the realities utilities face in preparing for, and responding to, natural disasters.

Additionally, SoCalGas and San Diego Gas & Electric has sponsored active research partnerships to further its understanding of climate resilience. The company has partnered with research groups th through a project under the Californian 4 Climate Assessment funded by the California Energy Commission (CEC). The project, entitled Potential Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation Actions for Gas Assets in the SDG&E Company Service Area, in partnership with ICF, analyzed the exposure of gas assets in the SDG&E Service Area to climate change-driven hazards, including coastal hazards, inland flooding, wildfire, extreme heat, and landslides and mudslides. A second project, Multi-Hazard Investigation of Climate Vulnerability of the Natural Gas Energy System in Southern California, was conducted in partnership with UC Irvine. This work investigated the climate vulnerability of natural gas energy infrastructure in southern California given concurrent, compounding, and dependent climate extremes. The analysis considered hazards including land subsidence, sea level rise, extreme precipitation, and extreme events.

1. Identify cost-effective priorities for increasing resiliency from natural gas. Additional research should consider the role that natural gas plays in building resilience to natural disasters. Key research questions include:

– Since natural gas is anticipated to experience overall limited impacts from natural disasters, should natural gas service be expanded in order to increase energy resiliency? In what areas or types of usage should this be prioritized?

– How can natural gas systems limit service disruptions during extreme events through infrastructure investments to improve robustness (e.g., increasing pipeline depth to avoid exposure to scour)?

– Which customers would benefit from installing backup generators, and how much fuel should they store on-site to prepare for potential service isolations?

– How can natural gas resilience efforts be incorporated into cost-benefit assessments to understand the cost of investment compared to resilience benefits?

– How does the availability of CNG and LNG to fuel vehicles affect responses considering potential petroleum access issues?

545 “When the Lone Star Froze Over: Winter Storm Uri and the lived experiences of Texas low-income communities.” Texas Poverty Research Institute, July 2021. https://www.txenergypoverty.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/When-the-Lone-Star- Froze-Over.pdf

2. Improve the understanding of how technology can be used and deployed to improve resilience.

Key research questions include:

– What role do Advanced Meters and other technologies such as fiber optics play in natural gas system resiliency?

– Where should technology upgrades be prioritized from a resiliency perspective?

– Is there additional regulatory support needed to ensure deployment of these technologies are optimized from a resiliency perspective? For example, some communities push back on the installation of equipment that supports smart infrastructure. Granting utilities more authority to install infrastructure as needed could be beneficial in some cases.

– Are there specific barriers to expanding smart infrastructure more quickly that the CPUC could help address?

– Additionally, how can acquisition and use of technologies such as drones and satellites build resilience? We observed an example of these technologies at work in SoCalGas’ response to the mudslides. These assets aided in visibility to damages and access to difficult-to-reach areas, and so it is worth pursuing a more robust discussion of how these tools can be used to their fullest potential.

3. Examine costs and benefits of isolating service areas to improve resilience. The greatest impact of natural disasters to natural gas service and infrastructure was found to be the voluntary service isolations put in place during the California wildfires. While an important strategy, the ramifications were costly. Future research into system modifications or other strategies for mitigating the extent of the impact would be useful for strengthening the response to future natural disasters. Key research questions include:

– How might utilities better prepare for the need to isolate areas?

– Is there technology that could aid in the restoration process?

– What are strategies for minimizing the area experiencing a service isolation?

5. Research potential for natural gas to support emergency services. Interviewees mostly expressed a preference for CNG/LNG in operating vehicles and generators during emergency services. Natural gas has greater reliability and pollutes less than petroleum products and

– Which strategies might reduce incidents due to excavation damage (to help increase overall reliability of natural gas)?

546 Gas Technology Institute. “Assessment of Natural Gas and Electric Distribution Service Reliability.” July 2018. https://www.gti.energy/delivering-quantitative-data-to-support-natural-gas-standby-and-emergency-generators/ 547 Ibid.

Case Studies of Multi-Sectoral Resilience to Natural Disasters CHAPTER 5 |

provides the opportunity to use low-carbon fuels with renewable natural gas. Our research also found successes in gas-fired CHP systems and water pumps during extreme events. Key research questions include:

– How might utilities expand access for vehicles and generators, as well as CHP and other gas- fired back up system? The interviewees noted a lack of access to natural gas during extreme events and cited this as the primary driver in expanding natural gas use.

– Given these benefits over diesel, how can natural gas be better utilized during emergency events for generators and vehicles through tube trailers or other technologies?

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U.S. Center for Disease Control. “Carbon Monoxide Poisoning.” Accessed July 8, 2022. https://www.cdc.gov/co/faqs.htm. U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Forest Service. “Press Release: Survey Finds 18 million Trees Died in California in 2018.” Press Release, February 11, 2019. https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/FSEPRD609321.pdf. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. National Response Framework, Fourth Edition. Washington, DC: FEMA, 2019. https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/NRF_FINALApproved_2011028.pdf U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). “US Department of Transportation Resources for Hurricane Michael, Storm Response Highlight Report.” USDOT, October 15, 2018. https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/us- department-transportation-resources-hurricane-michael U.S. DOE. “Tropical Cyclone Michael | Report #5.” US Department of Energy Infrastructure Security and Energy Restoration, October 12, 2018. https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2018/10/f56/Michael%20DOE%20Event%20Summary%20Report%20%235 %20Morning%20October%2012%2C%202018.pdf U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, OAR. “AP-42: Compilation of Air Emissions Factors.” Chapter 13. Policies and Guidance. US EPA, September 26, 2016. https://www.epa.gov/air-emissions-factors-and-quantification/ap-42- compilation-air-emissions-factors. University of California, Division of Agriculture and Natural Resources. “Woody Biomass Utilization Group.” 2019. https://ucanr.edu/sites/WoodyBiomass/Project/California_Biomass_Power_Plants/. University of Houston. Reliability and the Texas Power Grid in the Aftermath of Winter Storm Uri. (Houston: Hobby School of Public Affairs, 2021), https://uh.edu/uh-energy/research/forbes-blog/failure-of-texas-power- grid/content/tegs-report-6-24-2021.pdf Ura, Alexa and Juan Pablo Garnhma. “Already hit hard by pandemic, Black and Hispanic communities suffer the blows of an unforgiving winter storm.” Texas Tribune, February 19, 2021. https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/19/Texas-winter-storm-suffering-inequities/ Urban Sustainability Directors Network. “Resilience Hubs.” Accessed June 4, 2022. http://resilience-hub.org/ USDOE. “Using Backup Generators: Alternative Backup Power Options.” Accessed August 7, 2019. https://www.energy.gov/ceser/emergency-preparedness/community-guidelines-energy-emergencies/using-backup- generators-0 USDOT and Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). “Pipeline Incident Flagged Files.” PHMSA, June 5, 2019. https://www.PHMSA.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/pipeline-incident-flagged-files Valentine, Brittany. 2021. “Cristian Pineda’s death amid Texas’ winter storm crisis didn’t have to happen.” Aldia News, February 23, 2021. https://aldianews.com/politics/policy/preventable-death Van Der Drift, B. “Biomass Gasification in the Netherlands.” 2013. http://task33.ieabioenergy.com/download.php?file=files/file/country_reports/NL_July2013.pdf Venta, Lance. “Hurricane Michael Takes Panama City Off the Air.” RadioInsight, October 10, 2018. Accessed April 10, 2019. https://radioinsight.com/headlines/171070/hurricane-michael-takes-panama-city-off-the-air/ Ventura County Fire Department. Thomas Fire Investigation Report. Camarillo, CA (December 4, 2017). https://vcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Thomas-Fire-Investigation-Report_Redacted_3-14-19.pdf Verizon. “California wildfire network updates.” November 21, 2018. Accessed April 30, 2019. https://www.verizon.com/about/news/california-wildfire-network-updates Verizon. “Hurricane Michael network updates.” October 23, 2018. Accessed April 22, 2019. https://www.verizon.com/about/news/hurricane-michael-network-updates

Weir, W. “When Power Generator Fails, Hospital Takes Extreme Measure of Evacuation.” Hartford Courant, August 29, 2011. https://www.courant.com/health/hc-xpm-2011-08-29-hc-jmh-hurricane-evacuation-0830-20110829- story.html Wheeler, Cole, Daniel Greer, and Katharine Lamb. “The potential for using local PV to meet critical loads during hurricanes.” Solar Energy (2020): 205: 37-43. DOI: 0.1016/j.solener.2020.04.094 Wurzburger, Andrea. “See Photos from the Record-Setting Winter Storm Uri: Its Impact on Texas and Beyond.” People, February 21, 2021. Accessed May 20, 2022. https://people.com/human-interest/winter-storm-texas-snowphotos/?slide=eb22eef3-eddb-4aa7-9fbf-059dfec995f5 Zelinksi, Andrea. 2021. “What Went Wrong With Texas’s Main Electric Grid and Could It Have Been Prevented?” Texas Monthly, February 17, 2021. https://www.texasmonthly.com/news-politics/what-went-wrong-with-texass-mainelectric-grid-and-could-it-have-been-prevented/

APPENDIX A

Research Methods and Sources Consulted in Developing Case Studies

Desk Review

Over the course of developing the case studies, the research team searched for news articles and other publications and posts related to the disasters that would shed light on the impacts to and role of natural gas. The research team used search terms such as “Houston Harvey CNG,” “California fire natural gas pipeline,” and “Florida Michael natural gas backup generator,” to find information on how natural gas played a role across various sectors and responses. Most of the articles concerning Texas had to do with production, as facilities employed emergency response protocols and shut down production days in advance of Harvey. In Florida, the research team found more discussion surrounding the loss of electrical power, as natural gas is a major power source for electric generation in the state; however, such articles dealt with the destruction of electrical infrastructure rather than any impacts to natural gas. In California, most articles had to do with the voluntary isolation by gas utilities to customers. This review also included reading the Natural Gas Council’s report, “Natural Gas: Reliable and Resilient,” which detailed the strength of natural gas 548 infrastructure, the Gas Technology Institute’s report, “Assessment of Natural Gas and Electric Distribution Service Reliability,” which analyzed the high reliability of natural gas transmission and 549 distribution, and Sandia’s report “Natural Gas Network Resiliency to a ‘Shakeout Scenario’ Earthquake,” which looked at impacts to natural gas supplies in Southern California in the event of 550 a large earthquake.

The research team also obtained and reviewed Official Use Only reports from the Department of Energy with mandated reporting from utilities on infrastructure damage, service interruptions, and other impacts from the disasters. While the research team is not able to cite these reports in the case studies, they did serve as a guide, highlighting information that we were able to track down in other publicly available sources and therefore streamlining our search process. Ultimately, the research team was able to find citable sources detailing virtually all information from these reports.

One such source was the publicly available U.S. Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) database on mandated reports for pipeline incidents. The research team filtered the spreadsheet of all reports down to the states affected by the disasters and the years 2017 and 2018. From these results, the research team was able to pull examples of pipeline damage that are detailed in the report. The PHMSA pipeline incident data concerning gas distribution for the Gulf Coast region included reports of one incident for each hurricane: in Boca Raton, Florida during Irma, in Vidor, Texas during Harvey, and in Colquitt, GA during Michael. The PHMSA gas transmission, gas gathering, and underground natural gas storage incident report data included two reports – one during Hurricane Harvey and the other during Hurricane Harvey.

548 Natural Gas Council. “Natural Gas Systems: Reliable & Resilient.” July 2017. https://www.ipaa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/07/NGC-Reliable-Resilient-Nat-Gas-WHITE-PAPER-Final.pdf 549 Gas Technology Institute. “Assessment of Natural Gas and Electric Distribution Service Reliability.” July 2018.

content/uploads/2017/07/NGC-Reliable-Resilient-Nat-Gas-WHITE-PAPER-Final.pdf 549 Gas Technology Institute. “Assessment of Natural Gas and Electric Distribution Service Reliability.” July 2018. https://www.gti.energy/delivering-quantitative-data-to-support-natural-gas-standby-and-emergency-generators/ 550 Ellison, James F., Corbet, Thomas Frank, and Robert E. Brooks. “Natural Gas Network Resiliency to a ‘Shakeout Scenario’ Earthquake.” Sandia National Laboratories, June 1, 2013. https://doi.org/10.2172/1089984.

CPUC En Banc

One of the team members attended the CPUC Fire Safety and Utility Infrastructure En Banc on January 31, 2018 via webinar. This included a panel on the fire threat in California by CAL FIRE’s Deputy Director of Fire Protection and the Fire and Rescue Chief of the California Office of Emergency Services; a panel on national standards and best practices by representatives from CAL FIRE, SDG&E’s electric operations, and a utility vegetation management expert; a focused discussion on proactive utility disconnection with representatives from SDG&E, SCE, PG&E, and CALFIRE; a panel on climate adaptation and infrastructure impacts by representatives from the California Governor’s Office of Planning and Research, Reax Engineering Inc., CAL FIRE, and a Hoover Institution Research Fellow; and a final panel on supporting utility customers in emergencies by representatives from The Utility Reform Network, Cal OES, CPUC, and the Office of 551 Ratepayer Advocates. While most of the discussions centered on electrical infrastructure, the En Banc was useful for gaining insight into the details of the damages from the fires as well as a coordinated response between utilities, emergency personnel, and the government.

One-on-One Interviews

To gain information and perspective from emergency-, utility- and infrastructure-related personnel who had played a role in the response to the disasters, we conducted a series of interviews. We reached out to contacts at Texas utilities and the Harris County Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, the Miami-Dade County Government, Caltrans, CUEA, California utilities, California and Florida water agencies, the American Gas Association, and ICF colleagues with natural gas expertise and contacts. Due to the recency of the events when contacted, many of these contacts were still facilitating the

Due to the recency of the events when contacted, many of these contacts were still facilitating the response and were unavailable for comment. However, the conversations we were able to have with the contacts listed below in Table A1 and Table A2 proved insightful. Table A3 lists the contacts with whom we were able to have conversations as part of the 2022 update.

Table A1. Contacts consulted for the case studies in round one.

Table A2. Contacts consulted for the case studies in round two.

Table A3. Contacts consulted during the 2022 update to the case studies.

Social Listening

We performed a social listening exercise to better understand customers’ responses to the natural disasters and whether natural gas was factoring into the conversations via social media. We also used the results of this social listening to scan news articles dealing with the disasters for details on natural gas. This effort was performed in version one of the case studies, which dealt with Hurricanes Irma and Harvey and the 2017 California wildfires.

articles or social posts that employed them. Those terms were chosen to be excluded because of the types of results being returned by Crimson Hexagon without such a negative string: many articles dealt exclusively with the market-side impacts of reduced oil production during Harvey, or of safety tips being tweeted out by agencies warning customers to not shut off gas at their meters themselves.

Search Strings Used in Social Listening

Search Strings Used in Social Listening (“interruption in service” OR “natural gas service” OR “natural gas leak” OR “natural gas utilities” OR “natural gas

Search Strings Used in Social Listening (“interruption in service” OR “natural gas service” OR “natural gas leak” OR “natural gas utilities” OR “natural gas

repairs” OR “natural gas infrastructure”) AND (“wildfire” OR “wild fire” OR

AND (“wildfire” OR “wild fire” OR #thomasfire OR #LAfire OR #SDfire OR

AND (“wildfire” OR “wild fire” OR #thomasfire OR #LAfire OR #SDfire OR

#thomasfire OR #LAfire OR #SDfire OR hurricane OR leaks OR mudslide OR #Irma OR #Harvey OR #NunsFire OR

#TubbsFire OR #AtlasFire OR #LilacFire OR #CreekFire OR #RyeFire OR #SoCalFires OR #mudslide) AND - (author:@socalgas OR prices OR oil OR spikes OR “safety tips” OR coal OR Trump OR Obama)

#TubbsFire OR #AtlasFire OR #LilacFire OR #CreekFire OR #RyeFire OR #SoCalFires OR #mudslide) AND - (author:@socalgas OR prices OR oil OR spikes OR “safety tips” OR coal OR

The results were filtered by time and specific hashtags to dial in on the posts and articles for each event. For each of the four events, we were able to determine number of posts; sources of the posts (e.g., what percentage was coming from Twitter versus from news sources); the frequency with which hashtags were being used; top themes and topics; and examples of top tweets. See Figure A1 below for an example of the top themes and topics for Hurricane Harvey in Texas. The size of the portion of the wheel indicates the frequency with which that topic or theme appeared in the search results.

Figure A1. Example of results from social listening experiment showing top themes and topics for Hurricane Harvey.

• The topic wheel shows the top themes and topics from the past year. Larger font means more posts used those keywords.

• Subtopics are the smaller rings of conversation outside of the main theme.

• CNP Alerts Safety and Harvey HousWX Stay Safe were the top 2 keywords/topics that appeared in the 311 posts.

• The outer ring keywords connected to the "hurricane Harvey" portion of the inner ring are: Houston, Interruption in service, avangrid hurricane Irma, and natural gas leak.

Source: ICF

Winter Storm Uri – 2022 Social Media Listening Study

storm on customers and understand how those customers responded to the event. Issues of interest included residential customer’s ability to keep warm, cook food, and boil water to make it

interest included residential customer’s ability to keep warm, cook food, and boil water to make it safe for use, as well as the event’s impact on small businesses and the community. The effort was particularly focused on understanding how low-income and underserved communities were impacted and responded to the event.

interest included residential customer’s ability to keep warm, cook food, and boil water to make it safe for use, as well as the event’s impact on small businesses and the community. The effort was particularly focused on understanding how low-income and underserved communities were

Ÿ Wharton County (City of El Campo, TX)

Ÿ Edwards County City of Rocksprings, TX)

Ÿ Austin County (Cities of Bellville and Industry, TX)

Ÿ Waller County (City of Katy, TX)

ICF selected four counties in Texas for analysis based on the fraction of customers out of service 552 553 over the period of the event, the poverty rate in the county, and whether a local gas distribution company serves the county. The study captured social media activity within a 25-mile radius around the cities listed below. Note that Austin County is different from and not located near the City of Austin.

552 ICF used a subscription service to retrieve customer outage data 553 Poverty rates obtained from: Texas Poverty Rate by County (indexmundi.com)

ICF used a subscription service to retrieve customer outage data 553 Poverty rates obtained from: Texas Poverty Rate by County (indexmundi.com)

The analysis was conducted using the social media listening tool Sprinklr, which supports research across various social media platforms. The platforms searched included Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, and Facebook.

Some key takeaways from the analysis include:

Ÿ There was widespread confusion and misinformation about energy source availability and scarcity. Users disagreed on which energy sources and companies were to blame for scarcity.

Ÿ There were many mentions about natural gas availability including personal anecdotes from users who were grateful to have gas appliances, and users that wished they had gas appliances to heat, boil water and cook food.

Ÿ Other mentions included users that had natural gas heating but were unable to use it due to lack of electricity to power the fans or ignition/pilot lights of their appliances.

Selected posts from media platforms are listed below. Our review of such posts revealed the following insights:

Ÿ Texans with gas stoves that did not require electricity to operate were able to stay warm even if their power went out. It is important to note that it is not advisable to use a gas oven to heat a 554 home.

Ÿ Many Texans were frustrated by the government’s lack of cold weather preparedness both in preparation for and during the storm.

The tweets below illustrate the critical role natural gas played for some Texans during the storm.

Melissa H, @mrsviv08

We are now at the point in this Texas winter storm where we can’t let our faucets drip because the water levels in our town are getting so low that a boil order may need to happen. Except some people won’t be able to boil water b/c they have electric stoves and no power.

Anne Halsey, @anne_halsey

8+ hours without power. Luckily, we have a gas stove, running water, plenty of food, and blankets. But the roads are really slick and I worry about those nearby who are less prepared for a cold weather event of this proportion. Y’all hang in there. XO

If it hadn't been for our gas stove letting us warm up food/water in the winter storm this year in TX, we would've been in real trouble.

For people with unreliable electric connections, we need to resolve those issues before sticking to one fuel source.

554 U.S. Center for Disease Control. “Carbon Monoxide Poisoning.” Accessed July 8, 2022. https://www.cdc.gov/co/faqs.htm.

Amanda Glaser, @AmandaL_Glaser

I have had power off and on, mostly off, for 3 days now in 30 degree weather bc TX officials were completely unprepared for a winter storm. I have been lucky enough to have running water and a gas stove, but many are in a far worse position.

Colin Lowry, @colinglennlowry

My >80YO mom sleeping in front of our gas stove during Winter Storm Uri made this lifelong Texan realize just how FRAGILE and DEPENDENT and PATHETIC my home state actually is.

I’ve been progressively disgusted and hating TX since February

Kay Marley-Dilworth, @ATXFoodNews

Next month is the anniversary of our brutal winter storm in Texas, in which at least 246 people died. I made a list of prep ideas, in case we lose power and water again. Thankful for a gas stove! https://amzn.to/3nBDGyl

Jenny B, @JennyLovesBingo

Things suck in Texas right now. I've lived in the north, I promise you this is not the same thing as a winter storm there.We are very lucky our pipes haven't frozen and we have a gas stove.People are freezing to death and politicians are doing nothing. 🤬🤬

Grace Green, @gracefacegreen

after the way the texas gov handled the winter storm I WISH I had a gas stove👀👀👀👀👀👀

Case Studies of Multi-Sectoral Resilience to Natural Disasters APPENDIX A |

APPENDIX B

GHG Impacts from Forest Fires in 2017 and 2018 in California

Wildfires burn biomass, which generates GHG emissions through carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions. Wildfires also damage forests, and forest soils, that would otherwise sequester (or store) CO2. This reduced sequestration potential of forests, which are a large sink for GHGs, can compound the impacts of climate change from wildfires. In this section of the report, we estimate the GHG emissions from combustion, or burning of forest biomass, and sequestration losses to create a total estimate for GHG emissions from California’s wildfires.

(\mathrm{N}_{2}\mathrm{O})

\mathrm{(C O_{2})}

\mathrm{C O_{2}}

First in this section, we estimate CO2 and CH4 emissions from combustion of California’s wildfires. To achieve this, we estimate acres burned, and combine this with the fuel density of biomass and a corresponding emission factor from California-specific resources. The emission factors and the fuel loading information were obtained from US EPA’s AP-42 database555, which lists estimates for wildfires by gas and region. The data source for areas burned was California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection’s (CalFire). The calculated combustion estimates are in line with estimates 556 reported by the California Air Resources Board (CARB).

\mathrm{C O_{2}}

\mathrm{C H}_{4}

Second, in this section we assess the loss of carbon storage potential of soils. In addition to burning trees and creating GHG emissions, wildfires also impact the soil, which in turn has an impact on the climate. Fire alters the amount and distribution of carbon pools in the soil and forests. After the fire, while some of the carbon survives and continues to thrive as vegetation, the remainder of the carbon turns to either deadwood, soot or charcoal. Deadwood decomposes over time, causing more emissions from its decomposition. Soot and charcoal are stable forms of carbon that remain unchanged for a long period of time.

To estimate the biomass and soil sequestration losses regional sequestration loss factors, we relied 557 on a study by the US Forest Service. Here, we combined the area burned with a carbon loss factor, to estimate the amount of carbon pool lost due to the wildfire. The study assumes that California’s pine forests lose 2% to 23% of carbon stored per hectare of forest area burned. We combined the combustion emission method and sequestration loss to determine a net GHG impact of wildfires in California in 2017 and 2018 (Table B1).

Third, we benchmarked the previously described method with a method that combines both sequestration and combustion emissions in a single “land use change” emission factor. For this, we 558 used an emission factor, published by Winrock.

555 EPA. “Development of Emissions Inventory Methods for Wildland Fire.” EPA, February 2002. https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/chief/ap42/ch13/related/firerept.pdf

556 California Air Resources Board. March 5, 2019. California Wildfire Burn Acreage and Preliminary Emissions Estimates. https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/inventory/pubs/ca_wildfire_preliminary_co2_emissions_estimates.pdf 557 Harvey, Alan., Jurgensen, M., Deborah Page-Dumroese. “Fire and Fire-Suppression Impacts on Forest-Soil Carbon.” In

The Potential of U.S. Forest Soils to Sequester Carbon and Mitigate the Greenhouse Effect, CRC Press, 2003. 558 Harris, N., S. Grimland, and S. Brown. GHG emission factors for different land-use transitions in selected countries/regions of the World. Winrock International report to EPA, 2009.

The table below summarizes calculated CO2 and CH4 emissions, and loss in carbon stored in forests 559 and provides comparison to other sources.

\mathrm{C O_{2}}

\mathrm{C H}_{4}

Table B1. 2017 and 2018 California GHG impacts from wildfires.

For context, the approximately 700 MMT CO2e emitted between 2017-2018 using the Winrock land use change method represents more than California’s entire non-wildfire GHG emissions in 2016 562 (430 MMTCO2e). Figure B1 shows a visual summary of the Table B1 results compared with California’s non-wildfire emissions from the 2016 State Inventory.

\mathrm{C O_{e2}}

559 Black carbon from biomass burning (and other sources) may also be a significant contributor to global warming but is highly uncertain due to the many complicated pathways aerosols have to impact climate. IPCC AR5 (2013) WG1 estimates a 100-year global warming potential for black carbon of 900 with a range of 100-1700 on a global basis. Location, surface albedo, and other parameters influence this parameter. Bond et al. (2013), cited in IPCC AR5 notes that “Black carbon and CO2 emission amounts with equivalent 100-GWPs have different impacts on climate, temperature, rainfall, and the timing of these impacts. These and other differences raise questions about the appropriateness of using a single metric to compare black carbon and greenhouse gases.” Due to these uncertainties, we have only reported the impacts from the well mixed GHG emissions here. 560 CAL FIRE. “CalFire Incident Information, 2017 and 2018.” http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/incidents/incidents_statsevents.

well mixed GHG emissions here. 560 CAL FIRE. “CalFire Incident Information, 2017 and 2018.” http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/incidents/incidents_statsevents. 561 CO2 equivalency estimated using AR4 GWP. 562 California Air Resources Board. “California Greenhouse Gas Emission Inventory - 2018 Edition.”

\mathrm{C O}_{2}

CO2 equivalency estimated using AR4 GWP. 562 California Air Resources Board. “California Greenhouse Gas Emission Inventory - 2018 Edition.” https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/inventory/data/data.htm.

Figure B1. Comparison of two methods for estimating wildfire emissions and California’s 2016 non-wildfire emissions.

The results from the combined EPA and USFS method (about 250 MMTCO2e from 2017-18) is 563 equivalent to the annual emissions from over 50 million passenger vehicles in the US.

The net GHG impacts estimated using combined factors from Winrock is approximately 3 times higher than the calculated estimates from US federal data. This is generally because of the high uncertainty associated with sequestration factors of forests. While all factors used were specific to California forests, factors such as forest type, age, and condition of the forest was not distinguished, each of which, can have a substantive impact on emissions and loss of carbon sequestration. These factors above have an impact on the amount and type of biomass contained within the burned area, which influences how much carbon is originally stored, and the shift in carbon pools due to the fire. Fire intensity, air temperature, and duration of fire can also have an impact on emissions and loss of sequestration potential. Thus, the values presented here should be regarded as highlevel estimates only.

563 US EPA, OAR. “Greenhouse Gas Equivalencies Calculator.” Data and Tools. US EPA, August 28, 2015. https://www.epa.gov/energy/greenhouse-gas-equivalencies-calculator.

APPENDIX C

Criteria Air Pollutant Emissions from Forest Fires in 2017 and 2018 in California

The 2017 wildfire season in California was among the worst on record. 2018 showed the greatest burned acreage due to wildfire in the state in at least 15 years. 2017 included extensive wine country fires in addition to those in Southern California. 2018 included Butte County’s Camp Fire, 564 the deadliest in California’s history, and the Woolsey Fire in the Malibu area.

Table C1 lists the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection’s (CalFire) estimates for the number of fires and total combined acreage burned, in fires under the jurisdiction of both CalFire and the US Forest Service.

565 Table C1. 2017 and 2018 California Fire Statistics.

Depending on the acreage burned and type of land burned, wildfires can severely impair local air quality, and air quality throughout the state. During the November 2018 Northern California wildfires, areas in the state recorded some of the worst Air Quality Index (AQI) ratings globally. Emergency room visits spike in regions impacted by wildfire smoke, particularly for populations 566 over 65. Short-term exposures to the air pollutant emissions associated with wildfires can increase 567 568 the risk of exacerbating asthma, other respiratory diseases, cardiovascular disease, and stroke. Chronic exposure to particulate matter from wildfire smoke has been associated with adverse neurologic and metabolic outcomes. Furthermore, carbon monoxide levels surge during the smoldering phases of a fire and intoxication can result in death. Air quality impacts are estimated in this report through analysis of the state-wide criteria air

Air quality impacts are estimated in this report through analysis of the state-wide criteria air pollutant emissions from 2017-2018 California wildfires. To achieve this, we paired the Table C1 569 estimates of acreage burned with emission factors from US EPA’s AP-42 database. AP- 42, Compilation of Air Pollutant Emission Factors, is EPA's primary compilation of emission factor 570 information. We used emission factors and fuel loading factors for wildfires from AP-42, Chapter 13.1, to estimate the total emissions of particulate matter (PM), carbon monoxide (CO), volatile

564 Kasler, Dale. “Worst wildfire year since when? More California acres have burned in 2018 than the past decade.” The Sacramento Bee, November 16, 2018. https://www.sacbee.com/latest-news/article221788220.html. 565 CALFIRE. “CalFire Incident Information, 2017 and 2018.” http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/incidents/incidents_statsevents.

Sacramento Bee, November 16, 2018. https://www.sacbee.com/latest-news/article221788220.html. 565 CALFIRE. “CalFire Incident Information, 2017 and 2018.” http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/incidents/incidents_statsevents. 566 Turkewitz, Julia and Matt Richtel. “Air Quality in California: Devastating Fires Lead to a New Danger.” The New York Times, November 16, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/16/us/air-quality-california.html 567 Guarnieri, M. and John R. Balmes.. “Outdoor air pollution and asthma.” The Lancet, 383(9928), pp.1581-1592. 568 Balmes, John R. “Where There’s Wildfire, There’s Smoke.” New England Journal of Medicine 378, no. 10 (March 8,

Guarnieri, M. and John R. Balmes.. “Outdoor air pollution and asthma.” The Lancet, 383(9928), pp.1581-1592. 568 Balmes, John R. “Where There’s Wildfire, There’s Smoke.” New England Journal of Medicine 378, no. 10 (March 8, 2018): 881–83. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp1716846. 569 US EPA, OAR. “AP-42: Compilation of Air Emissions Factors.” Chapter 13. Policies and Guidance. US EPA, September

2018): 881–83. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp1716846. 569 US EPA, OAR. “AP-42: Compilation of Air Emissions Factors.” Chapter 13. Policies and Guidance. US EPA, September 26, 2016. https://www.epa.gov/air-emissions-factors-and-quantification/ap-42-compilation-air-emissions-factors. 570 Ibid.

571 organic compounds (VOC), and oxides of nitrogen (NOx) for these same two years. The provided emission factors report wildfire emissions per area burned by region. Emission factors are reported by geographic area.

This AP-42 approach is a simplified method and relies on readily available information compiled by EPA. However, the emissions and emission factors for forest wildfires are given a rating of “D”. Thus, the values presented here should be considered estimates only.

We applied the factors for California (Region 5) in units of kg emitted per Hectare burned to the total acreage burned from Table C1 to show the resulting annual, statewide emissions in Table C2.

Table C2. 2017 and 2018 Estimated Statewide Total Wildfire Emissions, metric tons.

For context, these values are roughly seven (2017) to ten (2018) times the total emissions of PM10 from all on-road mobile sources in the state in those same two years572.

Figure C 1 shows a comparison of wildfire emissions of PM2.5to other sources to demonstrate the magnitude of the emissions. PM2.5was selected as a common metric for comparison given the health effects associated with fine particulate matter. Emissions of PM2.5from the two years of wildfires statewide, estimated from the values calculated above, are shown in the two bottom 573 bars. The top bar shows the total emissions of PM2.5released within the South Coast Air Basin in 574 575 2012. The second bar shows the total PM2.5emissions from all on-road activities in the state. Based on these estimates, wildfires should be considered amongst the greatest contributors to particulate matter air pollution and associated public health risk in California.

\mathsf{P{M}}_{2.5}

\mathsf{P{M}}_{2.5}

\mathsf{P M}_{2.5}

\mathsf{P{M}}_{2.5}

\mathsf{P}\mathsf{M}_{2.5}

571 VOC reported as methane. 572 Excluding fugitive road dust emissions.

VOC reported as methane. 572 Excluding fugitive road dust emissions. 573 AP-42 only includes emission factors for total particulates for wildfires. PM2.5 emissions shown here for comparison are

Excluding fugitive road dust emissions. 573 AP-42 only includes emission factors for total particulates for wildfires. PM2.5 emissions shown here for comparison are estimated from total particulate emissions using the ratio of PM2.5 to total particulate emission factors from AP-42 for controlled burning of conifer forests.

574 Including fugitive road dust emissions. These values represent the baseline year, 2012, from SCAQMD’s most recent

574 Including fugitive road dust emissions. These values represent the baseline year, 2012, from SCAQMD’s most recent regional Air Quality Management Plan for year 2016. Values are taken from Chapter 3, Table 3-2. These values include fugitive road dust. More information at http://www.aqmd.gov/home/air-quality/clean-air-plans/air-quality-mgt-plan/final- 2016-aqmp. 575 Statewide, annual emissions inventory for calendar years 2017 and 2018 obtained with EMFAC2017 (v1.0.2). Available at

2016-aqmp. 575 Statewide, annual emissions inventory for calendar years 2017 and 2018 obtained with EMFAC2017 (v1.0.2). Available at https://www.arb.ca.gov/emfac/2017/. These values do not include fugitive road dust emissions but do include vehicle exhaust, brake, and tire wear emissions.

Case Studies of Multi-Sectoral Resilience to Natural Disasters APPENDIX C |

Figure C1. Comparison of statewide wildfire particulate emissions to other California

sources. PM

2.5

Emissions

2012 SCAQMD regional total 2018 statewide on-road 2018 statewide wildfire PM (est.) 2017 statewide wildfire (est.)

• 40,000 80,000 120,000 160,000 (metric tons)

APPENDIX D

Best Practices in Wildfire Risk Reduction

Managing vegetation to mitigate the spread and impact of wildfire, a practice known as fuel reduction or fuel treatment, is a core element of California’s recently expanded wildfire risk 576 reduction effort. This assessment provides a brief overview of current state of knowledge and best practices in fuel treatment for wildfire risk mitigation, both in living forests and in areas of high tree mortality.

Best Practices in Fuel Treatment

Fuel treatment seeks to remove or thin flammable material from vegetated areas that may be at risk of wildfire. Done properly, this can reduce the severity of fires when they occur, allowing for slower spread and more effective control by firefighting personnel. The following are core principles and practices of fuel treatment:

Ÿ “Thinning from below” is a standard principle of effective fuel treatment. Forest managers seek to remove ground-level dead plant debris, live brush, and smaller, lower-canopied trees— 577 leaving in place larger, fire-resistant trees. This practice eliminates “ladder fuels” and reduces the chance of ground-level fire reaching and spreading within the forest canopy. Thinning may also be intended to reduce forest canopy density, decreasing the potential for wildfire spread within the canopy. Thinning for wildfire risk reduction differs from thinning practices intended to 578 maximize a forest’s economic return.

Ÿ Prescribed burn, in which ground-level fuel is eliminated through a controlled fire, is considered 579 among the most effective methods of fuel treatment. This process mimics natural fire 580 processes and restores wildland ecosystems, providing significant risk reduction benefits. However, given the risk or perceived risk of escaped fire, forest managers may choose not to 581 pursue this technique, especially in proximity to populated areas.

Ÿ Mechanical thinning is the practice of manually removing or redistributing vegetation using chainsaws or other equipment. Thinned material (“slash”) can be removed, piled and burned, or redistributed within the surrounding area. Mechanical thinning may carry risks and downsides depending on the method of handling the resultant slash. Redistributing slash in the surrounding landscape may reduce fire intensity in the thinned area, but it may increase spread risk in other areas. Removing slash is most effective in reducing risk but may result in nutrient degradation.

576 California Senate Bill 901 (2018). 577 Omi, Philip N. “Theory and practice of wildland fuels management.” Current Forestry Reports 1.2 (2015): 100-117,

California Senate Bill 901 (2018). 577 Omi, Philip N. “Theory and practice of wildland fuels management.” Current Forestry Reports 1.2 (2015): 100-117, https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs40725-015-0013-9.pdf. 578 Hunter, M.E., W.D. Shepperd, L.B. Lentile, J.E. Lundquist, M.G. Andreu, J.L. Butler, and F.W. Smith. “A Comprehensive

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs40725-015-0013-9.pdf. 578 Hunter, M.E., W.D. Shepperd, L.B. Lentile, J.E. Lundquist, M.G. Andreu, J.L. Butler, and F.W. Smith. “A Comprehensive Guide to Fuels Treatment Practices for Ponderosa Pine in the Black Hills, Colorado Front Range, and Southwest.” U.S. Forest Service, 2007. https://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs/rmrs_gtr198.pdf. 579 Martinson, Erik, and Philip Omi. “Fuel Treatments and Fire Severity: A Meta-Analysis,” U.S. Forest Service, 2013.

Forest Service, 2007. https://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs/rmrs_gtr198.pdf. 579 Martinson, Erik, and Philip Omi. “Fuel Treatments and Fire Severity: A Meta-Analysis,” U.S. Forest Service, 2013. https://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs/rmrs_rp103.pdf. 580 CAL FIRE. “Welcome to FIRE.” Accessed July 1, 2019. https://calfire.ca.gov/.

https://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs/rmrs_rp103.pdf. 580 CAL FIRE. “Welcome to FIRE.” Accessed July 1, 2019. https://calfire.ca.gov/. 581 Hunter, M.E., W.D. Shepperd, L.B. Lentile, J.E. Lundquist, M.G. Andreu, J.L. Butler, and F.W. Smith. “A Comprehensive

CAL FIRE. “Welcome to FIRE.” Accessed July 1, 2019. https://calfire.ca.gov/. 581 Hunter, M.E., W.D. Shepperd, L.B. Lentile, J.E. Lundquist, M.G. Andreu, J.L. Butler, and F.W. Smith. “A Comprehensive Guide to Fuels Treatment Practices for Ponderosa Pine in the Black Hills, Colorado Front Range, and Southwest.” U.S. Forest Service, 2007. https://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs/rmrs_gtr198.pdf

Finally, if forests are mechanically thinned but slash is not removed promptly, increased risk 582 can result.

Ÿ Fuel breaks are areas where fuel has been thinned substantially or removed entirely, aiming to halt the spread of wildfire. These breaks can be strategically placed to protect communities or 583 assets or to provide anchor points for fire suppression.

Ÿ Computer modeling can be used to predict the stand-level and landscape-level impacts of fuel 584 treatment, providing information about where and how much vegetation should be removed.

Deceased Tree Management

Removal of dead standing trees has precedent in wildfire risk reduction, particularly as a means of 585 protecting key areas and assets and reducing the risk of fire spread. However, removal of dead trees does not feature prominently in the literature on effective wildfire prevention practices, potentially due to the fact that the climate-driven epidemic of dead trees is a relatively new phenomenon.

There are few empirical studies on the impacts of tree mortality on wildfire, but in general, dead 586 trees are known to be more subject to ignition. Simulation-based studies have modeled tree mortality, and have found that varying rates of tree death may increase wildfire the rate of wildfire 587 spread a factor of 1.2 to 2.7. A 2018 analysis by Stephens et al. points out that large areas of contiguous tree mortality threaten to create a homogenous forest landscape that will be continually subject to large-scale wildfire. As a result, the study recommends an increased emphasis on the management and protection of living forests, as opposed to a sole focus on dead tree removal, to 588 create a diverse and therefore resilient landscape.

The efficacy of vegetation management in reducing wildfire risk is notoriously difficult to quantify, given that landscape-scale wildfire dynamics cannot be easily studied using controlled trials and 589 that other variables (e.g., fire suppression activities) have interacting effects. However, a collection of scientific research conducted over the past two decades appears to validate core principles of fuel treatment for wildfire control. A 2013 meta-analysis from the U.S. Forest Service found an average reduction of 60% in canopy scorch and 38% in flame height in treated versus untreated vegetation stands. The study also found that effectiveness of fuel treatment varied

Ibid. 586 Stephens, Scott L., et al. “Drought, tree mortality, and wildfire in forests adapted to frequent fire.” Bioscience 68.2 (2018): 77-88. https://www.fs.fed.us/psw/publications/fettig/psw_2018_fettig002_stephens.pdf. 587 Perrakis, Daniel DB, et al. “Modeling wildfire spread in mountain pine beetle-affected forest stands, British Columbia,

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs40725-015-0013-9.pdf. 583 Benefeld, Mike. “Southern California Fuels Treatment Effectiveness Review.” Central Oregon Fire Management Service, n.d. https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5295359.pdf 584 Hunter, M.E., W.D. Shepperd, L.B. Lentile, J.E. Lundquist, M.G. Andreu, J.L. Butler, and F.W. Smith. “A Comprehensive

(2018): 77-88. https://www.fs.fed.us/psw/publications/fettig/psw_2018_fettig002_stephens.pdf. 587 Perrakis, Daniel DB, et al. “Modeling wildfire spread in mountain pine beetle-affected forest stands, British Columbia, Canada.” Fire ecology 10.2 (2014): 10-35 and Hoffman, Chad M., et al. “Modeling spatial and temporal dynamics of wind flow and potential fire behavior following a mountain pine beetle outbreak in a lodgepole pine forest.” Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 204 (2015): 79-93, cited in Hunter et al. 2015. 588 Stephens, Scott L., et al. “Drought, tree mortality, and wildfire in forests adapted to frequent fire.” Bioscience 68.2

Forest Meteorology 204 (2015): 79-93, cited in Hunter et al. 2015. 588 Stephens, Scott L., et al. “Drought, tree mortality, and wildfire in forests adapted to frequent fire.” Bioscience 68.2 (2018): 77-88. https://www.fs.fed.us/psw/publications/fettig/psw_2018_fettig002_stephens.pdf. 589 Omi, Philip N. “Theory and practice of wildland fuels management.” Current Forestry Reports 1.2 (2015): 100-117,

(2018): 77-88. https://www.fs.fed.us/psw/publications/fettig/psw_2018_fettig002_stephens.pdf. 589 Omi, Philip N. “Theory and practice of wildland fuels management.” Current Forestry Reports 1.2 (2015): 100-117, https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs40725-015-0013-9.pdf.

Case Studies of Multi-Sectoral Resilience to Natural Disasters APPENDIX D |

significantly by vegetation type, with grasslands and mixed coniferous forest—landscape types common to Southern California—showing the greatest effect of fuel treatment. These landscape types are particularly subject to rapid fuel accumulation. 590

While the landscape-scale dynamics of large wildfires are more difficult to predict, computer modeling studies have provided some insight into the benefits of vegetation management. A 2012 study from Cochrane et al. used a simulation methodology to reconstruct conditions underlying 14 actual U.S. wildfires and infer the impact of fuel treatments. This modeling indicated a complex relationship between wildfire and fuel treatment, in which fuel treatment activities within a landscape increase fire activity in some portions of the landscape (e.g., by allowing rapid spread through a grassy understory), while protecting other well-defined areas. This finding, the authors conclude, holds promise for the benefits of fuel treatment in providing strategic protection at the woodland-urban interface. 591 A 2010 simulation-based study from Ager et al. indicated similarly that strategic fuel reduction can reduce the impacts of wildfire at defined locations at the wildland-urban interface, but the authors advised to manage the buildup of fuels in surrounding wildlands that could lead to larger fires in the future. 592

Conclusion

Overall, while the science of wildfire management is characterized by need for further research, the existing body of knowledge is sufficient to indicate that fuel reduction is effective and can be used strategically to reduce risk in key areas. Wildfire management in the context of mass tree mortality in particular is an area in need of further study. Natural gas systems could participate and benefit from fuel reduction efforts. Removed fuel (i.e., dead trees) can serve as a feedstock for the dead tree gasification into RNG assessed in Appendix E.

590 Martinson, Erik J., and Philip N. Omi. “Fuel treatments and fire severity: a meta-analysis.” Res. Pap. RMRS-RP-103WWW. Fort Collins, CO: US Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station. 38 p. 103 (2013), https://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs/rmrs_rp103.pdf. Cochrane, M. A., et al. “Estimation of wildfire size and risk changes due to fuels treatments.” International Journal of Wildland Fire 21.4 (2012): 357-367, http://www.publish.csiro.au/wf/pdf/WF11079. Ager, Alan A., Nicole M. Vaillant, and Mark A. Finney. “A comparison of landscape fuel treatment strategies to mitigate wildland fire risk in the urban interface and preserve old forest structure.” Forest Ecology and Management 259.8 (2010): 1556-1570, https://www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/journals/pnw_2010_ager001.pdf.

APPENDIX E

Renewable Natural Gas Potential from Gasifying Deceased Trees in California Forests

In the recent years, California has experienced high levels of tree mortality due to an extended drought and bark beetle epidemics. These dead trees act as fuel for wildfires, inhibit the 593 reestablishment of productive forests, and create a public safety hazard. The Southern Sierra Nevada region experienced a relatively larger tree die-off than the rest of California in 2015-2016, 594 causing the declaration of a Tree Mortality State of Emergency. One potential solution to reduce excess fuel is to utilize the deceased trees as feedstock for renewable natural gas (RNG) production.

To produce RNG, low moisture feedstocks such as forestry waste must be gasified via thermal gasification. Standing dead trees may have an advantage compared to typical forest fuels due to a much lower moisture content. Thermal gasification is a series of processes where carbon-containing feedstocks are converted into a mixture of gases known as syngas at high temperatures and varying pressures. Figure E1 shows a process diagram for gasification and applications of various biofuel feedstocks.

Figure E1. Thermal Gasification Process Map

The synthetic gas produced from gasification includes carbon monoxide, steam, carbon dioxide, methane, and trace amounts of other gases. To produce pipeline quality RNG, the syngas requires other processing such as methanation, conditioning, clean-up, and compression. Thermal 595 gasification of woody biomass has only very recently been implemented on a commercial scale.

593 The Beck Group. “Dead Tree Utilization Assessment.” Presentation, 2017. 594 State of California Executive Department. “Proclamation of a State of Emergency.” 2015.

The Beck Group. “Dead Tree Utilization Assessment.” Presentation, 2017. 594 State of California Executive Department. “Proclamation of a State of Emergency.” 2015. 595 California Energy Commission. 2017. Re-Assessment of Renewable Natural Gas. Available at:

State of California Executive Department. “Proclamation of a State of Emergency.” 2015. 595 California Energy Commission. 2017. Re-Assessment of Renewable Natural Gas. Available at: https://efiling.energy.ca.gov/GetDocument.aspx?tn=220203.

Gasification as a biomass conversion technology for wood waste

596 Utilizing wood waste for RNG offers a significant opportunity for generating low cost RNG. Researchers recommend thermochemical conversion technologies for conversion of wood waste to RNG over biological or biochemical conversion technologies because they allow use of a variety of feedstocks, including wastewater solids, animal and agricultural wastes, and waste paper. Thermochemical conversions also use much shorter conversion processes. Thermochemical conversion technologies include gasification and direct combustion. Though direct combustion is more technologically simple, gasification is more efficient and cleaner than direct combustion. Furthermore, gasification eliminates 99% of criteria pollutants, can be easily scaled in accordance with a biomass collection radius, provides high biomass-to-fuel ratios, and can be stored when combined with synthesis technologies.

Though here we focus on the potential for transformation of biomass into syngas via gasification in this section, it stands to mention that steam reformation can also be used to create syngas from biomass waste. Pyrolysis gases created during biomass decomposition under high temperatures are 597 transformed into syngas using catalytic steam in a catalytic reactor. While steam reformation of methane is currently the most widely used method of hydrogen production, it requires capture and storage of greenhouse gases, while biomass gasification has the advantage of being a renewable energy resource. However, gasification for hydrogen production is limited by the logistics and costs of biomass collection and removal of tars to acceptable level for hydrogen production598

To estimate the amount of possible RNG production from dead trees, specifications of the Mariposa Biomass Project (MBP) were used, which is currently under construction in Mariposa. MBP is specifically designed to use nearby forest waste as fuel for its state-of-the-art multi-stage 601 gasification technology. The plant will produce syngas that could be upgraded to RNG for injection into distribution pipelines. The Mariposa Biomass Project has a capacity to process 50

596 Gas Technology Institute. “Low-Carbon Renewable Natural Gas (RNG) From Wood Wastes.” 2019. https://www.gti.energy/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Low-Carbon-Renewable-Natural-Gas-RNG-from-Wood-Wastes-Final- Report-Feb2019.pdf. 597 Akubo, Kaltume, Mohamad Anas Nahil, and Paul T. Williams. “Pyrolysis-Catalytic Steam Reforming of Agricultural

598 Christos M. Kalamaras and Angelos M. Efstathiou. “Hydrogen Production Technologies: Current State and Future Developments.” Conference Papers in Energy, vol. 2013, Article ID 690627, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1155/2013/690627. 599 United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Forest Service. “Press Release: Survey Finds 18 million Trees Died in California in 2018.” Press Release, February 11, 2019. https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/FSEPRD609321.pdf.

California in 2018.” Press Release, February 11, 2019. https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/FSEPRD609321.pdf. 600 The Beck Group. “Dead Tree Utilization Assessment.” Presentation, 2017. . 601 Simet, Amy. “Planned California biomass plant aims to use dead trees.” Biomass Magazine, 2017.

The Beck Group. “Dead Tree Utilization Assessment.” Presentation, 2017. . 601 Simet, Amy. “Planned California biomass plant aims to use dead trees.” Biomass Magazine, 2017. http://biomassmagazine.com/articles/14181/planned-california-biomass-plant-aims-to-use-dead-trees.

metric tons of biomass per day and is expected to produce 1.9 million cubic feet of syngas per 602 day. Using these specifications for gasification, California’s dead trees could potentially produce almost 8 trillion cubic feet of syngas.

The Mariposa Biomass Project will utilize Cortus Energy’s Woodroll technology (Figure E1), which integrates existing technologies including zero tars, a steam char gasifier, and an allotherm 603 process. The Woodroll process produces a syngas composed of 55-60% hydrogen and 25-30% carbon monoxide. This 2:1 ratio of hydrogen to carbon monoxide enables cost effective upgrading 604 of syngas to biomethane. The simplified CO-methanation reaction is:

C o+3H_{2}leftrightarrow C H_{4}+H_{2}O

Thus, hydrogen is the limiting reagent. Based on this chemical reaction and the estimated syngas production volume, California’s dead trees have the potential to produce almost 1.7 trillion 605 cubic feet of RNG. This is nearly double SoCalGas’s total gas demand in 2018 and 80% of 606 California’s total natural gas consumption in 2017.

While the potential is significant, full utilization of dead trees for RNG production is improbable. Critical barriers include:

Ÿ Limited access – There is limited or no access for large scale collection and transportation for large areas of dead trees.

Ÿ Feedstock competition – Wood waste is commonly used as fuel to produce electricity or steam.

Ÿ Capacity constraints – Thermal gasification technology required to generate biogas from forestry resources has only just begun to be implemented at commercial-scale. According to the University of California, Division of Agriculture and Natural Resources, there are currently only three operational biomass gasification plants in California and all are being used for electricity 607 production. As thermal gasification technologies improve and become economically competitive, we may begin

As thermal gasification technologies improve and become economically competitive, we may begin to see RNG production from dead trees.

Benefits of Dead Tree Gasification for RNG

Ÿ Wildfire risk reduction: Fuel (i.e., dead trees) removal in target areas, particularly in woodlandurban interfaces, is currently accepted as best practice in reducing wildfire risk. Though dead

GSTC (Global Syngas Technologies Council). “Mariposa Biomass Project.” 2019. https://www.globalsyngas.org/resources/world-gasification-database/mariposa-biomass-project/. 603 Cortus Energy. “Cortus Energy.” Accessed October 8, 2019. http://www.cortus.se/technology.html. 604 Bioenergy International. “Cortus Energy produces first RNG/SNG at Koping biomass gasification facility.” Bioenergy

Cortus Energy. “Cortus Energy.” Accessed October 8, 2019. http://www.cortus.se/technology.html. 604 Bioenergy International. “Cortus Energy produces first RNG/SNG at Koping biomass gasification facility.” Bioenergy International, June 8, 2018. https://bioenergyinternational.com/biogas/cortus-energy-produces-first-rngsng-kopingbiomass-gasification-facility 605 California Gas and Electric Utilities. “2018 California Gas Report.” 2018.

605 California Gas and Electric Utilities. “2018 California Gas Report.” 2018. https://www.socalgas.com/regulatory/documents/cgr/2018_California_Gas_Report.pdf. 606 U.S. Energy Information Administration. “Natural Gas Consumption by End Use.” 2019.

https://www.socalgas.com/regulatory/documents/cgr/2018_California_Gas_Report.pdf. 606 U.S. Energy Information Administration. “Natural Gas Consumption by End Use.” 2019. https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/NG_CONS_SUM_A_EPG0_VC0_MMCF_A.htm. 607 University of California, Division of Agriculture and Natural Resources. “Woody Biomass Utilization Group.” 2019.

https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/NG_CONS_SUM_A_EPG0_VC0_MMCF_A.htm. 607 University of California, Division of Agriculture and Natural Resources. “Woody Biomass Utilization Group.” 2019. https://ucanr.edu/sites/WoodyBiomass/Project/California_Biomass_Power_Plants/.

trees can provide habitat and return nutrients to the soil, selectively thinning dense forests contributes to forest health and water resource management, and California’s dry forests are in 608 need of such active management.

Ÿ Renewable energy development: California will need a diverse set of renewable fuel options to achieve its emission reduction goals. RNG can support both transportation fuel and electricity generation, and dead tree gasification can contribute to a portfolio of alternatives in RNG supply. For example, wood waste gasification has become an increasing source of RNG in the Netherlands to both reduce waste burdens and expand renewable energy production that can 609 be utilized in existing power infrastructure.

Ÿ Air pollution and human health – air quality impacts from wildfires potentially pose a greater threat to human health in California than all on-road emissions combined. Curtailing wildfire risks through dead tree removal for gasification could have significant health benefits.

Ÿ GHG emission reduction – a recent report by GTI found that woody biomass gasification had a carbon intensity of 16.8 gCO2e/MJ – an 82% reduction from conventional gasoline, and a 66% 610 reduction from average bio-based CNG. This carbon intensity number could be much lower (i.e., a net carbon sink) when considering the potential for wildfire GHG emission reduction, which we found as a significant source of recent GHG impacts to California.

These benefits should spur expanded investments into dead-tree removal for beneficial end use purposes. For example, PG&E’s recent investments in dead-tree removal for biomass power generation could be expanded to a greater state-wide effort in both wildfire resilience and 611 renewable energy generation.

608 Agee, James K., and Carl N. Skinner. 2005. “Basic Principles of Forest Fuel Reduction Treatments.” Forest Ecology and Management 211 (1–2): 83–96. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foreco.2005.01.034. 609 Van Der Drift, B. “Biomass Gasification in the Netherlands.” 2013.

Van Der Drift, B. “Biomass Gasification in the Netherlands.” 2013. http://task33.ieabioenergy.com/download.php?file=files/file/country_reports/NL_July2013.pdf 610 Gas Technology Institute. “Low-Carbon Renewable Natural Gas (RNG) From Wood Wastes.” 2019.

Management 211 (1–2): 83–96. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foreco.2005.01.034. 609 Van Der Drift, B. “Biomass Gasification in the Netherlands.” 2013. http://task33.ieabioenergy.com/download.php?file=files/file/country_reports/NL_July2013.pdf

http://task33.ieabioenergy.com/download.php?file=files/file/country_reports/NL_July2013.pdf 610 Gas Technology Institute. “Low-Carbon Renewable Natural Gas (RNG) From Wood Wastes.” 2019. https://www.gti.energy/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Low-Carbon-Renewable-Natural-Gas-RNG-from-Wood-Wastes-Final- Report-Feb2019.pdf. 611 PG&E. “PG&E Hauling, Processing Dead Trees to Enhance Public Safety.” 2017.

Report-Feb2019.pdf. 611 PG&E. “PG&E Hauling, Processing Dead Trees to Enhance Public Safety.” 2017. https://www.pge.com/en/about/newsroom/newsdetails/index.page?title=20170503_pge_hauling_processing_dead_trees_

PG&E. “PG&E Hauling, Processing Dead Trees to Enhance Public Safety.” 2017. https://www.pge.com/en/about/newsroom/newsdetails/index.page?title=20170503_pge_hauling_processing_dead_trees_ to_enhance_public_safety